The Let’s Be Fair Amendment

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Alright, folks, here I am, to stir up some of Talossa’s less pleasant traditions. I have dared touch the Vote of Confidence, and I think some of you may like my ideas. I invite you to debate!

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WHEREAS Votes of No Confidence occur seldom in other countries, and
WHEREAS such Votes of No Confidence are cause for a lot of turmoil, trouble, and thus carry significance, and
WHEREAS many countries have safeguards against the abuse of the Vote of Confidence, and
WHEREAS the Constitution of the German Reich (commonly known as the “Weimar Republic”) had a similar destructive Vote of Confidence, which essentially made way for the semi-democratic takeover by Adolf Hitler, and
WHEREAS in Talossa, Votes of (No) Confidence are regular part of the voting system, and just a tool of protest for derrière-bruised parties, or merely a “static opinion”, awhich some Members of the Ziu do not even ponder anymore, and
WHEREAS Votes of (No) Confidence should really not be popped like candy, now
THEREFORE be it known that the Ziu commend to the Citizenry following amendment of the Organic Law:

Org.XIII:6, which currently reads:

Vote of Confidence. The Clark must contain, in every edition, a Vote of Confidence. This reads as follows: "Do you wish the current Government to continue in its term of office?" Each MC must answer this question in his Clark ballot every month, either with a "yes" or a "no." If at the end of any month the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the King shall dissolve the Cosâ and call new elections.

shall be struck in full, and replaced by:

Constructive Vote of No Confidence. The Ziu may express its lack of confidence in the Prime Minister only by electing a successor with the support of an absolute majority of the members of either house respectively. The King must accede to the request, and must replace the Prime Minister with the person named in the Constructive Vote of No Confidence.

Org.XI:6, which currently reads:

Should a petition supported by members of the Cosa holding more than half the seats therein be presented to the Crown instructing the King to replace the Seneschal, the King shall accede to the petition, and shall replace the Seneschal with any specific person named in the petition, or, lacking any specific recommendation for a successor, with any person who the Crown believes will command the confidence of the Cosa.

shall be struck from the Organic Law.

Org.XI:2, which currently reads:

The King appoints the Seneschal. If a single party occupies a majority of the seats in the Cosâ, the King shall choose as PM whichever individual shall be designated by that party. If no single party has a majority, the King shall appoint a Seneschál after consulting party leaders with the objective of finding a PM who can be sustained in subsequent Votes of Confidence by a majority of seats in the Cosâ. The King must appoint a new Seneschál or announce the continuation of the incumbent in office within one month of the end of elections, or, if after one month no candidate can be appointed with the support of a Cosa majority, dissolve the Cosa after the first Clark and call for new elections.

shall be amended to read:

The King appoints the Prime Minister. If a single party occupies a majority of the seats in the Cosă, the King shall choose as Prime Minister whichever individual shall be designated by that party. If no single party has a majority, the King shall appoint a Prime Minister after consulting party leaders with the objective of finding a Prime Minister who can be supported by the parties, and who can lead the Government with such sufficient support that a Constructive Vote of No Confidence not be adopted by the Ziu. The King must appoint a new Prime Minister or announce the continuation of the incumbent in office within one month of the end of elections, or, if after one month no candidate can be appointed with the support of a Cosă majority, dissolve the Cosă after the first Clark, and call for new elections.

FURTHERMORE, following new Sections shall be added to the Organic Law:

Org.XIII:7 shall be added, reading:

A Constructive Vote of No Confidence may be hoppered no later than five days before the next Clark, wherein it shall be published. All members of the Ziu, including the Senäts, but excluding the Crown, must vote on such a Constructive Vote of No Confidence with either “për”, or with a word to that effect, thereby agreeing to dismiss the incumbent Prime Minister, and replacing him or her with the person specified in the motion; or with “contra”, or with a word to that effect, thereby demonstrating confidence in the incumbent Prime Minister. The King, or his Consort, or a Regent during his regency, must not introduce a Constructive Vote of No Confidence, must not vote on the motion, and must not veto such a motion. Further stipulations found in this Organic Law, or other bodies of law of the Kingdom of Talossa, regarding the Hoppering and Clarking of bills, shall not apply to the Constructive Vote of No Confidence.

Org.XII:10 shall be included, reading:

Ostracism. The Ziu may express its lack of confidence in any Cabinet Minister by means of a Destructive Vote of Confidence — or Ostracism — with the support of an absolute majority of the members of either house respectively. All members of the Ziu, including the Senäts, but excluding the Crown, must vote on such an Ostracism with either “për”, or with a word to that effect, thereby agreeing to dismiss the Cabinet Minister; or with “contra”, or with a word to that effect, thereby demonstrating confidence in the incumbent Cabinet Minister. When a Cabinet Minister is thus successfully ostracised, the Prime Minister must advise the King to dismiss the affected Minister, and replace the position with another citizen pursuant to the Prime Minister’s advice, as specified in Article XII, Section 1 of this present Organic Law. The King, or his Consort, or a Regent during his regency, must not introduce an Ostracism, must not vote on the motion, and must not veto such a motion.

MOREOVER, should the Citizenry ratify the Organic Law amendments found in this bill, following sections of El Lexhatx shall be amended to reflect the new situation on Votes of (No) Confidence:

Lexh:H.3.1., currently reading:

3.1. A person who is named as a Proxy Vote for another in a Living Cosâ is under the moral and legal obligation, whenever possible, to represent the original seat-holder's wishes and intentions on specific Ziu bills and the Vote of Confidence, whenever and however he is instructed or publicly notified to do so. (24RZ44)

shall be amended to read:

3.1. A person who is named as a Proxy Vote for another in a Living Cosă is under the moral, and legal obligation, whenever possible, to represent the original seat-holder’s wishes, and intentions on specific Ziu bills, and on any possible Constructive Vote of No Confidence, or Ostracism, which may or may not occur, whenever and however he or she is instructed, or publicly notified, to do so. (24RZ44)

And Lexh:H.5., which reads:

The Secretary of State will punish all Members of the Cosâ who cast invalid votes in the Vote of Confidence; the punishment being the declaration of said member's votes in the same Clark as null and void. (23RZ39)

shall be amended to read:

The Secretary of State will punish all Ziu members who cast invalid votes in a Constructive Vote of No Confidence, as well as in an Ostracism; the punishment being the declaration of said members’ votes in the same Clark as null and void. (23RZ39)

Uréu q'estadra så: Magniloqueu Épiqeu Ac'hlerglünä da Lhiun (Senator to Maritiimi-Maxhestic)

[Munditenens Tresplet]

Is there any particular reason you're replacing the terminology of "Seneschal" with "Prime Minister"? Other than that, this isn't a bad idea overall, though I'm not sure how I feel about Ostracism.

[Sir Alexandreu Davinescu]

So this would make the VoC an affirmative action, and further add the ability to single out individuals for no confidence.

I think the ostracism thing is definitely not appropriate, since it messes with our balance of powers. The Ziu doesn't run the Government and shouldn't be able to micromanage staffing, since that effectively puts all these positions under Ziu oversight. Plus, it's way too easy for flash-in-the-pan things to come up and fade away.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Well, the current vote of confidence is less appropriate than the ostracism, since the latter only affects one Portfolio. We can also put in limitations, or — as it was done in Athens — introduce a moratorium of two months (or one, if we deem it more appropriate for Talossa) between the submission of the motion for ostracism and the voting thereupon. That should eliminate any flash-in-the-pan things.

Anyway, the ostracism need not necessarily be as broad as stated in this initial draft, but I think we may want to introduce a way the Ziu can hold one specific Minister to account without having to do away with the entire (potentially favourable with the exception of that one Minister) Government.

Munditenens Tresplet ; no, there is no specific reason for replacing Seneschal with Prime Minister, other than me wanting to have a bit more of linguistic purity in our Bodies of Law. I find it very confusing that the Seneschal is referred to as such, as well as Prime Minister, in English. But I am not married to the idea, so I can boot it out any time.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Aug 19, 2016 22:30:36 GMT -6 Sir Alexandreu Davinescu said:

So this would make the VoC an affirmative action.

Yes, and no. Not only affirmative, but constructive, in that it does not leave the Kingdom in turmoil without government, but replaces the incumbent Seneschal, if successful. So, basically, the MZ wanting to introduce this motion gets asked: So you want the Seneschal gone? Who would you pick instead that would have confidence of the majority of the Ziu?

Note, also, that the Senäts would be included in this forthwith.

[Marti-Pair Furxheir S.H.]

Can we change this:

shall be amended to read:
The Secretary of State will punish all Ziu members who cast invalid votes in a Constructive Vote of No Confidence, as well as in an Ostracism; the punishment being the declaration of said members’ votes in the same Clark as null and void. (23RZ39)

To this:


shall be amended to read:
The Secretary of State will punish all Ziu members who cast invalid votes in a Constructive Vote of No Confidence, as well as in an Ostracism; the punishment being the declaration of said members’ votes in the same Clark as null and void, as well as making said members stand in a corner while the Secretary of State throws rotten apples at them while loudly expressing insults in multiple languages. (23RZ39)

[Sir C. M. Siervicül]

I don't like changing "Seneschal" to "Prime Minister".

Aside from that, how do you see the "constructive vote of confidence" as an improvement over OrgLaw XI:6, which seems to accomplish the same result and is already in the OrgLaw, but would be removed by this amendment?

I think the traditional VoC, which is a distinctively Talossan institution, serves an important purpose in that parties can experience significant changes over the course of a term, and there may be circumstances where it is appropriate to conclude that a new election should be held because either the Cosa or the electorate has changed so much since the last election that the former is no longer representative of the latter. On the other hand, we would still have the option of a Seneschal-initiated early dissolution under XIII:4.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Sept 19, 2016 6:08:00 GMT -6 Sir C. M. Siervicül said:

I don't like changing "Seneschal" to "Prime Minister".

Aside from that, how do you see the "constructive vote of confidence" as an improvement over OrgLaw XI:6, which seems to accomplish the same result and is already in the OrgLaw, but would be removed by this amendment?

I think the traditional VoC, which is a distinctively Talossan institution, serves an important purpose in that parties can experience significant changes over the course of a term, and there may be circumstances where it is appropriate to conclude that a new election should be held because either the Cosa or the electorate has changed so much since the last election that the former is no longer representative of the latter. On the other hand, we would still have the option of a Seneschal-initiated early dissolution under XIII:4.

I will reply to the rest at a later time, but on XI:6, the improvement would be not to be dependent on a King that is sometimes there, and sometimes not, and whose means of being reached is quite opaque. In addition to that, there is no set procedure of petitioning the King, so that this language is more confusing that the entirety of my Amendment.

[Owen Edwards]

Invasion of royal prerogative (and as a Justice who has ruled against overreach of royal prerogative in an exceptionally important case, I'm not just saying that). The King casts round for someone who can hold a majority government, or a more stable minority (if a proposed majority includes votes which aren't necessarily formally committed). The Ziu does not order the executive by law to appoint so-or-so. Let there be room for discernment and negotiation.

Beyond that, I think the VoC is fine, and has (I think) twice led to the early end of governments in recent years.

[King John]

A related issue: I've never liked the *requirement* that everyone vote on the VoC. I can certainly see instances in which, if I were an MC, I'd like to abstain — neither supporting the Government nor desiring its fall. Why don't we allow an abstention?

And why include the Senate in the VoC? That would be a little like letting the House of Lords fire the Prime Minister, no? The VoC is, and I think should continue to be, a Cosa-only thing.

— John R

[Owen Edwards]

Yep, separation of role of the Houses is good.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

I fail to see why the Senäts should be separated therefrom; I think it adds to the stability of such delicate votes and procedures to include a House that is not affected completely by GEs.

I would at least want to include the Senäts on an advisory, or suspensory capacity. An “unelected” Prime Minister might have dire consequences, as seen in the UK where many a people are complaining about Theresa May. It might be a sound choice to include as many representatives as possible in the election of a supplemental/consecutive Prime Minister.