Post by Sir C. M. Siervicül on May 25, 2013 21:37:48 GMT -6
His Majesty's Government, through its counsel, hereby presents its answer to the complaint of T. M. Asmourescu, which challenges the organicity of the What's the Difference Act, 37RZ2. The plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action, which should therefore be dismissed. In the alternative, the complaint lacks merit and judgment should be issued for the Government.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Article XVII, Section 6 of the Organic Law states that the “Ziu shall, subject to this Organic Law, have power to make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of the Kingdom” in the areas of (inter alia) “immigration and emigration, naturalization and aliens”; “treason and sedition”; and “external affairs, including foreign trade, commerce, borders and transportation.”
From the beginning, the Ziu has used these powers to regulate purported citizenship of Talossans in “micronations.” During the very first Cosa term under the new Organic Law, the Ziu enacted the Dual Citizenship Act (23RZ35), which provided:
This was effectively replaced (though not explicitly repealed) in the next term by the No Dual Citizenships in Fake Countries Act, 24RZ11, which read:
24RZ11 was supplemented in the following term by the Micronational Definition Act, 25RZ2, which provided statutory definitions relevant to 24RZ11 as follows:
The above statutes established the legal regime applicable to micronational citizenship until 2007, when the What's the Difference Act, 37RZ2, was passed by the Ziu on the first Clark of the 37th Cosa, without a single contra vote. 37RZ2, 1) repeals all three of the earlier statutes quoted above, 2) establishes a more detailed definition of the term “micronation,” 3) makes it a criminal act punishable by revocation of citizenship for a Talossan citizen to obtain citizenship in a micronation, 4) exempts “honourary citizenship” (which is defined by the act) from the scope of this criminal offence, 5) creates a “whitelisting” process to further exclude membership in organizations that might otherwise be considered micronations from the scope of the criminal offence, and 6) re-affirms Talossa's longstanding policy of prohibiting governmental relationships with micronations.
II. ARGUMENT
A. This case should be dismissed for lack of standing
The Government moves for dismissal of this case on the ground that plaintiff lacks proper standing to challenge the validity of 37RZ2.
Plaintiff asserts standing through vague statements of impedance of his rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of self-expression and limitation of his ability to function as a free citizen. These generalities are insufficient to establish a personal interest in the outcome of this litigation, as the plaintiff does not allege that he has engaged, is engaging, or intends to engage in conduct prohibited by the challenged statute. He does not describe with any particularity how the statute infringes on his personal exercise of the cited rights.
Plaintiff further states that the law makes it a crime for him to seek citizenship in a micronation, even of his own design. He does not, however, state that he intends to seek citizenship in any particular micronation, or to establish a micronation of his own design. Thus this statement is speculative and hypothetical, and has not yet ripened (and may never) into an actual personal interest in the outcome of this litigation. Furthermore, even if plaintiff were to engage in these actions, he has not yet availed himself of the administrative procedure contained in the law to obtain relief from its criminal prohibition (the “whitelisting” process), and therefore. Under both United States and United Kingdom law, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is ordinarily a precondition for seeking judicial review. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (citing “long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted”); R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2001) QB 1067 at 27 (“judicial review is a legal recourse of last resort; and an applicant must exhaust any proper alternative remedy open to him before the judicial review court will consider his case”). The Cort should apply the same principle here.
For the above reasons, the plaintiff lacks standing to seek judicial review of the challenged statute, and his complaint should therefore be dismissed.
B. The complaint is without substantive merit
The plaintiff raises six numbered grounds for asserting that 37RZ2 is inorganic and unenforceable. All of them are without merit. The grounds are discussed below in the order raised by the plaintiff.
1. Vagueness
The plaintiff asserts that the statute is unenforceable because its definition of “micronation” is “incredibly vague,” and because the Minister of Foreign Affairs has sole discretionary authority over the “whitelisting” process with no opportunity for citizens to appeal adverse decisions.
37RZ2's definition of “micronation” is sufficiently detailed and clear to give citizens fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. To the extent a citizen is left with any uncertainty as to whether he faces liability in a particular situation, the statute establishes an administrative ruling procedure (the “whitelisting” process) to allow the citizen to obtain security that he will not be prosecuted in a doubtful case.
Furthermore, plaintiff's characterization of the whitelisting process is inaccurate. The process is not within the sole discretion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as said minister is required by section 8 of the statute to consult with the Attorney-General regarding whitelisting petitions, and his determination must be approved by the Seneschal. Moreover, even where a petition has not been made, or having been made has not been granted, the Attorney-General has an independent responsibility under section 6 of the statute to determine the legal sufficiency of the potential charges against a citizen prior to initiating a prosecution for micronational citizenship. Finally, although plaintiff asserts that the process allows no opportunity for citizens to appeal adverse whitelisting decisions, the statute gives no greater leave to citizens to appeal the validity of the statute itself – and yet this action has been brought. The Government trusts that the Magistracy will not decline to exercise appropriate jurisdiction in an appropriate future case where the denial of a whitelisting petition is arbitrary or contrary to law. If the statute is unenforceable for explicitly recognizing such jurisdiction, then jurisdiction over this action is similarly suspect.
2. Conflict with the Criminal Code Reform Act, 35RZ34
The plaintiff asserts that the penalty of revocation of citizenship prescribed for violation of 37RZ2 is impermissible under the Criminal Code Reform Act, 35RZ34. But a cursory glance at the preceding sentence reveals that 35RZ34 was self-evidently enacted by the 35th Cosa, while 37RZ2 was enacted by the 37th Cosa. The complaint does not acknowledge this sequence of the statutes, or provide a theory as to how an earlier-passed law supersedes a later-passed law. As the illustrious Blackstone explained in his Commentaries on the Laws of England:
1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 89-90. Moreover:
1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 90-91.
These statements have continuing validity as basic principles of Anglo-American law. Even in the United States, which (like Talossa) have a written constitution and where the principle of absolute parliamentary supremacy does not obtain, it is recognized that a present legislature cannot bind future legislatures, because the acts of the future legislature are in no way inferior to those of its predecessors. Although the Constitution is superior to Congress (and the Organic Law to the Ziu), one Congress is not superior to the next (nor one Ziu to the next). See Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1898) ("the will of a particular Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years").
Of course, the conclusion that a statute has been implicitly repealed is to be avoided where possible; rather, statutes are to be given a harmonious construction whenever possible. As Blackstone put it:
1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 60. One of the United States' earliest legal scholars, St. George Tucker, elaborated on this point in his edition of the Commentaries:
1 Tucker's Blackstone (1803), Part 1, Section 2, note 27.
Here, 35RZ34 must be read in the context of the Criminal Code to which it refers, adopted by the Talossan Civil and Criminal Codes Act, 31RZ14, as amended by the What the Heck is the Civil Code of the State of Wisconsin Act, 35RZ21. The Criminal Code of the State of Wisconsin (Chapters 938-951, Wisconsin Code) has been recognized as the criminal code of Talossa as well. Wisconsin's Criminal Code contains a scheme (set forth in Chapter 939) for classifying criminal offences (such as “class C felony” or “class A misdemeanour”) and specifying penalties applicable to different offences based on their classification. 35RZ34 serves to provide further clarification and guidance for sentencing in cases of such offences that are defined by their classification but do not explicitly specify the applicable penalty. In light of the principles of statutory construction described above, it must not be taken to purport to prohibit future Zius from defining criminal offenses outside of the Criminal Code or explicitly specifying particularly penalties applicable to those offenses.
3-5. Violation of the Organic Law's Covenant of Rights and Freedoms
The plaintiff alleges that 37RZ2 violates the 2nd, 5th, and 13th Covenants of the Organic Law's Covenant of Rights and Freedoms (Article XIX). The complaint appears to be based on the Organic Law as it stood prior to the ratification of the Article XIX Amendment, 44RZ11, in July 2012. The covenants cited by plaintiff now exist in substantially similar form as the 1st, 3rd, and 6th Covenants, respectively.
The 2nd Covenant protects “the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression.” But 37RZ2 does not target any thought, belief, opinion, or expression; it is aimed squarely at non-speech conduct: holding citizenship in a purported nation not recognized by the Kingdom of Talossa – and then only when the citizenship carries the legal right to participate in the political process of the purported nation (not “honourary citizenship”). These actions are regulated not because of their expressive content, but because of their legal effect and significance, apart from the challenged statute. All citizens remain free to think any thought, hold any belief, or express any opinion regarding micronations in general or any micronation in particular. They are prohibited only from voluntarily assuming a legal status incompatible with the longstanding foreign policy of the Kingdom of Talossa.
The 3rd Covenant protects the rights of citizens to freely assemble and to organize political parties and other organizations. Implicit in this guarantee is the concept that the organizations in question are private organizations subject to the Organic Law. It should not be taken to create a right to claim sovereignty independent of Talossa, defying the authority or jurisdiction of the Organic Law. Viewed in this context, it can be seen once again that 37RZ2 does not restrict the right of citizens to assemble or organize under the Organic Law, but only forbids attempts to adopt a legal status under a purported sovereignty outside the Organic Law.
The 6th Covenant states that: “Liberty consists of any action which is not detrimental to others, and no right herein enumerated, or elsewhere recognised by the Cosâ, shall extend to anyone engaged in activities which injure, endanger, risk or compromise the physical health, privacy, or tranquility of other persons through the pretended exercise of said right.” By its terms, this Covenant acts as a limitation on the claimed exercise of other rights under the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms, declaring that no one may raise their Covenant rights (the phrase “right herein enumerated” being most naturally interpreted as referring to those rights protected by the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms) as an excuse for “activities which injure, endanger, risk or compromise the physical health, privacy, or tranquility of other persons.” Because 37RZ2 is not a “pretended exercise” of an individual right guaranteed by the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms, but rather the exercise of enumerated powers of the Ziu specified in Article XVII, Section 6, the 6th Covenant has no apparent relevance to 37RZ2.
6. The plaintiff concludes by observing that national statutes contrary to the Organic Law are null and void. This is indisputable, as far as it goes, but the force of the observation is entirely dependent on whether 37RZ2 actually does violate the Organic Law. As the above discussion reveals, it does not.
Certain language found in the preamble to the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms (originally the 1st Covenant) is particularly illuminating in this respect:
It must be recognized that prohibiting micronational citizenship has been a continuous and consistent policy of the Kingdom of Talossa from the earliest days of the Organic Law. The details of the definition and enforcement of the policy have changed, but the basic policy has remained constant for sixteen years. Such longstanding statutory precedent carries the weight of “Talossan custom and tradition”, and is due substantial deference in interpreting the Covenant. It is also consistent with the historical practice of other nations within the Anglo-American legal tradition. See 8 United States Code § 1481(a); Canadian Citizenship Act 1946, ch. 15 S.C. 1946, Part III, § 15; Savorgnan v. United States, 338 US 491, 498 (1950) (“From the beginning, one of the most obvious and effective forms of expatriation has been that of naturalization under the laws of another nation”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in section II.A of this answer, plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action for judicial review of 37RZ2, which should therefore be dismissed. In the alternative, for the reasons stated in section II.B of this answer, the claims of the plaintiff are without merit and the Cort should grant judgment in favour of the Government.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of May, 2013/XXXIV,
/s/
C. M. Siervicül
Counsel for His Majesty's Government
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Article XVII, Section 6 of the Organic Law states that the “Ziu shall, subject to this Organic Law, have power to make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of the Kingdom” in the areas of (inter alia) “immigration and emigration, naturalization and aliens”; “treason and sedition”; and “external affairs, including foreign trade, commerce, borders and transportation.”
From the beginning, the Ziu has used these powers to regulate purported citizenship of Talossans in “micronations.” During the very first Cosa term under the new Organic Law, the Ziu enacted the Dual Citizenship Act (23RZ35), which provided:
WHEREAS, no nation on earth allows its own citizens to be "Dual Citizens" without some special legal dispensation; and
WHEREAS, citizenship in Talossa and friendship with non-Talossans are completely different matters, and one's true friends will obviously understand why Talossan citizenship is incompatible with activity in a friend's micronation; and
WHEREAS, because of Talossa's small population, it makes an enormous difference if even a handful of individuals are somehow loyal to foreign (and potentially hostile) heads of state;
THEREFORE, the Ziu hereby proclaims that Talossan citizenship is incompatible with any real or pretended citizenship in any "micronation."
Exception 1: such one-person, no-other-citizens-but-me imaginary places that individual Talossans may create as diversionary experiments, and which do not allow the recruiting of citizens for themselves.
Exception 2: The Ziu may make special individual exceptions to this Act, by law. Violations of this Act are considered to be treason, and the Uppermost Cort is empowered to enforce this Act accordingly.
This was effectively replaced (though not explicitly repealed) in the next term by the No Dual Citizenships in Fake Countries Act, 24RZ11, which read:
The Ziu hereby resolves: Any contract of "dual citizenship" or any other type of formal, legal participation equivalent to citizenship, in any micronation (other than Talossa), by a citizen of Talossa, shall constitute the renunciation of Talossan citizenship by said person. The Uppermost Cort shall enforce this Act through appropriate means.
24RZ11 was supplemented in the following term by the Micronational Definition Act, 25RZ2, which provided statutory definitions relevant to 24RZ11 as follows:
The Ziu hereby resolves that a micronation is:
1. A country with 1 or more citizens, which is not recognised by the international community of nations.
2. And that by "participation in a micronation" it means when a person either:
1. may vote in general elections,
2. may participate in legislative referenda,
3. may partake of the decisionmaking in one of the 3 branches of government,
4. may participate in local debating fora,
5. publishes newspapers,
6. makes a website,
7. participates in local discussions via snail- or e-mail,
8. is a naturalised citizen.
The above statutes established the legal regime applicable to micronational citizenship until 2007, when the What's the Difference Act, 37RZ2, was passed by the Ziu on the first Clark of the 37th Cosa, without a single contra vote. 37RZ2, 1) repeals all three of the earlier statutes quoted above, 2) establishes a more detailed definition of the term “micronation,” 3) makes it a criminal act punishable by revocation of citizenship for a Talossan citizen to obtain citizenship in a micronation, 4) exempts “honourary citizenship” (which is defined by the act) from the scope of this criminal offence, 5) creates a “whitelisting” process to further exclude membership in organizations that might otherwise be considered micronations from the scope of the criminal offence, and 6) re-affirms Talossa's longstanding policy of prohibiting governmental relationships with micronations.
II. ARGUMENT
A. This case should be dismissed for lack of standing
The Government moves for dismissal of this case on the ground that plaintiff lacks proper standing to challenge the validity of 37RZ2.
Plaintiff asserts standing through vague statements of impedance of his rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of self-expression and limitation of his ability to function as a free citizen. These generalities are insufficient to establish a personal interest in the outcome of this litigation, as the plaintiff does not allege that he has engaged, is engaging, or intends to engage in conduct prohibited by the challenged statute. He does not describe with any particularity how the statute infringes on his personal exercise of the cited rights.
Plaintiff further states that the law makes it a crime for him to seek citizenship in a micronation, even of his own design. He does not, however, state that he intends to seek citizenship in any particular micronation, or to establish a micronation of his own design. Thus this statement is speculative and hypothetical, and has not yet ripened (and may never) into an actual personal interest in the outcome of this litigation. Furthermore, even if plaintiff were to engage in these actions, he has not yet availed himself of the administrative procedure contained in the law to obtain relief from its criminal prohibition (the “whitelisting” process), and therefore. Under both United States and United Kingdom law, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is ordinarily a precondition for seeking judicial review. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (citing “long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted”); R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2001) QB 1067 at 27 (“judicial review is a legal recourse of last resort; and an applicant must exhaust any proper alternative remedy open to him before the judicial review court will consider his case”). The Cort should apply the same principle here.
For the above reasons, the plaintiff lacks standing to seek judicial review of the challenged statute, and his complaint should therefore be dismissed.
B. The complaint is without substantive merit
The plaintiff raises six numbered grounds for asserting that 37RZ2 is inorganic and unenforceable. All of them are without merit. The grounds are discussed below in the order raised by the plaintiff.
1. Vagueness
The plaintiff asserts that the statute is unenforceable because its definition of “micronation” is “incredibly vague,” and because the Minister of Foreign Affairs has sole discretionary authority over the “whitelisting” process with no opportunity for citizens to appeal adverse decisions.
37RZ2's definition of “micronation” is sufficiently detailed and clear to give citizens fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. To the extent a citizen is left with any uncertainty as to whether he faces liability in a particular situation, the statute establishes an administrative ruling procedure (the “whitelisting” process) to allow the citizen to obtain security that he will not be prosecuted in a doubtful case.
Furthermore, plaintiff's characterization of the whitelisting process is inaccurate. The process is not within the sole discretion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as said minister is required by section 8 of the statute to consult with the Attorney-General regarding whitelisting petitions, and his determination must be approved by the Seneschal. Moreover, even where a petition has not been made, or having been made has not been granted, the Attorney-General has an independent responsibility under section 6 of the statute to determine the legal sufficiency of the potential charges against a citizen prior to initiating a prosecution for micronational citizenship. Finally, although plaintiff asserts that the process allows no opportunity for citizens to appeal adverse whitelisting decisions, the statute gives no greater leave to citizens to appeal the validity of the statute itself – and yet this action has been brought. The Government trusts that the Magistracy will not decline to exercise appropriate jurisdiction in an appropriate future case where the denial of a whitelisting petition is arbitrary or contrary to law. If the statute is unenforceable for explicitly recognizing such jurisdiction, then jurisdiction over this action is similarly suspect.
2. Conflict with the Criminal Code Reform Act, 35RZ34
The plaintiff asserts that the penalty of revocation of citizenship prescribed for violation of 37RZ2 is impermissible under the Criminal Code Reform Act, 35RZ34. But a cursory glance at the preceding sentence reveals that 35RZ34 was self-evidently enacted by the 35th Cosa, while 37RZ2 was enacted by the 37th Cosa. The complaint does not acknowledge this sequence of the statutes, or provide a theory as to how an earlier-passed law supersedes a later-passed law. As the illustrious Blackstone explained in his Commentaries on the Laws of England:
Where the common law and a statute differ, the common law gives place to the statute; and an old statute gives place to a new one. And this upon a general principle of universal law, that "leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant;" consonant to which it was laid down by a law of the twelve tables at Rome, that "quod populus postremum jussit, id jus ratum esto." But this is to be understood, only when the latter statute is couched in negative terms, or where its matter is so clearly repugnant, that it necessarily implies a negative. . . . But if both acts be merely affirmative, and the substance such that both may stand together, here the latter does not repeal the former, but they shall both have a concurrent efficacy.
1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 89-90. Moreover:
Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not. . . . Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it's ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament. And upon the same principle Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, treats with a proper contempt these restraining clauses, which endeavour to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. "When you repeal the law itself, says he, you at the same time repeal the prohibitory clause, which guards against such repeal."
1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 90-91.
These statements have continuing validity as basic principles of Anglo-American law. Even in the United States, which (like Talossa) have a written constitution and where the principle of absolute parliamentary supremacy does not obtain, it is recognized that a present legislature cannot bind future legislatures, because the acts of the future legislature are in no way inferior to those of its predecessors. Although the Constitution is superior to Congress (and the Organic Law to the Ziu), one Congress is not superior to the next (nor one Ziu to the next). See Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1898) ("the will of a particular Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years").
Of course, the conclusion that a statute has been implicitly repealed is to be avoided where possible; rather, statutes are to be given a harmonious construction whenever possible. As Blackstone put it:
If words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their meaning from the context; with which it may be of singular use to compare a word, or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of parliament. Of the same nature and use is the comparison of a law with other laws, that are made by the same legislator, that have some affinity with the subject, or that expressly relate to the same point.
1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 60. One of the United States' earliest legal scholars, St. George Tucker, elaborated on this point in his edition of the Commentaries:
It is an established rule of construction that statutes in pari materia, or upon the same subject, must be construed with a reference to each other; that is, that what is clear in one statute, shall be called in aid to explain what is obscure and ambiguous in another.
1 Tucker's Blackstone (1803), Part 1, Section 2, note 27.
Here, 35RZ34 must be read in the context of the Criminal Code to which it refers, adopted by the Talossan Civil and Criminal Codes Act, 31RZ14, as amended by the What the Heck is the Civil Code of the State of Wisconsin Act, 35RZ21. The Criminal Code of the State of Wisconsin (Chapters 938-951, Wisconsin Code) has been recognized as the criminal code of Talossa as well. Wisconsin's Criminal Code contains a scheme (set forth in Chapter 939) for classifying criminal offences (such as “class C felony” or “class A misdemeanour”) and specifying penalties applicable to different offences based on their classification. 35RZ34 serves to provide further clarification and guidance for sentencing in cases of such offences that are defined by their classification but do not explicitly specify the applicable penalty. In light of the principles of statutory construction described above, it must not be taken to purport to prohibit future Zius from defining criminal offenses outside of the Criminal Code or explicitly specifying particularly penalties applicable to those offenses.
3-5. Violation of the Organic Law's Covenant of Rights and Freedoms
The plaintiff alleges that 37RZ2 violates the 2nd, 5th, and 13th Covenants of the Organic Law's Covenant of Rights and Freedoms (Article XIX). The complaint appears to be based on the Organic Law as it stood prior to the ratification of the Article XIX Amendment, 44RZ11, in July 2012. The covenants cited by plaintiff now exist in substantially similar form as the 1st, 3rd, and 6th Covenants, respectively.
The 2nd Covenant protects “the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression.” But 37RZ2 does not target any thought, belief, opinion, or expression; it is aimed squarely at non-speech conduct: holding citizenship in a purported nation not recognized by the Kingdom of Talossa – and then only when the citizenship carries the legal right to participate in the political process of the purported nation (not “honourary citizenship”). These actions are regulated not because of their expressive content, but because of their legal effect and significance, apart from the challenged statute. All citizens remain free to think any thought, hold any belief, or express any opinion regarding micronations in general or any micronation in particular. They are prohibited only from voluntarily assuming a legal status incompatible with the longstanding foreign policy of the Kingdom of Talossa.
The 3rd Covenant protects the rights of citizens to freely assemble and to organize political parties and other organizations. Implicit in this guarantee is the concept that the organizations in question are private organizations subject to the Organic Law. It should not be taken to create a right to claim sovereignty independent of Talossa, defying the authority or jurisdiction of the Organic Law. Viewed in this context, it can be seen once again that 37RZ2 does not restrict the right of citizens to assemble or organize under the Organic Law, but only forbids attempts to adopt a legal status under a purported sovereignty outside the Organic Law.
The 6th Covenant states that: “Liberty consists of any action which is not detrimental to others, and no right herein enumerated, or elsewhere recognised by the Cosâ, shall extend to anyone engaged in activities which injure, endanger, risk or compromise the physical health, privacy, or tranquility of other persons through the pretended exercise of said right.” By its terms, this Covenant acts as a limitation on the claimed exercise of other rights under the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms, declaring that no one may raise their Covenant rights (the phrase “right herein enumerated” being most naturally interpreted as referring to those rights protected by the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms) as an excuse for “activities which injure, endanger, risk or compromise the physical health, privacy, or tranquility of other persons.” Because 37RZ2 is not a “pretended exercise” of an individual right guaranteed by the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms, but rather the exercise of enumerated powers of the Ziu specified in Article XVII, Section 6, the 6th Covenant has no apparent relevance to 37RZ2.
6. The plaintiff concludes by observing that national statutes contrary to the Organic Law are null and void. This is indisputable, as far as it goes, but the force of the observation is entirely dependent on whether 37RZ2 actually does violate the Organic Law. As the above discussion reveals, it does not.
Certain language found in the preamble to the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms (originally the 1st Covenant) is particularly illuminating in this respect:
These Covenants shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with Talossan custom and tradition, and with the aim in mind of preserving and enhancing the ethnic heritage of the Talossan nation and the peace, order, and good government for the Kingdom of Talossa.
It must be recognized that prohibiting micronational citizenship has been a continuous and consistent policy of the Kingdom of Talossa from the earliest days of the Organic Law. The details of the definition and enforcement of the policy have changed, but the basic policy has remained constant for sixteen years. Such longstanding statutory precedent carries the weight of “Talossan custom and tradition”, and is due substantial deference in interpreting the Covenant. It is also consistent with the historical practice of other nations within the Anglo-American legal tradition. See 8 United States Code § 1481(a); Canadian Citizenship Act 1946, ch. 15 S.C. 1946, Part III, § 15; Savorgnan v. United States, 338 US 491, 498 (1950) (“From the beginning, one of the most obvious and effective forms of expatriation has been that of naturalization under the laws of another nation”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in section II.A of this answer, plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action for judicial review of 37RZ2, which should therefore be dismissed. In the alternative, for the reasons stated in section II.B of this answer, the claims of the plaintiff are without merit and the Cort should grant judgment in favour of the Government.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of May, 2013/XXXIV,
/s/
C. M. Siervicül
Counsel for His Majesty's Government