Estimat Túischac'h,
first, I would like to cite the
Organic Law, before I go into basics of Interpretation of Law for the benefit of everyone, since I have no doubt that the questioner knows much more about such rules as they exist in the Realm of Our Big Neighbour.
Org.XVI:9 states that (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from the passage “according to the most just and equitable understanding of law”, which is written even before “according to the plain meaning of the words” within this Section of the Organic Law, that Talossa does not put the
plain meaning of law above all else, as the United States Supreme Court does. Instead, what can be understood is that Talossan Jurisprudence can and shall use interpretatory tools in conjunction with one another.
Let us first look at the plain meaning of the cited statute Lexh:H.2.2., which gives a questioner the right to ask one question to “a named [Member of the Government]²
relating to Public Affairs connected with their Ministry or on matters of administration for which
they² are officially responsible”. As you can see, I have put a superscript ² next to two words, namely “Member of Government”, and “they”. I have done so, because both words refer to one another (i.e., the pronoun “they” is co-indexed with “Member of Government” specifically). Even in the interpretation of plain meaning, one cannot construe this statute to mean that Members of Ziu may ask a Member of Government something that is not under the auspices of that very Member of Government’s administrative duties.
The meaning of the word “administration” refers unto a ruling Government. While Talossan English mostly uses British English conventions, which prefers the word “Government” over “Administration”, many legislators within Talossa do not adhere to this preference. Thus, since the word “administration” refers almost exclusively unto a Government (see the Oxford English Dictionary, which explains administration as (i) the process or activity of running a business, organization, etc., (ii) the management of public affairs; government, or (iii) the act of dispensing, giving or applying something), the statute clearly, and repeatedly, makes reference exclusively unto the Government, and allows Members of Ziu to ask questions related to Governmental duties. Throughout Lexh:H.2., the questionee is referred unto as “Minister”, never as anything else, which further supports this argument.
In case this interpretation does not fully convince, let us move on to other interpretations. This is, as shown above, legitimate and well-founded in Talossan Jurisprudence.
The principle of
in pari materia (“on (an/the) equal matter”) determines that the meaning of a statute may be inferred from similar statutes pertaining unto the same matter. In European interpretatory practices, according to the well-revered Friedrich C. von Savigny, this would probably be classified as the
Systematic Interpretation. Within the Systematic Interpretation, or
in pari materia, either the Section in which a statute is found, or the whole context, aids in the interpretation of a statute. As stated before, the whole act H.2. (when not related to Living Cosăs where it only speaks of MCs, i.e. Members of Cosă, asking one another questions), continuously refers to a questioner, and a Minister. Therefore, it can be inferred
in pari materia that questions shall be posed to Ministers in their Ministerial capacities.
Furthermore, the principle of
noscitur a sociis (“it is known by [its] companies”), in case of a dispute about a word, or when it is ambiguous whereunto it may refer, the
accompaniment of said word may be utilised to interpret its meaning. Here, “matters of
administration” seems to be the word(s) in dispute. While administration can also mean, as I have stated above, the applying or administering of something to another thing or person (i.e. mostly in the medical sense), or the activity of running a business or organisation (the Senäts is not a business-like organisation), the word in most cases refers to the management of public affairs, to the government. By the exclusive repetition of the word “Minister”, the word “administration” cannot be interpreted but as referring to Governmental duties. Therefore, this canon of construction supports my interpretation of the statute, as well.
At last, I want to quote a summary of the
Purposive Approach, which is practiced by some Common Law Courts in interpreting law, which have found the application of plain meaning, or other single rules of interpretation as unjust, misleading, not useful, or other negative adjectives. One such country is Canada:
(Find the quote
here.)
Estimat Túischac'h, I realise that this here is no Court of Law. I furthermore realise that I need not convince you of my reasons to refuse to answer this Terpelaziun. If the questioner be not satisfied with my grounds for refusal, then he is free to bring the matter to the Corts, and it shall be up to them to decide. However, I also wish not to disrespect this Cosă, and therefore, I have chosen to explain in detail why I believe this is not a justified Terpelaziun, for the benefit of its Members.
I am hence choosing not to answer it, because I do not wish to be the instrument by which the intent and purpose of Terpelaziuns are completely perverted, and changed negatively.
The questioner is, short of remonstrating on my refusal to the Corts, welcome to approach me privately, or the Senäts officially, to ask his question in the proper environment. This shall not constitute an open invitation to speak in the Senäts, as the questioner is not a Member therein, and therefore must request leave to speak before it. Neither can I promise to give such permission. However, I am endeavouring to satisfy the questioner’s request within the bounds of legal possibility, and in good faith.
Thank you.
