The Advisory King Amendment

[Ian Plätschisch]

The Advisory King Amendment 

WHEREAS Every citizen has their own concept of the perfect role of the King in Talossa today, and

WHEREAS I realized that my own such concept was founded on a highly romanticized version of the King, in which he was omnibenevolent and respected the will of the people except in the direst circumstances, and

WHEREAS Even if this were currently the case, it would be no reason to believe that the Crown would always behave this way, and

WHEREAS I have just recently grasped the full consequences of an unelected head of state possessing such broad powers, and

WHEREAS Despite this, misdeeds by one King is no reason to abolish the office entirely, and

WHEREAS in a country as small as Talossa, retaining the same, heavily involved head of state is good for stability, even if the King is not as involved as we would like, and

WHEREAS The Crown has, does, and will likely continue to provide valuable advice concerning matters of governance, so he should retain at least some amount of political power, and

WHEREAS This is the heart of the matter: while an unelected official can offer new perspectives and encourage legislators to stop and think, someone without a democratic mandate should not have final say on anything, nor even be able to indefinitely put roadblocks in the path of the duly elected Ziu, and

WHEREAS for all these reasons, applying the concepts of the ¾ Majority Amendment to regular legislation seems like a pretty good idea


THEREFORE, Org.X.6, which currently reads:

Every bill which shall have passed the Ziu shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the King. The King may sign such a Bill, in which case it shall immediately become law; or he may veto the Bill, in which case it shall be returned, with his objections, to the Ziu, which shall proceed to reconsider it in the next Clark. If the King neither signs nor vetoes a Bill before the last day of the month in which it was passed by the Ziu, he shall be deemed to have signed it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the Cosâ shall agree to pass the bill, with the approval of the Senäts, or the part of the bill objected to, it shall become a law over the objection of the King.

is amended to read:

Every bill which passes the Ziu shall be presented to the King before it comes into effect. The King may sign such a Bill, in which case it shall immediately enter into effect and become law; or he may veto the Bill, in which case it shall be returned, with his objections, to the Ziu, which shall reconsider it in the next Clark. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the Cosă agree to pass the bill, or the part of the bill objected to, with the approval of the Senäts, it shall become a law over the objection of the King. If a bill vetoed by the King in a certain term of the Cosă is passed by a simple majority of the Cosă and the Senäts in the subsequent term of the Cosă, the bill shall become law over the King’s objections, and cannot be vetoed. If the King neither signs nor vetoes a Bill before the last day of the month in which it was passed by the Ziu, he shall be deemed to have signed it.

Noi urent q'estadra så;
Ian Plätschisch (MC-MRPT)
Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun (Sen-MM)

[Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN]

Jan 29, 2017 8:53:05 GMT -6 Ian Plätschisch said:

The Advisory King Amendment 

WHEREAS Every citizen has their own concept of the perfect role of the King in Talossa today, and

WHEREAS I realized that my own such concept was founded on a highly romanticized version of the King, in which he was omnibenevolent and respected the will of the people except in the direst circumstances, and

WHEREAS Even if this were currently the case, it would be no reason to believe that the Crown would always behave this way, and

WHEREAS I have just recently grasped the full consequences of an unelected head of state possessing such broad powers, and

The Free Democrats kept telling you, and telling you, but you kept being influenced by the RUMP. Good to see you got the point eventually. Nice bill.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Well, this bill is worth considering. However, I would like to change the whole passage to something more... accommodating to the reader:

Every bill which passes the Ziu shall be presented to the King before it comes into effect. The King may sign such a Bill, in which case it shall immediately enter into effect and become law; or he may veto the Bill, in which case it shall be returned, with his objections, to the Ziu, which shall reconsider it in the next Clark. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the Cosă agree to pass the bill, or the part of the bill objected to, it shall become a law over the objection of the King. If a bill vetoed by the King in a certain term of Cosă is passed by a simple majority of the Cosă and the Senäts in a subsequent term of the Cosă, the bill shall become law over the King’s objections, and cannot be vetoed. If the King neither signs nor vetoes a Bill before the last day of the month in which it was passed by the Ziu, he shall be deemed to have signed it.

[Munditenens Tresplet]

So, if I am reading this correctly, the bill would not only make veto overrides redundant (though I've not seen the Ziu take up a veto override, despite the "shall proceed...in the next Clark" language), but it would basically eliminate the King's very limited powers in the Ziu.

I respect the King's ability to veto a bill, as I would respect the ability of any executive in a country to do the same. (Keep in mind, he has in fact vetoed a bill that I was the primary author of before, something that can't be said very often around here.) But barring some drastic change in the makeup of a Cosa from one term to the next, the ability to veto would become simple delay mechanism for what will otherwise be the inevitable passage of a bill.

If you want to eliminate the King's veto, that's fine. Propose an amendment that cuts right to the point instead of something like this which does virtually the same thing while pretending not to.

[Ian Plätschisch]

Jan 29, 2017 16:50:56 GMT -6 Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN said:

The Free Democrats kept telling you, and telling you, but you kept being influenced by the RUMP. Good to see you got the point eventually. Nice bill.

I would beg to differ concerning the amount of influence the RUMP ever had over me, but that is beside the point.  I'm glad you like the bill.

[Ian Plätschisch]

Jan 29, 2017 18:22:06 GMT -6 Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun said:

Well, this bill is worth considering. However, I would like to change the whole passage to something more... accommodating to the reader:

Every bill which passes the Ziu shall be presented to the King before it comes into effect. The King may sign such a Bill, in which case it shall immediately enter into effect and become law; or he may veto the Bill, in which case it shall be returned, with his objections, to the Ziu, which shall reconsider it in the next Clark. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the Cosă agree to pass the bill, or the part of the bill objected to, it shall become a law over the objection of the King. If a bill vetoed by the King in a certain term of Cosă is passed by a simple majority of the Cosă and the Senäts in a subsequent term of the Cosă, the bill shall become law over the King’s objections, and cannot be vetoed. If the King neither signs nor vetoes a Bill before the last day of the month in which it was passed by the Ziu, he shall be deemed to have signed it.

It looks like you omitted the Senate from the first veto override option.

[Ian Plätschisch]

Jan 29, 2017 18:40:28 GMT -6 Munditenens Tresplet said:

So, if I am reading this correctly, the bill would not only make veto overrides redundant (though I've not seen the Ziu take up a veto override, despite the "shall proceed...in the next Clark" language), but it would basically eliminate the King's very limited powers in the Ziu.

This bill would not eliminate the King's powers; it would just convert the King's veto into a suspensive veto.  The King will still be able to delay a bill for the length of a Cosa term (unless the veto was overridden by a supermajority), which should give him plenty of time to make his case against the bill and let legislators reconsider it.  If the King had a valid point, then legislators in the next Cosa will not pass the bill.  Basically, this bill lets the King retain an ability which seems very important to him; the ability to prevent the Cosa from acting on bouts of temporary fervor.

I respect the King's ability to veto a bill, as I would respect the ability of any executive in a country to do the same. 

The difference between the executives of other countries and the King of Talossa is that the King is not accountable to the people.  While vesting an advisory role in such a figure is fine, if a majority of the Ziu consistently wants to pass a bill on behalf of the people, the King should not be a permanent roadblock.

[Munditenens Tresplet]

Jan 29, 2017 19:58:49 GMT -6 Ian Plätschisch said:

Jan 29, 2017 18:40:28 GMT -6 Munditenens Tresplet said:

So, if I am reading this correctly, the bill would not only make veto overrides redundant (though I've not seen the Ziu take up a veto override, despite the "shall proceed...in the next Clark" language), but it would basically eliminate the King's very limited powers in the Ziu.

This bill would not eliminate the King's powers; it would just convert the King's veto into a suspensive veto.  The King will still be able to delay a bill for the length of a Cosa term (unless the veto was overridden by a supermajority), which should give him plenty of time to make his case against the bill and let legislators reconsider it.  If the King had a valid point, then legislators in the next Cosa will not pass the bill.  Basically, this bill lets the King retain an ability which seems very important to him; the ability to prevent the Cosa from acting on bouts of temporary fervor.

I disagree. There are already many who are concerned with the the King exercising his right to voice his opinion, and any time he opens his mouth is a cause for concern. (Which is probably one reason we don't seem him very often.) The suggestion that a suspensive veto would give him plenty of time to make his case against a bill erroneously assumes that his concerns would be heard by MZs with an open mind, much less considered. In practice, this amendment would eliminate his veto powers completely.

I respect the King's ability to veto a bill, as I would respect the ability of any executive in a country to do the same. 

The difference between the executives of other countries and the King of Talossa is that the King is not accountable to the people.  While vesting an advisory role in such a figure is fine, if a majority of the Ziu consistently wants to pass a bill on behalf of the people, the King should not be a permanent roadblock.

Again, I disagree.

First, the only time this King has ever vetoed a bill for reasons other than the bill's inOrganicity is when he was asked to earlier this year. In other words, this bill isn't correcting any problem, merely the perception of one.

But even if he was to do so in the future, I disagree with it being considered a permanent roadblock. Actually, it would only be a permanent roadblock if the bill weren't able to sustain a veto override. While you are correct that the King isn't accountable insofar as he isn't an elected official, I question whether you can claim the bill should be passed on behalf of the people when you suggest that a bill should become law when it can't even muster the support of at least 2/3rds of a Cosa to override a veto.

[Ian Plätschisch]

Jan 29, 2017 20:25:27 GMT -6 Munditenens Tresplet said:

I disagree. There are already many who are concerned with the the King exercising his right to voice his opinion, and any time he opens his mouth is a cause for concern. (Which is probably one reason we don't seem him very often.) The suggestion that a suspensive veto would give him plenty of time to make his case against a bill erroneously assumes that his concerns would be heard by MZs with an open mind, much less considered. In practice, this amendment would eliminate his veto powers completely.

Well, recently, whenever the King has opened his mouth, it has been to deny a ruling of the Court.  Whenever he contributes to discussions about bills, on the other hand, I have never seen people get upset, as the King is Organically part of the Ziu.  

First, the only time this King has ever vetoed a bill for reasons other than the bill's inOrganicity is when he was asked to earlier this year. In other words, this bill isn't correcting any problem, merely the perception of one.

While you are correct that the King isn't accountable insofar as he isn't an elected official, I question whether you can claim the bill should be passed on behalf of the people when you suggest that a bill should become law when it can't even muster the support of at least 2/3rds of a Cosa to override a veto.

If this were so, why don't we require all bills to be passed with a 2/3 majority?  My point is, the 2/3 threshold is a currently a roadblock which can be imposed indefinitely in the way of the majority of the people.  

[Munditenens Tresplet]

The scale of the problem of the King being a permanent roadblock is equivalent to someone failing to submit coversheets with their TPS reports.

The difference with this proposed amendment and the 3/4ths majority amendment is that there has not been a single demonstrable case of the King vetoing a bill for political reasons. Indeed, when he has vetoed citing Organicity, most of the time the bill is fixed and passed in a subsequent Clark, and it doesn't require a veto override because it isn't the same bill. In other words, his veto already acts as an advisory opinion. But by allowing the exact same bill with no changes to proceed to passage by a simple majority in the next Cosa, the King's advisory is meaningless because it didn't prompt the author to tweak the bill.

I'm also concerned about whether the will of the people would actually be reflected. If a bill passed 101-99, and a seat was given to a party as the result of a coin flip, can you really say it reflects the will of the majority of the people?

We already have a veto-override. If the King of Talossa has such significant problems with a bill that he feels the need to exercise his sparsely used veto power, then yes, a 2/3rds threshold should absolutely be necessary. This is because the King should advocate for all people, including those holding minority opinions. There would be no check to the Ziu's power if we did not have a higher threshold for overcoming a veto.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Overriding a veto by simple majority after General Elections seems sufficient a check upon the Ziu’s powers, if you ask me.

Ián, please be so kind as to include the Senäts override in the first round into my modification, and adapt that version. And I would be happy to co-sponsor. Thank you.

[Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN]

As a good Republican, I'm going to have to disagree with my party leader on this one, in that any reduction in the unelected monarchy's power to do anything but hand out titles and wave nonchalantly at the opening of shopping malls is good by me.

[Ian Plätschisch]

Jan 30, 2017 7:42:22 GMT -6 Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun said:

Ián, please be so kind as to include the Senäts override in the first round into my modification, and adapt that version. And I would be happy to co-sponsor. Thank you.

Done

[Ian Plätschisch]

May the FreeDem MCs who voted against this bill (Chirbi Scherpa-Carriedo, Iason Bitxichë Taiwos, Inxheneu Crova) please let me know why you did so, and what improvements could be made to the bill?