Sumo (oops, I meant "suo moto")

[Ian Plätschisch]

Seriously?


I want to say what I have to say right now instead of having to wait for the Cort to grant me leave, and I don't know how to write an amicus brief, so here are my thoughts.  Maybe someone who knows how to write a brief can incorporate these ideas.

Nov 3, 2017 19:56:01 GMT -6 Béneditsch Ardpresteir, O.SPM. said:

This Court room assembles in haste to pass a suo moto injunction in haste with a bonafide intention to save the citizens of Talossa from being associated with certain activities which might border on illegality.

If RZ3 passes, the "certain activity" will be legal in Talossa.  I don't see how the Court could argue otherwise.

Also, the Cort is only authorized to issue injunctions "according to the generally accepted principles of Anglo-American law" (Org.XVI.13).  I am not a lawyer, but I am not aware of any principal which allows a court to stop a law which legalizes an activity which is illegal in other jurisdictions, in order to prevent the citizens from being "associated" with that activity.  The real kicker here is that the Uppermost Cort is the final judge of the Organicity of injunctions, so there is basically no mechanism to prevent the Uppermost Cort from issuing ridiculous injunctions except to just ignore them.

Also, how much of the Court actually assembled?  Just you?  If I am wrong I'd love to know, but the injunction was not signed off on by any other Justices.

This Court prima facie feels that either RZ3 needs to be somehow removed from the Clark, or it has to be voted down. Despite this, even if it passes, the King should not give his assent to it and make it a law.

This would seem to me a blatant usurpation by the Cort of the prerogatives of the Ziu and the Crown.  The Ziu and the SoS control the Clark, not the Cort.  The King decides which bills to assent to, not the Court.  The only other time in recent memory that the Cort issued such an injunction on the King, Tresplet v. HM Chancery, was when there was concern that the bill in question was inOrganic.  This injunction, controversial in itself, at least squared with the Organic example that the Cort may enjoin the enforcement of a bill that may be inOrganic.  Nowhere in the Organic Law does it say the Cort can enjoin a bill that it just doesn't like, or just thinks is unwise.

Being situated in a location where the same is illegal, plus voluntarily accepting the Winconsin Codes, the Kingdom of Talossa can't be seen to be violating the code of conduct of our neighbouring nation.

Talossa is Talossa.  Talossa is situated near Wisconsin but not in it.

Talossa applied particular sections of the Wisconsin legal codes (not even all of it) by an act of the Ziu, so it should be obvious that Talossa can remove a section or sections as it sees fit, by an act of the Ziu.

Your opinion that Talossan shouldn't have laws contrary to the laws of Wisconsin is purely personal and has no Organic backing.  It is wholly inappropriate for the Cort to issue an injunction based on such an opinion.

In recent times though there was a cry to legalize recreational use, but the same was not successful in the neighborhood state. It has been reported that Rep. Chris Taylor & Sen. Jon Erpenbach co-sponsored two medical cannabis bills earlier this year, but their attempts have been stalled by the state’s leadership.

So?  This is completely irrelevant.

Hence we as a nation should [emphasis added] not attempt to do something illegal per se by trying to change the Talossan Laws, and bringing them to conflict with the Winconsin/ US laws at least.

"Should" is for the Ziu, not the Cort.  Again, there aren't any Organic issues here, so why is the Cort getting involved when no one asked them to?

Whilst the Court was concerned on the above line, it was also made aware that certain honorable citizen share similar concerns.

The number of people that share a particular concern has no bearing on whether or not the Cort can act on it.  Political problems are for the Ziu.

Thus this Court as a precautionary and preventive measure

The Cort can't just do whatever it wants, regardless of whether it thinks it needs to save the Ziu from itself.  What is the Organic basis for this injunction?

Even if RZ3 of the 51st Cosa is passed as a law for the Kingdom of Talossa, it would not make any changes to any Statutes of the Nation and the passed Bill in the form of the Act would be kept in abeyance from implementation till the neighborhood state of Winconsin or the Federal Government of the USA makes certain changes to their existing laws whereupon no penal or civil action(s) could be taken against the Kingdom of Talossa or any of it's citizen in relation to the substance of the proposed legislation."

This is silly.  Unless there is a widely accepted principle of Anglo-American law which allows a Court to nullify acts at random, the Cort can only do things like this if the act at hand is, or at least has a reasonable chance of being, inOrganic, which this bill clearly isn't.  Also, why is the Cort issuing injunctions that depend on the laws of other jurisdictions?

The Court now goes into recess, but calls for opinions and interpretation on the subject matter and encourage discussion on the subject on the Witt. People are encouraged to apply for presentation of their Amicus brief. At the end of a fortnight or even a month the Government is urged, and it may place it's stand before the Court.

Well, here you go.  I might even file an amicus brief, but there is probably someone who could write it a lot better than I could.

[Viteu Marcianüs]

Nov 3, 2017 21:28:11 GMT -6 Ian Plätschisch said:

 The real kicker here is that the Uppermost Cort is the final judge of the Organicity of injunctions, so there is basically no mechanism to prevent the Uppermost Cort from issuing ridiculous injunctions except to just ignore them.

Not entirely. The UC has five justices. A justice may sit as a judge for a trial cort, and all appeals require a quorum of three justices (or 1 provided section 8 of Article XVI is met). 

In this instance, Ben-Ard, as a justice of the UC, acted as a trial judge, so the UC issued the decision by virtue that we did have not named our trial courts something, but in reality, it's not the last step, as the appeal would require a three judge quorum. So because we lack formal distinctions, and we just call every instance the UC, we tend to say "UC" and then the final appeal "UC sitting en banc". (see generally Org.L.XVI.2.(a)-(d). 

Yeah, it's unnecessary confusing. But gee... if only we could rewrite the Org Law. 

[Açafat del Val]

lolwut. Where did this Justice earn his J.D.? Wherever would he have learned to make such maneuvers? I just— this is a parody, right?

[Viteu Marcianüs]

Nov 5, 2017 8:35:02 GMT -6 Açafat del Val said:

lolwut. Where did this Justice earn his J.D.? Wherever would he have learned to make such maneuvers? I just— this is a parody, right?

He's a lawyer in India, they don't have JDs. I don't know their equivalent is. It's being dealt with. 

[Ian Plätschisch]

Nov 4, 2017 21:01:56 GMT -6 Viteu Marcianüs said:

Nov 3, 2017 21:28:11 GMT -6 Ian Plätschisch said:

 The real kicker here is that the Uppermost Cort is the final judge of the Organicity of injunctions, so there is basically no mechanism to prevent the Uppermost Cort from issuing ridiculous injunctions except to just ignore them.

Not entirely. The UC has five justices. A justice may sit as a judge for a trial cort, and all appeals require a quorum of three justices (or 1 provided section 8 of Article XVI is met). 

In this instance, Ben-Ard, as a justice of the UC, acted as a trial judge, so the UC issued the decision by virtue that we did have not named our trial courts something, but in reality, it's not the last step, as the appeal would require a three judge quorum. So because we lack formal distinctions, and we just call every instance the UC, we tend to say "UC" and then the final appeal "UC sitting en banc". (see generally Org.L.XVI.2.(a)-(d). 

Yeah, it's unnecessary confusing. But gee... if only we could rewrite the Org Law. 

Yes, I understand that.  I wrote all of this before I knew the other members of the Court would intervene so quickly.  Basically, if one Justice does something bad and none of the other Justices are around (which could happen), it would be a real problem.

I think the minor edits necessary to make article XVI more clear could be enacted without rewriting the entire OrgLaw, but of course I speak solely in a personal capacity.

[Istefan Perþonest]

Nov 5, 2017 9:11:39 GMT -6 Viteu Marcianüs said:

Nov 5, 2017 8:35:02 GMT -6 Açafat del Val said:

lolwut. Where did this Justice earn his J.D.? Wherever would he have learned to make such maneuvers? I just— this is a parody, right?

He's a lawyer in India, they don't have JDs. I don't know their equivalent is. It's being dealt with. 

The degree for a lawyer established in the common law world in the 19th Century was the LL.B (Legum Baccalaureus, or Bachelor of Laws); outside of the US and Canada (and to a growing extent Australia), that's still the standard legal degree. (In the US and Canada, the transition from LL.B. to J.D. was largely a matter of simply renaming the degree conferred.)

[Dame Litz Cjantscheir, UrN]

Nov 6, 2017 22:01:37 GMT -6 Istefan Perþonest said:

Nov 5, 2017 9:11:39 GMT -6 Viteu Marcianüs said:

He's a lawyer in India, they don't have JDs. I don't know their equivalent is. It's being dealt with. 

The degree for a lawyer established in the common law world in the 19th Century was the LL.B (Legum Baccalaureus, or Bachelor of Laws); outside of the US and Canada (and to a growing extent Australia), that's still the standard legal degree. (In the US and Canada, the transition from LL.B. to J.D. was largely a matter of simply renaming the degree conferred.)

Not quite true. Here in the UK we have the "non-law graduate route" (approximately 20 per cent of solicitors qualify via the non-law graduate route). Students can complete a degree in any subject and then undertake a year long ‘conversion course’ - the Common Professional Examination or Graduate Diploma in Law (CPE/GDL).

In addition, the CILEx routes don't even require a LL.B.

However, all routes nonetheless require an excellent working knowledge of the law and you can't simply show up with a Arts degree in Renaissance Literature and become a lawyer.

[Istefan Perþonest]

Nov 7, 2017 10:09:56 GMT -6 Dame Litz Cjantscheir, UrN said:

Not quite true.

Oh, there are lots of local variances from country to country as to requirements to practice law. But an LL.B. is still the "standard" degree in the sense of "usual" (as opposed to "required", which does vary) outside North America. (And in North America, Canadian universities still called their legal degree an LL.B. until after the turn of the millennium, even though they'd swapped to postgrad-only study of law rather earlier.)