The National Security Act

[Deleted]

WHEREAS it is rather easy to pretend to be someone you are not on the internet and

WHEREAS this could mean a security problem for the Talossan government and

WHEREAS we know that people in the past have created to attempted to create second accounts on Witt and

WHEREAS we should ensure that each person appointed to certain government positions and diplomatic posts actually exists so

THEREFORE, a system of government security clearances is hereby established and shall be monitored by the Ministry of Defence.

1. These clearances shall be required for cabinet ministers and high level staff members appointed by cabinet ministers or any person who is to be given access to protected data information.

2. The clearance system shall be no more strenuous than to ensure the appointee actually exists and has not been convicted or charged with crimes by the Uppermost Cort which would bring into question the suitability of the candidate.

3. The system shall consist of a four point verification to include the following:
a) Verification that the person can be reached at a regular telephone number and physical address.
b) Verification that the person is not presently facing charges or has charges pending in the Talossan Cort System.
c) Verification that the person has not been convicted of any crime by the Uppermost Cort or been Dismissed from the service of the King's military service.
d) Monitor those who control protected information. Regular reviews can ensure that the appointee should retain their clearance. These reviews will occur once quarterly.

4. Clearances can be suspended if the individual is charged with a crime by the Uppermost Cort or a Military Disciplinary Review Board for any offence punishable by Court Martial.

5. Protected information is defined as personal information of citizens, access to the Kingdom website admin functions or any regular inside knowledge of government workings which is not publicly available.

6. For the purpose of issuing clearances, all civil servants will be divided into three tiers:

Tier 1: The Royal Family and members of the Royal Household to include the Prime Ministry, Distain, Defence Ministry, Director of Intelligence, Foreign Ministry.
Tier 2: All other Cabinet Ministers, Deputy and Sub-Ministers and Bureau Directors, members of the Primary Intelligence Group, Foreign Diplomats.
Tier 3: Regular Ministry staff members

Cabinet Ministers will assign tier levels to each position to which a person is appointed based upon the scope of their duties and the amount of protected information that they will have access to. Positions may be assigned Tier 1 status with the approval of the Minister of Defence.

7. There will be three levels of government security clearances corresponding to each tier level:

Tier 1 - Top Secret- The highest level of trust in the Talossan government. In addition to identity verification, holders of this clearance will undergo regular review and frequent monitoring to determine continued eligibility. Holders of this clearance may view internal documents marked as "Secret" and may handle, possess or view documents directly relating to foreign relations, intelligence and national security.

Tier 2 - Secret - Holders of this clearance are prohibited from viewing classified documents pertaining to foreign policy or relations.

Tier 3 - "For Talossan Eyes Only" - Abbreviated FTEO, this is the lowest level of clearance, requiring only identity verification, which permits the holder to handle some protected information such as portions of the Kingdom website and citizen profiles.

8. All original correspondence originating from any Ministry, Bureau, Office or the Royal Household should bear a clearance designation (Top Secret, Secret or FTEO or Public). Any document without a designation or marked "Public" may be released to anyone without penalty.

9. Unauthorized distribution of classified materials to persons lacking the necessary security clearance constitutes an act of criminal mishandling of classified materials, a misdemeanor punishable by an applicable civil disability as determined by the Uppermost Cort.

10. Unauthorized distribution of classified materials to non-citizens or representatives or officers of foreign governments shall constitute an act of espionage, a felony, punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed the natural life of the offender or revocation of citizenship if imprisonment is impractical or impossible.



Uréu q'estadra sa:
Noi urent q'estadra sa:
T.M. Asmourescu, Minister of Defence, MC-RUMP
Flip Molinar, Foreign Minister, MC-CCCP

HM Government, represented by: T.M. Asmourescu, M. Defence
MC-RUMP

[Deleted]

Would this be applied retroactively to existing positions?

[Deleted]

It would be retroactive in that I would kindly ask my fellow Ministers (along with myself, of course) to go through it themselves. Individuals who are not cabinet ministers I would be open to discuss.

I am trying to avoid imposing law on other Cabinet Ministers without first discussing it with them but still ensuring that we protect what needs to be protected.

It is also worth noting that the bulk of the clearance is a simple phone call to verify that an actual person answers the phone and a snail mail verification to verify they actually have a physical address. This isn't the sort of due diligence where we are trying to trip people up, just make sure they exist somewhere other than Witt.

[Deleted]

I understand, and I think this is a good idea. I don't see any reason to NOT hold existing officials to the standards. As you say, it's a simple procedure.

[Flip Molinar]

Might a password be pm'ed to the account of the person being contacted which they could state over the phone to ensure it is indeed said person and not just someone sharing their residence?

[Deleted]

Also a good idea, Flip. I think we all know we can only take so many precautions. I mean, after all, without extensive background checks, we're kind of firing in the dark with this. The purpose of this particular bill is just to bring it into law. We can always tweak the actual procedure later with new ideas, trial and error and all of that. That is the reason I left the actual procedure a bit vague. The purpose will remain the same, the means are subject to change.

I'd also invite all Cabinet Ministers to co-sponsor.

[Flip Molinar]

I proudly co-sponsor this act.

[EM Vürinalt]

Dec 13, 2008 14:33:57 GMT -6 Adm. T.M. Asmourescu, O. Ben. said:

It would be retroactive in that I would kindly ask my fellow Ministers (along with myself, of course) to go through it themselves. Individuals who are not cabinet ministers I would be open to discuss.

I am trying to avoid imposing law on other Cabinet Ministers without first discussing it with them but still ensuring that we protect what needs to be protected.

It is also worth noting that the bulk of the clearance is a simple phone call to verify that an actual person answers the phone and a snail mail verification to verify they actually have a physical address. This isn't the sort of due diligence where we are trying to trip people up, just make sure they exist somewhere other than Witt.

I applaud the idea but remember the immigrant questionaire- is it okay for citizens to contact you by phone? By email?

That would have to be changed or another option added.

Also- I think it would be in the best interest of those who chose not to do this that perhaps another option is made avaliable? I know that AIM or Google Chat isn't as personal as a phone call or snail mail but computers cannot hold a logical conversation over these channels as well which could easily show proof of identity. Similarly, if any citizens have actual pages on social networking cites which are actively updated or used (i.e. new photos added, people writing little blurbs to you), this could be used as a means of verification as well.

I would also like to ask that this act include something to the extent that the inactive accounts on Witt be able to be deleated after sufficient evidence that 1)the person does not exist or two 2)the person is no longer active in any way.

[Sir C. M. Siervicül]

Nice bill! Couple of suggestions/questions:

1. The bill could use a little bit of clarification about who is responsible for administering the clearance system, like who determines which staff members are "high level" (sec 1), and who makes the call about whether clearances are suspended (sec 3 - or is it supposed to be automatic in these cases?). The language right after the "therefore" mentions the Ministry of Defense, but it could be clearer.

2. Change "protected data" in sec 1 to "protected information" to match the wording in the rest of the bill.

3. Have you considered multiple levels of security clearances? This is good for maintaining reasonable controls on what would be considered FOUO or PA information in the U.S., but what about more sensitive defence or national security information?

Dec 14, 2008 9:26:57 GMT -6 EM Vürinalt said:

I know that AIM or Google Chat isn't as personal as a phone call or snail mail but computers cannot hold a logical conversation over these channels as well which could easily show proof of identity.

I don't think we're worried so much about data-harvesting bots as about real people using pseudonyms and false contact info infiltrating the government in order to obtain information to abuse. A single person can have any number of instant messaging accounts under any number of names. If someone is given access to (for example) the real addresses and phone numbers of all our citizens, we want to know that we have their real name, address, and phone number.

[Deleted]

I believe this bill is complete in this draft and request that the SoS clark it for the next session of the Cosa.

[King John]

One minor suggestion. Usually, in English, we say "Uppermost Cort" instead of "High Cort" for "Cort pü Inalt".

— John R

[Deleted]

The change has been made. Thank you for pointing that out.

[Dréu Gavárþic'h]

I guess this is a little late for asking. But if this bill passes, shouldn't we also pass an act that would allow the release of not-then-pertinent secret and top-secret documents upon request and approval after X number of years (say 10 or 15)?

[Deleted]

Ahh, like a Freedom of Information Act type of thing?

I wouldn't be opposed to such an act. But first, our main concern needs to be the passage of this one.