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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Feb 29, 2020 11:40:14 GMT -6
Without stating my position on the issue, the SoS has discretion to act within a reasonable interpretation of the law. If that interpretation is determined wrong, but reasonable, then the SOS acted, IMO, properly. That is to say, a wrong interpretation of the law can still be reasonable. We should encourage reasonableness, and we should also permit the SOS some latitude on how to perform their duties. Removing an SOS for wrongly, but reasonably, interpreting a law, without any final guidance from the Ziu or Organic Law or Corts, for me, would severely hurt Talossa. The State functions and grows positively when we are not drones, but permitted to perform our jobs with the latitude necessary for reasonable disagreement, provided there are channels for remedy and final resolution.
Nothing above indicates my thoughts on the issue, only that I think Glüc, without stating whether I think any interpretation is reasonable, does an excellent job at trying to perform his duties reasonably, even when I have disagreed with him in the past. He's also, generally speaking, really good about raising potential issues or stating how he will perform a duty in advance. I do not get the impression the Seneschal intends to remove him, but I just wanted to publicly state that, from what I can tell, he performs his job timely, to the best of his ability, and within how he understands the Law, the latter of which he tends to explain well beforehand. So maybe some of us could reflect a little bit, consider the full picture, and reconsider advising, implicitly or otherwise, for his removal?
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Feb 26, 2020 14:16:39 GMT -6
Okay, sorry, I misunderstood. I can get behind consistency.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Feb 26, 2020 10:28:43 GMT -6
That's not to say I like 2.3.2.1. I would prefer a uniform system 1.A.i.c, for example, so we'd always know 1 is the top level, A is the first sub, Roman is the second sub, and lower case letter is lowest sub (I don't think we should encourage a fifth layer; even four is pushing it)
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Feb 26, 2020 7:05:47 GMT -6
Can you get rid of the lettered subsections so it is just one section? Why are you so against subsections? They're actually quite useful and easy to follow if done right. One large section is cumbersome to read.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Feb 17, 2020 14:31:58 GMT -6
RZ 5 - Për RZ 6 - Për RZ 7 - Contrâ RZ 8 - Për RZ 9 - Për RZ 10 - Për RZ 11 - Për RZ 12 - Për RZ 13 - Për
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 30, 2020 21:38:55 GMT -6
Fellow Vuodians and Dandenburgers,
It occurs to me that some have raised once more the idea of merging our province with M-M.
On prior occasions, I have come out against this proposal. But we are a small province that lacks sufficient numbers to form a fully functional provinicial government. Perhaps we should reconsider the issue.
I find myself growingly sympathetic to a merger. So let us, and only those in this province, have an honest discussion about whether we desire to maintain the status quo or think our future interest entails merger.
What are the pros? What are the cons? Discuss.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 30, 2020 18:33:51 GMT -6
I can't with the name of this bill. Hahaha
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 27, 2020 20:50:40 GMT -6
I thank the kind words of Sen del Val. And please use his edits for the motion. :-)
Naturally, I vote Per.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 27, 2020 15:24:05 GMT -6
Mx. Chair:
Please allow the following to amend my motion:
In accord with Rule 23 of the Set Rules for the Public Hearing of Viteu Marcianüs ("Set Rules"), I hereby move for an immediate adjournment of this Committee, and upon said adjournment, to adopt and publish the following report to the Senate, "The Committee of the Whole House has considered the nomination of S:reu Viteu Marcianüs to the position of Justice of the Uppermost Cort of Talossa, and have considered such, recommend S:reu Marcianüs for the position of Justice of the Uppermost Cort of Talossa."
Thank you,
V
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 27, 2020 14:11:48 GMT -6
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 26, 2020 12:33:13 GMT -6
Follow-up questions and clarifications:
No. 17 – I see no reason why cort proceedings should not be translated. Who should translate them I do not know. There is an obvious issue of person power. If the Government wants to encourage use, it should have in place ways for proceedings to be translated. It may be too much for the Cort or its staff to do it, but it could outsource it to another State organ or private entity. Until we have more speakers who can verify accurate translations, I think we should hold off on “official” effect of those matters translated.
No. 23 – If the parties and judges in an action are open to teleconferencing, I, personally, would relish holding some hearings that way. If for no other reason than a one hour teleconference may serve to speed things along. Decisions should *always* be reduced to writing. A bench decision requires an official transcript for appeals.
No. 31. – I applaud the Chair’s meticulous planning of this hearing. The rules were set beforehand, and everyone has done a stellar job at trying, to the best of their ability, to respect the rules and the process. But this is new and it could be refined. To circle back to supplemental No. 23, imagine how much faster this could have gone if you and I had done it by teleconference. But that in and of itself requires some planning on our end, and then people have to watch/listen. But in any event, I think these should become standard practice. The only way to truly require them is to make an Organic Amendment, which I presently do not support (non-Talossan life time is a thing). But let’s play this out for a moment. The Senate and the Cosa can have standing rules, but it cannot bind itself prospectively absent an Organic Amendment. If it did, then we run the risk of failure to adhere to an explicit requirement rendering a nominee’s otherwise legitimate appointment null and void. On the other hand, if only standing rules, and the Senate diverges, who would determine to what extent that impacts the Organic requirements? It’s necessarily a political question that the Cort should never touch. I would say that it would not impact the nominee because it is not Organically required. But I think convention should be established, and I hope this hearing serves as the predicate, for all nominees to undergo a hearing. Finally, there is nothing stopping the Cosa from doing something similar, but I am mindful that a nominee may not want to submit, and understandably so, to the Cosa and Senate hosting separate hearings. I would propose following the outline in this hearing—convention favors the Senate conducting a hearing with a liberal approach to “guests” asking questions. I do think time for questions should refined, but I am unsure what can be done differently.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 26, 2020 12:17:44 GMT -6
Quick addendum to No. 14:
The dissent in Petition for Declarative Relief – Application of 47RZ28 hits the nail on the head. That said, the dissent’s reasoning is not necessarily at odds with the majority opinion. In any event, what constitutes a proclamation within the meaning of the Organic law is what was actually at issue. The majority was of the mind that by allowing the King to “proclaim” an amendment gave rise to an implicit ability to “veto” an amendment. The dissent means to require an “affirmative act of not proclaiming” to exercise that veto. The majority in Petition for Injunctive Relief – re: OrgLaw Amendment (UC) adopts the dissent’s approach while tracking with the prior conclusion—it is settled that the King may veto an organic amendment, but that veto must be an affirmative act. In the prior instance, the King’s affirmative act to withhold proclamation was the veto; in the second instance, “the existence or absence of an explicit proclamation does not prevent its application and enforceability.” In other words, the King may withhold proclamation, but that cannot be implied. The King’s affirmative act rebuts presumed proclamation.
The Cort did not hurt stare decisis because it expanded and clarified its prior holding. The first instance acknowledged the Organic right of the King to veto amendments; the second instances explained the outer limits of the right. It did not unsettled law, but fortified it further.
As an aside--It may be beneficial for Talossan Corts to normalize case captions. This should be the Cort's prerogative, for those wondering. (Perhaps there is a guide somewhere to which I am ignorant.)
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 26, 2020 11:42:16 GMT -6
Senator del Val: Thank you for your patience.
Getting directly to your questions:
(1) Favorite flavor=vanilla; iced cream= soft serve
(2) Winning some dispositive motions, an appeal, and closing about five other matters with highly favorable results in a two week span.
(3) The role of the courts in merged, common-law systems is to effect justice. The law comes from several sources: constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and the common law. Equity is the inherent power of the court to ensure that strict application of the law does not result in a severe injustice. However, equity becomes law per se when it becomes common enough to be standardized. In any event, law + equity = justice.
(4) Courts enjoy broad discretion within the confines of the law to effectuate justice. A judge may absolutely go too far when they render a decision that, essentially, obviates something like a statute. In many instances, the judge is acting in an outcome driven manner and ignoring why the law exists. The judge has become an advocate for one position instead of the neutral arbiter. As I mentioned above, equity comes in when there is a severe injustice, not just because there might be some injustice. So when a judge completely relies on “equity” when there is no real cause for it, or without a sound explanation as to what injustice the party has faced, they abuse their discretion. A certain high profile case is a clear example of this. The court, unequivocally and undeniably, abused its discretion in testing the legal sufficiency of the charging documents.
(5) See my answer to no. 4. But generally, when the court’s decision is patently unreasonable, erroneous, capricious, or arbitrary. The Law and facts do not support the conclusion. When comparable cases have resulted in another result that is diametrically opposite and irreconcilable with the court’s decision in the instant matter without any dispositive distinguishing circumstance.
(6) None directly. Talossa should not get in the business of sanctioning judges based on decisions. Generally, appellate courts serve to remedy these mistakes. Judges are humans and make mistakes. I am of the mind that sanctions or censure would undermine the independence of the judiciary and call into question whether it should be followed. Such would eat away at the Rule of Law. I fear that partisan politics may begin to play significant roles in judicial opinions. People tend to think exceptions are the rule and do not care much for nuance. But I do think that judges should, in some regards, be held accountable. Balancing these concerns, I think terms with renewal procedure, as proposed in the recent judiciary amendment, gives Talossa a way to get rid of an errant judge without calling the entire judiciary into question.
(7) See no. 6.
(8) Passing of my aunt. I kept focus on becoming who I am today and continuing to become the person I think would make her proud.
(9) No.
(10) I have four cats: Kaiserin (16 years old); Neikka (12 years old); Leon (4 years old); and Damien Thorn (3 years old). I prefer cats over dogs, but I love dogs. I do not care much for the entire “which one is better” arguments.
(11) Diagonally. I eat outside to inside so the best (the core) is enjoyed last and a sandwich may start out only tasting mediocre at first but become the best sandwich by the end.
(12) Yes. A country is defined by its own characteristics. I’m more of a derivativist with a penchant for percularism. I do not see the two as mutually exclusive but creating a spectrum for nuanced approaches.
(13) It certainly does than it did circa 2013. On the whole, I do find it more satisfactory, but there are times when it is more negative and I dread checking Witt.
Time spent on answers nos. 1-13: 27 minutes.
(14) I’m unsure exactly where the UC overturned prior decision. In the first matter, the issue was whether the King has the authority to not proclaim an amendment. The UC focused on the word “may” and found that its permissive use granted the King authority to veto an Organic Amendment. The second case concerned the temporal aspect of “may.” Does the King have to affirmatively veto an amendment? The UC answered the inquiry by holding that “may” requires affirmative action within the appropriate temporal window for that action. Basically, all amendments are presumed proclaimed unless the King exercises his discretion in the Organic window o affirmatively withhold proclamation. This is logical—let’s balance the inverse result: all amendments require the King’s affirmative proclamation. I will use absolute extremes so my slip down this slope gets me to the final bottom. There is an amendment that EVERYONE supports. No a single person is opposed. It receives absolute unanimous support in the Ziu, the King even stated before the Ziu voted that he supported. The King even publicly voted it during referendum. But the Organic Law requires proclamation of an amendment during that temporal window. So the King voted and then life happened and he is unable to proclaim within that window. Had the Uppermost Cort gone the other way, it would mean that the referendum that has absolute, unanimous support is vetoed. That is clearly the exact opposite of everything I just said but the process has to be repeated, so the entire country is harmed by one person’s failure, however justified, and must spend valuable time and resources to remedy that oversight. Now, let’s change one fact—the King is the only person who is opposed to the amendment; everyone else in Talossa supports the amendment. So everything else being the same, the UC’s holding means that his failure, albeit justified, permits the amendment to take effect. The only injured party is the King in that scenario, which resulted from his own fault. Now, if the King had timely vetoed the amendment, you could say that Talossa is harmed, but that harm is Organically supported and within the King’s discretion. So when we balance the foregoing equities, the UC’s decisions is the most sound. Both decisions are reconciled with the Organic Law and each other, so, perhaps I am missing something and need to reread the decisions together again, but I do not really see where the Uppermost Cort went the other way.
To the second part of your question, which is really the first, there are instances in other jurisdictions where a court may vacate its prior order and “go the other way.” In New York, that is on a motion to renew/reargue. It, in no way, impacts stare decisis because the prior order is a nullity, and the court explains what fact or law it misapprehended or how a new fact changes the disposition of the issue. It’s essentially, without any sarcasm, “well that fact changes everything!” In US federal court, this may be seen as a Rule 60 motion for relief from an order. But in any event, this is not what happened here. These are different cases that have been portrayed as an instance where the Uppermost Cort went the other way on the same issue. But I submit that this is not what happened—in the first instance, the Uppermost Cort was presented with the question: can the King veto an amendment? The Uppermost Cort answered in the affirmative. In the next instance, the issues begged the question: Do we presume an amendment proclaimed when passed by the Legislature and ratified through a referendum or do we presume an amendment not proclaimed (i.e. vetoed) until the King affirmatively does so? The Uppermost Cort adopted the former and acknowledged a rebuttable presumption. And that rebuttal comes in the form of the King affirmatively acting within the allotted temporal window. The result is, in fact, quite simple and fair and not really political per se. What would transform it into a political question would be if the cort decided to carve out exceptions or identify some play in the joints. Avoiding that, in what I submit was/is the best way for the Cort to decide because its balance of equities provided the most equitable result (the least amount of people harmed by the negative (i.e. implicit) presumption), was to avoid creating some form of nuanced grey areas that places corts in the center of what would manifest as an epitomized political question: under what circumstances does the negative presumption of “may” require an affirmative act?
(15) Ugh, I have a strong dislike for the color green; but for some reason I love my new olive suit. Red I like; pink goes fantastically with brown. If you’re wondering, orange is my favorite color.
(16) No. It doesn’t pique my interest. Incidentally, neither does Spanish. But it doesn’t invalidate it as a language. It also doesn’t mean that I do not have to deal with Spanish in my professional life; after all, I’m an attorney in New York City!
(17) I favor New York’s approach, which favors the public’s right to know. But courts should control video or audio recordings, while transcripts and filings publicly accessible. That said, some redactions (e.g. confidential or personal information) is appropriate, and there are mechanisms to achieve that. Filings under seal or proceeding in camara should really be the extreme exception. I am not a fan of the approach by the U.S. federal courts that seems to provide less public access. That’s said, the latter may be appropriate for Talossa to some degree given our strong emphasis on privacy rights. I’m not entirely sure which one I think works best for Talossa, and my mind is not in any way made up on the issue or falling significantly on one side over the other. But if I had to decide today, I’d try to find a middle ground.
(18) Sure. Just as more New Yorkers should be encouraged to learn Spanish. But nobody should be required to learn Talossan. The de facto lingua franca of Talossa is English. That comes with its fair share of problems (e.g. not all Talossans understand the idiosyncrasies or weight of certain words in English). But those problems would be amplified if we require a language that maybe only a handful of people (and perhaps not even current Talossans) to learn and use officially. Also, I imagine that many people would be turned off. Talossa is small and needs to grow. If we impose a requirement that people learn Talossa to participate, we will create an avoidable brain drain.
(19) I have not. I cannot provide a date because I do not know.
(20) I don’t know. I have stated in the public record before that I do not favor abolishing the Senate, but maybe a diminished role—something akin to the House of Lords (elected) in the UK. That is, delay but not prevent. I don’t know. I’m still very much unsure of the issue. The Cosa does have a tendency of having large majorities in favor of a Government. And because public votes generally correspond with those in the Cosa, I’m unsure that we would have an adequate check on mob rule.
(21) Yes. Europa Universalis; Stellaris; Civilization; etc. I enjoy grand strategies.
(22) See No. 20.
(23) I don’t know. Not sure how this impacts the hearing though.
(24) Jelly.
(25) Ask me again if or when I have that moment. I think I’m still in the self-delusional phase. At work, I occasionally get the question, “Do you feel you’re getting it?” Not in the sense of the issue, but actually being an attorney in my area of law. DO I feel I’m getting what it take so to practice this type of law. Some older attorneys have said they didn’t feel that they got it until 10 or 20 years of practice. I hate this question—I think “getting it” is something that is continuous, and much like “can something be perfect” the state of “getting it” means that you probably don’t get it. New things come up, law changes, etc. So you’re constantly trying to “get it.” To your question, I don’t know what form of self-actualization a lawyer practicing in the US may achieve professionally.
(26) Nope.
(27) Neither weigh heavier than one thousand pounds of self-doubt. But they weigh the same. (For our metric listeners: one-thousand kilograms of feathers weigh the same as one thousand kilograms of bricks.)
(28) Yes.
(29) See No. 28.
(30) An apple.
Answer time for nos. 14-30: 42 minutes.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 24, 2020 19:31:21 GMT -6
S:reu Chair:
My apologies to you and the Committee, and my apologies to Senator del Val for not providing timely answers. Yesterday I sent messages to you and Senator del Val regarding work events that were occupying my time and that I would reply last night. However (and unfortunately), those obligations continued today.
Unfortunately, I have been unable to timely answer within the allotted 48 hours, which has prejudiced Senator del Val. I join his request to extend the time allotted to him. On account of the Senator's request for brevity, I hope to be able to carve out 30 minutes to respond to all questions tomorrow, but if not, I will post my answers on Sunday upon this Committee resuming.
Thank you,
V
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 19, 2020 22:16:58 GMT -6
King John,
It is wonderful that Talossa endeavors to actualize democratic institutions, and that we, as a nation, can look beyond personal grievances for the greater good. Certainly, that awesome type of collective forgiveness helped drive reunision, at least publicly. Talossa again showed her perchant for forgiveness when did not outright reject Ben's attempt to return. It's saddens me that he did not see it through. Many people, even so many years later, are still hurt by his actions, but what struck me as uniquely Talossan, what reflects the awesome ability of the average Talossan to look beyond themselves, was that even those expressing the most concern still saw that he potentially offered value. And those merely wanted a moment to reflect. But Ben did not stick around, and that's unfortunate. Perhaps he foresaw a situation where some Talossans would seek to use what should have been a process about immigration into a way that they could air personal grievance. And perhaps that would've been warranted.
In any event, Talossa demonstratred this unique virtue with ESB. Think what you'd like about him, but he stuck around. And look, so much time after his sentence was reduced, he has demonstrated that rehabilitation is possible. He's served faithfully and actively in Government and shows no signs of repeating prior behavior. That concern was, after all, what many expressed concern about.
I am thrilled that you are here, and while I had hoped that your questions would be more about Talossa than your personal feelings, I committed to answering them.
To address the issue of recusal--and I'm thrilled that Sir Alexandreu supplied you with the grounds for this--your initial hypothetical speaks of a judge saying things about s State official. But that question is about the Judge's conduct when in office. But even so, we have elected justices, in those situations, the Justice has to wait two or three years before hearing a case where there would have been a conflict of interest or the appearance of impropriety. But again, this isn't a question about the Justice's comments before getting elected, but what was said after becoming a Justice.
As to your second hypothetical, if a Justice was saying that about my client, again this is the justice saying it about someone in their courtroom, I would move to recuse. To your question about criminal defense, if I did not move, I could not raise it on appeal unless I learned of it after the trial. New York appeallate courts are particular regarding preservation issues.
The problem with this line of questioning is that it presupposes that I cannot distinguish personal feelings about a person from personal feelings about an institution. Regardless of how I feel about you, a question about the organic authority of the crown should never be decided because of how a Justice feels about the occupier of that position.
You ask if I would recuse myself from every case involving the Crown. But isn't that too far? The Crown is, by default, named in a number of actions even though it may not need to be an active litigant. Why would I recuse myself from that? I said recusal would be a case by case basis. It was assumed that this meant no recusal. Nobody bothered to follow up. What that does mean is that I would not see an issue with committing to recuse myself from any cases directly involving claims against you personally for a reasonable period of time. But at some point, and I'm sure you would agree, a sufficient time would pass that this wouldn't be necessary, provided I didn't make further comments.
I trust you also realize that Talossa is unique. I have been chided because I was acting too formally with my approach to litigating in Talossa. Now I am told I need to be just as formal. I can only presume that you, and others, do not want me anywhere near the Talossan judiciary, whether that is as an attorney, as a Justice, as A-G, as a Senator, or just in Talossa. That's unfortunate, and it does not do much good. But here we are. Talossa necessarily has that awesome ability to forgive and set our personal feelings aside because it's the right thing to do, and because we are a small community without a lot of people volunteering to do things. Are you prepared to hold our personal vendetta as the reason to deny helping Talossa's judiciary? That is not a threat. I am not saying I would continue the insults of I am not appointed. What I am asking is simple--can you set aside your hurt feelings here? I certainly am, notwithstanding your harsh criticisms of me in the past.
Turning to your next question, Talossa now has a statute that mandates appointment of special counsel in those situations. But I do not think it was inappropriate to protest to you speaking. You had not been invited. Applying how that would play out in other jurisdictions, following your hypothetical earlier, the reviewing court would look at the record. Does the record establish the charges? But we are harping a lot on the ESB matter. Perhaps I am mistaken, but there aren't tons of criminal convictions where this could come up. Indeed, I can't think of a single scenario, presently known, where this will come up again.
I advocated my position zealously. Incredible as a matter of law is a legal term. You seem to question my legal acumen because I argued a legal standard against you. But in any event, I've already addressed my feeling and my regrets on the ESB matter elsewhere.
To your next question, see above. Again, I note that there's a statute about this.
I do think that, at times, you act as if you're above the law. My main criticism of you, hyperbole aside, is your tendency to assume that what you think the law is controls. As a Justice, however, my feelings about you are irrelevant. You want my honest feeling--I think you honestly believe that what you do helps Talossa; that you see yourself as a father figure. This blinds you. That does not mean I would use the cort to abrogate your authoirty. Additionally, your recent committement expressed in your holiday speech soften my position on you.
Do you know what has been overlooked? At the height of my posts at you, during the ESB matter, I proposed a new org law. Why do I mention it? What I initially proposed did not abrogtate any of your authoirty. It was truly an attempt to just reorganize the Org Law for easier flow. So at the very height of my animus towards you, I still proposed an org law that maintained the authority vested in you the same. That is almost always overlooked because it doesn't feed the narrative that V will use any tool to undermine you. But in reality, when the record is actually scrutinized objectively, it reveals that I've said mean things about you, but I have never attempted to use the corts to evade winning my political positions honestly--through the democratic process.
To your last question--I was not around for the proclamation crisis. But courts in other jurisdictions do have what is called a motion to renew/reargue. To reargue means that you point to where the court overlooked or misapprehended the law or facts. Renew is when there's been a change in law or new facts learned that could not have been learned before that warrant a reveiw. These happen in the same court. In NY, I will move to renew/reargue and appeal. If I win the motion, the appeal is moot.
I do not know enough about the election and subsequent action to comment on the UC's purported reversal. What I will say is that I've seen courts of law resort withdraw a decision and go the other way upon reconsideration. It's extremely rare and should be used only in the most extreme of circumstance, but it is not alien.
My feelings that Talossa should abandon the monarchy remain. But that is necessarily a political question. Regardless of what I have said about you, or you calling me a nut, I have never advocated using the Cort to revoke your authoirty. That must come through the democratic process.
I look forward to your follow up questions.
V
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