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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Nov 21, 2019 22:47:48 GMT -6
You use this phrase “freedom of speech”, but I do not think it means what you think it means. It's becoming a bit of a trend on Wittenberg as of late. Quasi-Government run forum. Freedom of speech means the government can't prosecute you. You, on the other hand, can just ignore and move on.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Nov 12, 2019 21:54:29 GMT -6
Of course the Free Dems are a team. Before doing anything we propose it to the party. Everything is open to scrutiny. Not everything may get scrutinized, but what is posted on Witt has been worked on or commented on or could have been addressed.
I think this gets lost to those on the outside. Many of us are fiercly loyal. We may debate in our party rooms with each other, but we support each other outside. The thing is, so many of the other parties apply/rely on a traditional hierarchy. Sure, we have a party leader, but they more administer to make sure things are happening. In the very, very (I can think of once) rank was pulled, the person explained why it was done, encouraged change so it doesn't happen again, and opened themselves up to backlash. The person who made the contentious proposal. . quickly saw they were wrong and withdrew. The Free Dems are for those who realize strength comes from a multitude of voices.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Nov 12, 2019 19:41:25 GMT -6
Agreed. FreeDems support tradition when it doesn't hold Talossa back and is supported by the virtue of being tradition. We want to try different things to find the best fit for Talossa, while recognizing that what may work today might not work tomorrow. But let's try to make something flexible enough to endure.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Oct 26, 2019 19:58:39 GMT -6
Lol. You weren't an interested party. The Cort literally left the podium open for months for anyone to comment. After the bar closed, you showed up and demanded service, and are still railing against your own untimeliness. Alex, really. Own your own fault here. I'd love it if you could post to Talossa without lying. But eh, your moral character has been lacking for years. It's interesting that I displayed a generic garment and you claim that it's cut to fit. I tend to believe you But I was actually referring to a different case, one with which you were not involved. I believe it happened after the time you renounced your citizenship and before you reimmigrated. lol You've been complaining about ESB since it happened. It's not a stretch to think that your vagueness here referred to it.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Oct 26, 2019 19:13:53 GMT -6
I've long expressed my frustration with the lack of any actual procedure in Talossan courts. Like, the free for all nonsense we have is exactly why the judiciary doesn't work. You say the emphasis should be on Talossan law and not US procedure. Without procedure, the Court cannot dispense law. You entirely miss that procedure actually *is* law. Procedure is literally I move, you oppose, I reply. Motion fully briefed. Procedure is also how you serve someone, so they know they're being sued. Improper service (a procedural argument) is grounds for dismissal. Procedure is moving to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Procedure is how you draft the complaint and what information must be included so the defendant knows how to respond. PROCEDURE IS LITERALLY THE RULES OF THE GAME. That is what hurts Talossa--that the Courts have no rules. I never said Talossa has to adopt US procedure. But I use what I know. (in the above-referenced matter, Dien and I were more than happy to adopt the US's Federal Rules of Civil Procedure given that he has some familiarity with them (his home state had seemingly adopted the rules for state practice) and I use them when in US federal court in NY.) Some procedure can be fixed through amendment (failure to state a claim if timely). Some is strict (subject matter jurisdiction). I agree that having a set procedure for Talossan Corts would be Very helpful. What is not very helpful is when an American lawyer pulls out an American rule of procedure that most would-be Talossan lawyers have never seen before and that has never been recognized in a Talossan Cort. I also fully understand the need for procedure. However, do we really think that legal procedure in Talossa needs to be nearly as complicated as it is in other countries? Until we get Talossan rules of procedure, could someone produce even a one-page document explaining how they are supposed to operate in Cort? Could the atmosphere of the Cort be made a bit more casual a little to allow for people who are trying to learn? Yet, in the matter concerning Dien, he first used US procedure. I just responded by applying that same procedure to what he did. Do you not see how in my opposition I explained why I thought we should look to the US for procedure, absent anything by the Talossan Cort. Like, I tried to tie to historical precedent (which is what the common law is). In a lot of other matters, I've looked to other countries. Like the suo moto issue or the adversary opinion. Those are ALL procedural issues. Each time I went to different common law countries. But the every day stuff, I'm going to use what I know. I agree that we do not need a civil procedure as specific as the US. I'm not advocating that we do. Also, civil procedure is not a one-size-fits-all. Some parts are flexible (like surviving a motion to dismiss) with liberal requirements; and some are strict (like pleading requirements). A lot can be cured through amendment. But the thing is, quit getting pissy with me because you decide to play a game without any rules, then bring over rules from another game that I happen to play professionally, and I point out how the rules of the other game mean I should win, simply because, again, my profession demands that I know the rules or I will lose my job. Let's draft a straight forward procedure for Talossa regarding pleadings and answers, identify some types of motion, and require any party seeking to move the cort to request permission to do so, outlining what the motion is, how it should be evaluated, and let the cort decide how it will do so in an order that would also function as a briefing schedule. That is, the party does not argue merits, only, "I want to to do this; We can do it this way; he's a legal standard" and the other side can say "I agree with that legal standard" or "I disagree with that standards, let's do it this way." The cort comes back and says "we're doing it this way; file briefs by this date, opp by this date, reply by this date. To me, that's a way to recognize that we don't need a fine tuned civil procedure but allow the corts to address issues as they arise in unique cases.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Oct 26, 2019 19:02:16 GMT -6
That's not at all what happened. Dien introduced new arguments in a letter to the Cort after briefs were filed and I made a letter application to strike as improper. We then stipulated to withdraw the new arguments and I withdrew part of my protest, which literally happens every day in Court. In fact, the actual substance of that case was never resolved. How it went down- I filed a petition but was AG. I appointed Dien as Dep AG to defend the Government. Dien moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, in the alternative, moved for a judgement on the pleadings. I opposed that the former was without merit and the latter procedurally improper. The Cort never actually decided the case. It technically remains pending. (I will point out that I did not except to Dien's alternative grounds for dismissal. This is another common aspect of the adversarial system--attorneys will argue "for X reason, I am entitled to this relief. But if the Court disagrees and holds the opposite, then for Y reason I still get that relief." It's called pleading in the alternative (different than changing a position). You're acknowledging that the positions are contradictory, or one precluded the other, but pointing out that the Court's resolution of one against you means you still win. That is what Dien was doing. Dismissal for failure to state a claim and a judgment on the pleadings are different ways. My argument was that the suit survived the failure to state a claim point, and that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was premature. This is actually how real life cases in the US work out. There was nothing, from a US prospective, novel about how Dien and I engaged each other via arguments, except that it is novel because Talossa has no real procedure.) You can see for yourself here talossa.proboards.com/post/153017/threadUnless you're talking about Nordselvas nonsense opinion. That was an entire mess of procedure. In any event, I'm not seeing where Dien didn't clearly articulate a legal standard and I argued it was conceded. But arguing a party's failure to address an argument means they conceded is pretty standard in litigation, so I'm not exactly sure what your point is, other than demonstrating why some legal training is necessary. I, too, invite everyone to read the briefs to see what transpired. However, here are they key components. 1) V's initial brief, found on the first post in the thread talossa.proboards.com/thread/12190/marcian-da-schir-et-petition, had a series of numbered points. Some of these are factual allegations and some are legal conclusions. 2) Dien responded to this brief point by point in the document "answerPDF." Dien did not answer any of the legal conclusions and instead wrote the following text whenever one of the points was such a conclusion: 3) V then responds with a brief called "Marcians v da Schir - Mem in Opp to Def Motion" that, in part, reads: 4) Finally, Dien filed a response called "reply_memooflaw" that read in part: The Cort never officially accepted this argument, but in refraining from accepting all of V's legal conclusions as admitted, they did so in effect. TL;DR - I did, in fact, give an accurate account of the aspect of the case that was relevant to the point I was making. TL;DR NO YOU DID NOT, IN FACT, GIVE AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT. You merely demonstrate why a lack of some legal training, even if something to practice in Talossan Corts, is problematic. I pleaded an allegation in a petition; Dien used standard responses the followed with either US Civil Procedure or his State's civil procedure; Dien made a motion that has never been made in Talossa and had no basis in Talossan law or civil procedure; the motion has a basis in US and his state civil procedure; his State and US Civil Procedure follow substance in this area, so it was fair to conclude he relied on one of those for how to respond; I noticed the Dien used a fourth type of response in his Answer that is not allowed under either his state or US civil procedure; under both, an answer not conforming to one of the three Dien had also used is deemed admitted; Dien introduced US procedure on his own with his motion and Answer; I simply applied that same procedure; Dien did not rebut my logic; I literally applied the wording of the procedure.
So now, the weeds. First, there is the obvious problem: the Cort never decided the case. Technically it's still pending. You cannot say that the Cort never officially accepted OR rejected my argument. So no, the Cort NEVER issued its order. So no one really defeated my "line of logic." The problem here is that you don't know what you're talking about. Second, this is the problem with you--you claimed I did something that I conclusively did not do. You claimed that someone did something that they conclusively did not do. But you do so in soundbites, and the only way for me to prove that you're wrong is to get into the weeds. So now, most people will stop (or have stopped) reading. And you are believed. Are you taking lessons from Alex? - Notice that this comes up specifically in IV. DEFENDANATS [sic] ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (see V. Opp. at 9-10).
- I could not find a single instance where a party moved for a judgment on the pleadings in Talossan jurisprudence. Accordingly, I argued that Dien was relying on procedure outlined in the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which makes sense given that his home state's civil procedure mirrors the federal rules. Although it is not an exact replication, it is close enough and I checked both. I relied on the FRCP because it's more readily accessible, Dien and I had spoken about it in the past (before this case), and it would not require me to say "DIEN LIVES IN THIS STATE." Really, the substance of the two are nearly identical. Given Talossan' anonymity preferences, I will gladly post links to both if Dien consents to sharing the location of his home state.
- Given that it was obvious he was looking to either his home state's approach or the federal approach, I applied them to his Answer to the Petition. Again, the two are not identical, but there is nothing that permitted Dien to decline to answer a pleading.
- To wit, FRCP 8(b) states: Defenses; Admissions and Denials. (1) In General, in responding to a pleading, a party must: (A) state in short an explain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it; and (2) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party. . . . (5) Lacking Knowledge or Information. A party that lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the statement has the effect of a denial. (6) Effect of Failing to Deny. An allegation--other than one relating to the amount of damages--is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If a responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided.
- To summarize above: Under US civil procedure, when responding to a complaint or petition, you have three choices: (1) admit; (2) deny; or (3) deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief ("DKI").
- A DKI is generally considered a denial, but it isn't an outright denial (there's a reason for this but it's not relevant). The only time a party can decline to answer is if a responsive pleading is not required (e.g. pleading relating to the amount of damages). I am not even making a big deal about specific or general denials.
- In recent years, there's been a trend among lawyers answer with a fourth type: Allege the allegation in the petition/complaint are a legal conclusion, refer it to the court, and decline to answer.
- This "fourth" type of response is a misnomer, and courts are routinely concluding that they constitute admissions. The reason is that, especially under the FRCP, a party must plead legal conclusions. YOUR ADVERSARY DENIES THEM. It's that simple. Hell, sometimes a legal allegation will require a DKI (like if a party pleads another is a certain type of corporation and the attorney representing them is unsure of the type; or for allegations against a codefendant; I'm not admitting a legal allegation against a codefendant, nor do I have a basis, at times, to deny them).
- If a complaint does not have sufficient legal allegations, it will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. If a complaint does not have sufficient factual allegations, it be will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
- Why is this all important? Because of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
- When a party moves, as Dien did, to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court MUST accept all factual allegations as true. Generally the court then determines if, accepting all facts as true, the plaintiff would be successful on the claim. Now, thee is a substantive differences in the standard the US federal courts use and some states (e.g. US uses plausible; NY uses possible). Say all you have are factual allegations, but not a single legal allegation, well what are you suing for? Defendant has a right to know. So you no legal allegations, dismissed. All of this is US civil procedure because Dien used US procedure for his motion and his answer.
- But it's not up to either party to determine what is and what is not a legal or factual allegation. The court does that, and really only when evaluating a motion to dismiss (it does not accept legal allegations as true). The Court will actually go through an analysis on each claim and identify which are factual allegations. It may not identify them out right, but you can generally tell which it determined where factual.
- In fact, I explain the motion to dismiss and why the Cort should adopt the US approach in the opp. By the way, it's a very liberal pleading standard and winning them are not easy. So this is why you need both, because if you don't plead adequate legal and factual allegations, you will lose an opponent's MTD.
- Again, what is a legal allegation is not decided by the parties; the court does that.
- There is no mechanism to deny a legal allegation. An allegation not denied or DKI'ed is deemed admitted. That's a pretty common rule.
- Now, Dean's Answer declined to answer what he decided, on his own, is a legal conclusion. For example, I alleged "The Prime Dictate sets a procedure for the early referendum that differs significantly from the procedure set forth in the Organic Law and El Lexhatx." That is not a legal allegation; that's a factual allegation. That will be an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. Whether the prime dictate sets out procedure is a factual issue; whether there is an early referendum is a factual issue; whether that procedure for the early referendum differs significantly from the procedure set forth in the Organic Law and El Lexhatx are factual issues; whether either the Org Law or El Lex has procedures for this are factual issues.
- In Dien's defense, he included some savings language, "to the extent paragraph 13 contains factual allegations, Defendants deny each and every allegation contained within Paragraph 13."
- So that's interesting, right? Para 13 is factual, so he saved himself.
- But let's go to the another one. Say my conclusion for my first cause of action. Para 26 alleges, "Therefore, it stands to reason that the Organic Law imputes the procedure described in Article VII on all elections held by the Chancery, and requires even those non-General Election referrenda to be held with that procedure."
- This goes to the very heart of the matter, and is the legal result I wanted. This is purely a legal conclusion. I'm not denying that. But it's in the petition (complaint), so it's an allegation. An allegation must be admitted, denied, or DKI'ed.
- Dien's answer, "As the allegation within Paragraph 26 are merely legal conclusions, Defendants decline to answer. To the extent that the allegation contained within Paragraph 26 are factual allegations, Defendants deny the allegation."
- Dien's answer used qualifying language. Had he said, "To the extent that the allegation contained within Paragraph 26 requires a response, Defendants deny the allegation." That would have just been a fancy denial.
- Had the Court evaluated the matter and issued a decision, it should have evaluated whether each allegation that Dien claimed was a "legal conclusion" was either a factual allegation or a legal allegation, and then deemed all legal allegations as admitted. WHy? Dien already demonstrated he understood how to answer a complaint and how to reach US civil procedure rules through his use of same and through his motion and answer.
- On the motion to dismiss side, the Court would already disregard paragraph 26, but being as Dien imputed foreign civil procedure, he gave me an argument--his failure to deny is deemed an admission, so the court must take it as true and deny his motion to dismiss. But Court would disregard that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because it's a legal allegation, but my argument was, as there is no basis to decline to respond to a legal allegation, by Dien failing to deny the legal allegation, it's deemed admitted. Therefore, it should be used to defeat his MTD. Further, it means that a judgment on the pleading should be entered in my favor because there is no longer an issue of fact for which we need to gather evidence and that we need a trier of fact to resolve.
- Also note my argument in response to Dien--those parts of the allegations that are "legal conclusions" are deemed admitted by Dien's failure to admit, deny, or DKI. Those parts that are "factual allegations" are denied. The Court should take judicial notice of that in determining the motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings. Also, really, dude? It was like a paragraph when I was rushing the brief out. I randomly through it in there to be honest. I probably spent more time explaining it to you then I thought about it at the time. I did not actually think, for one moment, the Cort was going to properly apply the procedure upon which Dien relied and to which I cited.
- In response, Dien questioned the propriety of bringing in procedure that had not been previously agreed upon. I cannot say I disagree with him entirely. I can say that, well, what the hell do you call a motion for judgment on the pleadings? It did not exist in Talossan law until Dien interposed it with his answer. So I commence an action and he gets to pick and choose which part of US procedure suits him? Nice Ian, Nice.
- We are talking about a petition/complaint. They must contain legal allegations and factual allegations.
- A legal allegation is, by definition, a legal conclusion.
- You must admit, deny, or DKI all of them. Only a few (e.g. damages) can you decline to respond. It's better practice to just deny or DKI. Don't be creative with answers.
- Some legal allegations are obvious, some are not. Some factual allegations are obvious, some are not. You do not get to judge which are which. The Court does. You must admit, deny, or DKI them. Failure to do so is an admission.
- Here's the fun part-in Dian's answer, he admits, denies, and DKIs different allegations.
- I did not argue that an admission means i'm correct. I said it's an admission to my allegation. In the instance of a legal allegation, it would prove my case. In actual court in the US, I would have won on that alone.
- Let us also be clear, a party is responsible for what they file with the Court. Some arguments, although inartful, will work. But a pleading, notsomuch.
- So let's square this all up--I filed a petition (complaint). It contained factual and legal allegations. Dien answered, in which he admitted, denied, and DKI'ed many factual allegations. These type of responses do not exist in Talossan procedure. It does exist in US FRCP and the civil procedure of Dien's home state. There is no "fourth" type of response. If you do not admit, deny, or DKI, then it is deemed admitted. Doesn't mean it's right, just admitted. If it happens to be something that conclusively proves the other's argument, well, you jacked up.
- So Dien, ostensibly already relying on procedure from the US, gets called out for not doing it properly and, under that same procedure, is to have admitted a legal allegation.
- As it's deemed admitted, there is nothing left to prove.
- So yes, Ian, you did misrepresent what happened. It was not that Dien failed to "rebut" a legal conclusion (he couldn't at that stage), it's that you have to respond a certain way. He did it right everywhere else, but he fell into a trap that's causing some lawyers headaches.
- Further, he did not defeat my logic. The Court never ruled on it.
- You, however, seem to think it's okay for someone who is my adversary in Talossan Cort to bring in foreign procedure without any basis as to why (notice how I try to point to Organic provisions or persuasive authority from other common-law countries when I do this?), but if I turn around and hold them to that procedure I point to an Organic provision as to why, I also try to find support from other common-law countries)
- An attorney does not get to judge what is and what is not a legal allegation. This is important because courts that interpret certain types of motions have, at times, scrutinized one allegation to determine what it is.
- To sum up, and this bears repeating for the last time: (1) I was AG; (2) I commenced an action against the Chancery; (3) I appointed Dien as Dep AG to defend the Chancery; (4) Dien interposed an answer and he moved for certain relief (he actually did not need to answer given his MTD, but okay); (5) Dien's motion sought dismissal for failure to state a claim and, alternative, judgment on the pleadings; (6) neither appear in Talossan law (in fact, I cannot find a judgment by motion on the pleadings in Talossa before); (7) Dien's answer resembled one that I might find in his home state or in federal court; (8) it was obvious Dien was using civil procedure from either of those two, which happen to match, for his motion and answer; (9) I noticed that, applying that procedure, Dien's answer was defective; (10) in my opposition to his motion, which was entirely based on US procedure to begin with, I pointed out that his "fourth" type of answer actually constitutes an admission; (11) the Court never actually decides the case; and (12) Ian utterly misrepresents the foregoing because he has no idea what he's talking about.
Great, so now that it's been shown that you are misrepresenting what happened, we can move on. Next time, do a minute of research before you come at me with that nonsense.
On another note, I should work on my typos. Perhaps I shouldn't draft talossanmotions on my phone? Or posts. Meh, who cares. Different courts. I don't need to worry about things like typos in Talossan corts, right? That's too serious and too American I would presume.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Oct 26, 2019 1:03:32 GMT -6
You speak of "crushing legalism", which I find very ironic, because the very purpose of the judiciary is... legalism. Not sure whether you got that memo? Of course that's true; notice how I said "crushing legalism" rather than just legalism. I bet there are a non-trivial number of people who might be interested in law (myself included) but are scared off because of how seriously all of the real-life lawyers take it. The best example of this occurred in MARCIANÜS v DA SCHIR, et al., when V argued that because Dien (the opposing counsel) did not rebut his legal conclusions in exactly the right way, the Cort must accept these conclusions as admitted and correct (thankfully, Dien defeated this line of logic). This is an extreme example, but there are very few non-lawyers who currently understand the correct order to submit motions, the bases on which to file or rebut a motion, etc. That's not at all what happened. Dien introduced new arguments in a letter to the Cort after briefs were filed and I made a letter application to strike as improper. We then stipulated to withdraw the new arguments and I withdrew part of my protest, which literally happens every day in Court. In fact, the actual substance of that case was never resolved. How it went down- I filed a petition but was AG. I appointed Dien as Dep AG to defend the Government. Dien moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, in the alternative, moved for a judgement on the pleadings. I opposed that the former was without merit and the latter procedurally improper. The Cort never actually decided the case. It technically remains pending. i will point out that I did not except to Dien's alternative grounds for dismissal. I did what any attorney would do, poked holes in it. To be clear, what Dien did was entirely proper, and I took no issue--he argued in the alternative. It's quite common in the adversarial system. Attorneys will argue "for X reason, I am entitled to this relief. But if the Court disagrees and holds the opposite, then for Y reason I still get that relief." It's called pleading in the alternative (different than changing a position that could lead to estoppel). You're acknowledging that the positions are contradictory, or one precludes the other, but pointing out that the Court's resolution of one against you means that it can still grant you the relief on a different ground, or that it means you must win because it went against your other ground. That is what Dien was doing. Dismissal for failure to state a claim and a judgment on the pleadings are different means to dispose of a matter. My argument was that the suit survived the failure to state a claim point, and that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was improper because it was premature. That is, his alternative grounds was improper because it wasn't at the right time, not the fact that he made the argument. This is all pretty common in actual litigation. There was nothing, from a US prospective, novel about how Dien and I engaged each other via arguments, except that it is novel because Talossa has no real procedure. There was nothing novel about moving to strike from the record a new arguments made after the briefs were submitted. There is nothing novel about an attorney making an application/motion to the court seeking remedy for opposing counsel conduct, just to stipulate to resolve the matter without a judicial ruling and withdraw the request. You can see for yourself here talossa.proboards.com/post/153017/threadUnless you're talking about Nordselvas nonsense opinion. That was an entire mess of procedure. In any event, I'm not seeing where Dien didn't clearly articulate a legal standard and I argued it was conceded just to be slapped down by the Cort. But arguing a party's failure to address an argument means they conceded is pretty standard in litigation, so I'm not exactly sure what your point is, other than demonstrating why some legal training is necessary. I've long expressed my frustration with the lack of any actual procedure in Talossan courts. Like, the free for all nonsense we have is exactly why the judiciary doesn't work. You say the emphasis should be on Talossan law and not US procedure. Without procedure, the Court cannot dispense law. You entirely miss that procedure actually *is* law. Procedure is literally I move, you oppose, I reply. Motion fully briefed. Procedure is also how you serve someone, so they know they're being sued. Improper service (a procedural argument) is grounds for dismissal. Procedure is moving to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Procedure is how you draft the complaint and what information must be included so the defendant knows how to respond. PROCEDURE IS LITERALLY THE RULES OF THE GAME. That is what hurts Talossa--that the Courts have no rules. I never said Talossa has to adopt US procedure. But I use what I know. (in the above-referenced matter, Dien and I were more than happy to adopt the US's Federal Rules of Civil Procedure given that he has some familiarity with them (his home state had seemingly adopted the rules for state practice) and I use them when in US federal court in NY.) Some procedure can be fixed through amendment (failure to state a claim if timely). Some is strict (subject matter jurisdiction). In any event,do show us where the Cort slapped me down in favor of Dien's argument.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Oct 26, 2019 0:31:31 GMT -6
We should also have some Talossanized version of some ethical rules; currently Talossa allows legal ex parte communications, for example, meaning that lawyers are actually permitted (thanks to a cort decision) to make private arguments to a judge without the other side having an opportunity to respond. I'm not going to get into the specific case, since that was a bitter disagreement, but everyone should be able to agree on the principle that this is wrong. But these should be guardrails to guide our attorneys and judges, not a rigid rail system that forces everyone off the road. Lol. You weren't an interested party. The Cort literally left the podium open for months for anyone to comment. After the bar closed, you showed up and demanded service, and are still railing against your own untimeliness. Alex, really. Own your own fault here. I'd love it if you could post to Talossa without lying. But eh, your moral character has been lacking for years.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Oct 14, 2019 3:15:02 GMT -6
RZ27 - Për RZ28 - Për RZ29 - Për RS01 - Për
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Sept 17, 2019 2:23:34 GMT -6
RZ24: PER RZ25: PER RZ26: CONTRA (I've already made me feelings known on this)
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Aug 21, 2019 17:15:46 GMT -6
53RZ20 - PER 53RZ21 - Austanéu 53RZ22 - PER 53RZ23 - PER
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Aug 14, 2019 12:09:36 GMT -6
But isn't that what Constitutions DO, "to tie the hands of citizens today"? (Also elections, and laws, and appointments ...) Stable countries don't change their Constitutions in a moment, or without quite a bit of difficulty, even if the Constitution was enacted "several years ago". — John R Well, no: that is not what they do. A Constitution is only a body of laws, but it is a body of laws that (by agreement) are slow, but not impossible, to change. A Constitution is a base set - firm, but not immovable. If a constitution cannot be changed, and the people wish it to be changed, then (as history has shown in many countries) there is a revolution of some sort. The citizens' hands are not tied - must never in democracy be tied - but are slowed down when changing these base laws. Tied hands means oppression from the past. We must learn from the past, but we must not be limited by it to the detriment of freedom. ...and some very stable countries do not even have a constitution - the United Kingdom, for example. ...and the Constitution of the USA has been amended twenty-seven times. To piggy back off of this point, the amount of amendments to the US Constitution tend to occur in groups, with periods of no amendments. Amendments 01-12: 1791-1804 Amendments 13-15: 1865-1870 Amendments 16-21: 1913-1933 Amendments 22-26: 1951-1971 (with at least one amendment per decade) Amendment 27: 1992 Further, while amendments themselves require a lot of steam and politics, the submitted to ratified period is anywhere from 100 days to just shy of 4 years, with the average being 1.5 years. The outlier, of course, is the 27th Amendment, which was submitted on September 25, 1789 and ratified on May 5, 1992 (202 years, 223 days). In the US context, amendments are not usually something that happens overnight, but the point at which they are submitted and ratified is a lot quicker than people would expect. Further, most of the amendments respond to issues the US faced that the wording of the constitution did not then address. Also I point out, the 26th Amendment only took 100 days to be ratified. All of this to say--a constitution should not be tinkered with constantly. It should be functional and adapt to the changing needs of society while setting the basic parameters for the State to govern. It should be interpreted based on the living tree doctrine so it can evolve with society. Changing it should only be done to remedy a deficiency, clarify an issue, protect further rights, or update it when the text cannot address an issue impacting society. And sometimes, we realize the constitution won't work even if amended (see e.g. the articles of confederation), and we need an entirely new constitution. It should not be easy, but it should also not go at a snail's pace simply because one person disagrees. In the current context, the issue has been before the Nimlet twice. The second time, passing overwhelmingly. The people should now be asked whether they wish to maintain their current constitution or adopt a new one in a merged province. This is a slow process that has been debated and even litigated. This is not a constitution that is being changed in a moment and without much difficulty (John saw fit to the latter point). Finally, constitutions are not meant to "tie the hands of the citizens." That's textualist nonsense. Constitutions create the system for the State to functions, and sets limits on what the State can and cannot do. They should always be interpreted as expansive of the people's rights, not to bind them to the moralities of yesteryear.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Aug 9, 2019 7:26:33 GMT -6
We could pass an Organic amendment that sets certain parameters for provincial governments. For instance, per the US Constitution, all states must haves republican form of government. So New York can't decide to become a constitutional monarchy. In turn, we could set a parameters that all provinces must adhere to the principles of democracy with final recourse to always be held by the people except as it concerns the rights expressed in the covenants (ie the people always have the final say, no matter what you try to do, unless they are trying to impede cov rights)
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Aug 4, 2019 20:11:12 GMT -6
Because we are going strictly by the rules now--I do not know if the request by King John for the Cort to instruct the Senechal, Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN, to refrain from making political speeches in Cort concerned a speech in this thread or if she made one in a proceeding, but, if the former, I would point out that this thread is technically not in a "Cort." The "Rules of the Courtroom" (est. 2006) are the only somewhat relevant rules that I could find ( perhaps there are some elsewhere I don't know about?) that offer some guidance. But they only address conduct in a courtroom. They do use broad "in this board" but that would always require an invitation by the Cort, but that was abrogated with the "Process for Filing Legal Business" rules posted by in 2012. So those rules recognize that not every thread is a "courtroom" per se, and that posts there are in the virtual "Clerk's office." So the Rules of the Courtroom are not applicable. With the forums taking the place of physical buildings that exist in other countries, sometimes it's good to visualize where a post would have been made if done in an actual brick and mortar building. On one hand, we can say that the post was made on the courthouse steps, which, depending on the court, one can do outside of Talossa. On the other hand, one could view this thread as being made in the clerks office, for which we have no rules as to what can and cannot be said. But given that the rules only allow those invited by the cort to post in the courtrooms, and the rules permit a person to file their complaint in a thread in this board, then it is safe to say that the rules recognize the difference between threads that are virtual courtrooms and threads that aren't. Accordingly, this thread was not started in any particular "Cort" (i.e. the Uppermost Cort or the Magistrate Cort). So I do not believe that the King's request is appropriate. Further, Justice dal Nordselvă's "proceed with caution" is out of place and is an unenforceable threat. There's no rules, statutory or otherwise (unless they're somewhere else), that says that the Senechal (or anyone else for that matter) cannot make a speech in a thread on this board, and there's no authority for a judge to impose some penalty. Do not confuse my post--I am supportive of updated rules to preclude political or all non-case-related speeches anywhere in the courthouse, which other courts have. Rather, being as we are going to go by the exact letter of the rules (or the law), Miestra did not breach any rule or law and the Justice lacks any authority to punish her (or even me for this post).
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Aug 4, 2019 19:37:44 GMT -6
During my last trip to London, I took the train out to have a pint with Ian. I had completely forgotten about the Zog Salute (I've not done it or seen others do it in the few times I've met Talossans in person). Anyway, as the cab pulled up to the pub, Ian and I recognized each other. But in the quick course of events, I turned to pay the driver, and I saw Ian do the salute in the corner of my eye. It took me a moment to remember the salute.
That said, having completely forgotten about it and seeing it in person, we probably should do away with it. I agree with AD that it can be easily misunderstood.
In any event, you probably wouldn't know a Talossan if they passed you on the street if you haven't met them in person before (unless you saw their photograph and have an excellent memory). If you're meeting up with a Talossan, however, then it's pretty much like any other "meet someone off the internet" situation.
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