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Post by Martì Prevuost on Jul 11, 2013 13:16:21 GMT -6
The Cort, in no wise, intended to stifle discussion of the opinion by this latest post, merely to reaffirm its opinion.
The Cort invites the Honourable Puisne Justice of the Uppermost Cort to inquire further if that is his desire.
M.A.G. Prevuost Magistrate
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Ián Tamorán S.H.
Chief Justice of the Uppermost Court
Proud Philosopher of Talossa
Posts: 1,401
Talossan Since: 9-27-2010
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Post by Ián Tamorán S.H. on Jul 14, 2013 15:18:43 GMT -6
I note, from postings made elsewhere, that this - somewhat lengthy comment of mine here may be a little late. I shall make it anyway. A Thesaurus does not provide definitions of words: a dictionary does. To quote an easily-accessible source: (from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thesaurus ) Also:(my emphasis added). If we look at the use of dictionaries in courts in other countries we may, in Talossa, garner some guidance as to what the Corts might do. (Kevin Webach, from werbach.com/stuff/hlr_note.html)We must note the cautions raised in the most excellent paper War Of The Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries In Accordance With Textualist Principles, Phillip A Rubin, Duke University of Law, etc. (from scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1474&context=dlj), but we may, from that same source, note: Since we are, in case 13-01, in objective rationality contemplating only the ‘plain meaning’ or words, (Note: See more at: blog.oup.com/2011/06/dictionary-courtroom/ ), we do not need to consider specific Legal dictionaries, such as Stroud's judicial dictionary of words and phrases. 7th ed (2007, Sweet and Maxwell) or Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1872 Edition), Ballentine's Law Dictionary, or Black's Law Dictionary (4th edition or earlier: see thelawdictionary.org ). The Supreme Court in the USA appears to prefer Webster’s 3rd (in its various editions - 1961, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986), Webster’s 2nd (1939, 1942, 1945, 1949, 1950, 1954, 1957), as well as the original Webster 1828 (information from and www.1215.org/lawnotes/lawnotes/language.htm ). In the UK we seem to prefer the Oxford English Dictionary (usually abbreviated as OED and often, colloquially, called The Greater Oxford):(from www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/dictionary quoting The Law Society). In none of the references that I have encountered in my research into the use of dictionaries in Courts of Law in the USA and the UK have I found reference to the use of a Thesaurus to determine the meaning of a term.It may be noted from my previous remarks in this thread, and from postings made elsewhere, that revered dictionaries do not support the synonymity of the words seek and desire, upon which some part of the judgement in this case depends. It is my considered opinion that the Corts in Talossa should, henceforth, use, primarily, dictionaries in the determination of the meanings of terms.Which dictionaries the Corts should use, however, it is not for me to decide here - though I would strongly suggest Webster's 3rd and the OED, in the first instance. Puisne Justice Ián Tamorán14th day of July in the year of our Lord 2013/xxxiii [As a complete aside – there is a lovely article concerning the verification of word derivations at www.guardian.co.uk/books/2013/may/10/oxford-english-dictionary-meanderings-memory )
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Ián Tamorán S.H.
Chief Justice of the Uppermost Court
Proud Philosopher of Talossa
Posts: 1,401
Talossan Since: 9-27-2010
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Post by Ián Tamorán S.H. on Jul 14, 2013 17:13:17 GMT -6
This posting is not yet complete: I, alas, do not have enough time to finish it this evening - but I shall return. You may, of course, read this posting - but it is not in the form upon which observations may be made by others until I have edited and signed it.Note that in the postings in this thread I am NOT making any comments on the arguments raised by the parties in this case, but only upon the legal aspects of the ruling given in this case. I am NOT going to make public any consideration of the arguments raised by the parties, as they have not been made before me in Cort. I am NOT going to make public any opinions I have or may have as to the arguments of the various parties involved unless and until they are made before me in Cort. I wish here to raise some points of legal consideration upon the ruling given in case 13-01 by My Learned Colleague, The Honourable Martì Prevuost, Esq., Magistrate which I partially quote: 1. The Act’s provision allowing for honorary citizenship sufficiently provides for freedom of expression, association and general liberty as a citizen of Talossa in accordance with the Covenants of Rights and Freedoms cited. 2. The Act sufficiently defines a micronation. 3. That, while the Act is in keeping with the history and tradition of Talossa not recognizing micronations, the Kingdom of Talossa itself meets the legal definition of, and is hereby defined as, a micronation. 4. Clauses 6 and 8 of the Act are inconsistent and unenforceable as written. In accordance with OrgLaw XVI:9, the Cort is required to use the plain language meaning of words unless a specific technical meaning is intended. The words “desire” and “seek” are synonyms, therefore, by desiring membership in an organization which may constitute a violation of Clause 6, a Talossan citizen may be guilty of seeking to hold citizenship in an organization in violation Clause 6 merely by exercising the option afforded in Clause 8, i.e. whitelisting. Should the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Attorney General and with the approval of the Seneschal determine the organization is not consistent with citizenship in Talossa, the citizen who expressed a desire to join said organization could be tried for seeking to hold citizenship in a micronation and be subject to revocation. In accordance with OrgLaw XVI:9, the Cort calls upon the Ziu to revise the Act. 5. Given the penalty for violation of the Act, it is assumed violation constitutes a felony. 6. There is no inconsistency with the lack of judicial discretion with respect to the penalty for violation and OrgLaw Article XVI: The Corts. Of these six separate points, I am in agreement with only one of them - number 5 - that Act 37RZ2 defines the proposed offence as a felony. I wish to raise some careful consideration of the other five points.
In this posting I am going to discuss only the first point: Freedom of expression. Subsequent postings will deal with other points.
Act 37RZ2 denies the Talossan citizen the freedom to be any part of any micronation (*) which is democratic. (*) except those already permitted. The model Talossan citizen, whom, for the case of this discussion I shall name Ián Evéu (being the Talossan John Doe, though more dear to us than that) is a Talossan citizen in good standing, who neither desires nor seeks to contravene the Laws of The Kingdom of Talossa / El Regipäts Talossan. (a) Let us suppose, furthermore, that Ián Evéu is (by right of birth) a citizen of Southern Ireland. Now, within the meaning of Act 37RZ2 Southern Ireland is not a micronation. But let us also suppose that, due to no action on the part of the estimable Ián Evéu, Southern Ireland declares that it is no longer a member of The United Nations, and that it is no longer a member of The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. By the wording of 37RZ2, as quoted in this Cort, Southern Ireland becomes a micronation - a ludicrous, but none the less real, legal fiction. Of course, Talossa could, in its wisdom, recognise Southern Ireland or could reword or clarify 37RZ2 to permit all nations which have ever been members of The United Nations, but until that action is taken Ián Evéu as a result of no action of his is potentially in contravention of this law 37RZ2. (b) Let us, instead, suppose that Ián Evéu is, by birth, a citizen of Sudan, prior to its partitioning. There was, then, a brief period in which Southern Sudan existed - and of which Ián Evéu could have been a citizen - but was not yet a member of The United Nations. For that brief period our blameless friend Ián Evéu was again in contravention of Act 37RZ2. (c) Let us again, instead, suppose that Ián Evéu is by birth a citizen of some ordinary nation, such as The United Kingdom, but that he also has by choice become a citizen of a known micronation called XYZia. For the purposes of this discussion we shall assume both that XYZia is not recognised by Talossa, and that the citizens of XYZia have no vote in the running of that micronation - it is (say) a dictatorship. Although Ián Evéu is a member of the sort of nation (albeit micronation) that we, explicitly, in Talossa deem to be of dubious moral quality, he has committed no offence under Act 37RZ2. (d) Now let us suppose, using the same conditions as (c), that the dictator of XYZia has a change of heart, and permits it to become a free democracy, allowing a vote to each of its citizens. Now XYZia is the sort of micronation that we, in Talossa, seem to deem of good moral standing - it is, after all, the standard to which we ourselves aspire. But until XYZia is recognised (whitelisted) by Talossa our puzzled citizen Ián Evéu is now in contravention of Act 37RZ2. In other words, Ián Evéu needs no permission to be subject to a despicable dictatorship, but breaks our laws by taking part in a free democracy.It is my opinion that The Ziu, in not considering these, or similar, points in the framing of Act 37RZ2 took an action, in voting for that act, which it might not have done, after more sober thought. It is, of course, not for me to say what the Ziu might or might not have done - it is a free body. It is, however, for me to comment on what it is possible for the Ziu to do.Although a parliament is unfettered, and may pass whatever laws it pleases, there are, none the less, restrictions upon it: Impossibility: It can not, for example, meaningfully pass a law which contravenes Natural Law. Thus, the Corts cannot enforce an act which requires, for example, that in Talossa an oject dropped falls upwards on even numbered days, sideways on prime numbered days, and in a random direction on other days. Nor a law that requires all its citizens to walk at the speed of 20 kilometres per hour, as that is an unreasonable expectation for the bulk of people. Parliament cannot require the impossible.
Immorality: Also parliament cannot, meaningfully, pass a law which contravenes Moral Law. Thus the Corts may be (and in my opinion, should be) reluctant to enforce an act which requires dishonesty or lying or theft or religious intolerance, etc. This restriction is a more difficult one than Impossibility, as moral jugements change over time, and are not agreed between all persons, but none the less Parliament cannot require the immoral.
Inconsistency: Parliament, if it passes a law that is inconsistent with existing laws, creates a problem for the courts. The existing, inconsistent, laws may be deemed by the courts to have been, wholly or in part, repealed; or the courts may declare that they are unable to judge upon contraventions of the lawas affected, as the will of the parliament is not clear. Good drafting of laws should avoid this error - but, none the less, it may still arise. Parliament cannot require the inconsistent. So let us consider Impossibility, Immorality and Inconsistency in relation to the Ziu's Act 37RZ2 here in The Kingdom of Talossa / El Regipäts Talossan.Impossibility. It is impossible to detect all contraventions of Act 37RZ2. If we require, of every citizen and every prospect, that they honestly declare all their citizenships or things which might, in Talossa, be deemed to be citizenships and then deny Talossan citizenship to those that seem to contravene Act 37RZ2 then, you may think, we could detect every contravention. But a Talossan citizen in good standing, our stalwart Ián Evéu, say, may not know all his other potential citizenships. My own children, for example, discovered quite by accident that they too were citzens of Southern Ireland (as I am, by birth), even though they are also (by birth) citizens of The United Kingdom. Are they, without knowing, also citizens of XYZia? Perhaps they are - who knows? Can they, then, legally (within the Talossan code, including 37RZ2) successfully apply to become citizens of Talossa? Similarly, we see an incorrect (and inconsistent) basis in 23RZ35 (a precursor to 37RZ2) which declares using this to suggest that some other-micronation citizens might be whilst not considering that same (hypothetical) conflict for non-micronations. It is my opinion that Act 37RZ2 requires Impossibility.Immorality. Talossa is a free place. That is part of our pride. We talk openly and freely. We criticise each other in loud, and uncensored voices. Talossa is a democracy. That, too, is part of our pride. We talk openly and freely about our democracy, and how it could be changed or improved or is already perfect or a hundred other things. Act 37RZ2, however, says that Talossans may not associate with other democracies - unless Talossa permits it. Act 37RZ2 also says that Talossans may, without contravening Talossan law, associate with dictatorships, or non-democratic associates. This was not the intention of The Ziu in considering this act. FOr if it was the intention of The Ziu, then The Ziu is permitting - nay, promoting - immorality in its acts. It is my opinion that Act 37RZ2 requires (or permits) Immorality.Inconsistency. Not only is Talossa a free place, we have declared it to be a free place. Within the Organic Law {SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO BE INSERTED HERE} we have emphasised the freedom of Talossan citizens. {CONSTRASTS AND CONCLUSION TO BE INSERTED HERE}
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Sir C. M. Siervicül
Posts: 9,636
Talossan Since: 8-13-2005
Knight Since: 7-28-2007
Motto: Nonnisi Deo serviendum
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Post by Sir C. M. Siervicül on Jul 14, 2013 19:35:58 GMT -6
Is this kind of back and forth really appropriate, on what may soon be an appeal to the Uppermost Cort?
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Jul 14, 2013 20:17:29 GMT -6
Indeed, it appears that at least one of the Puisne Justices has already begun to issue his opinion on the case, well before argument is made or evidence presented.
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Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă
Puisne (Associate) Justice of the Uppermost Court
Fraichetz dels punts, es non dels mürs
Posts: 4,063
Talossan Since: 9-23-2012
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Post by Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă on Jul 14, 2013 20:23:57 GMT -6
The Uppermost Cort seems to be tainted with only one justice that hasn't weighed in.
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Ián Tamorán S.H.
Chief Justice of the Uppermost Court
Proud Philosopher of Talossa
Posts: 1,401
Talossan Since: 9-27-2010
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Post by Ián Tamorán S.H. on Jul 15, 2013 11:13:00 GMT -6
Indeed, it appears that at least one of the Puisne Justices has already begun to issue his opinion on the case, well before argument is made or evidence presented. With respect, I am NOT issuing opinions on the case. I AM, however, issuing legal opinions upon the specific ruling made by one of my Learned Colleagues. At the time of posting, I am still in the course of writing a further comment upon that ruling.
At the risk of being boring (because I am repeating myself) I am making NO consideration of the arguments raised by either of the parties in this case (13-01), but only upon the legal foundations of the ruling itself. Puisne Justine Ián Tamorán15th day of July in the year of our Lord 2013/xxxiii
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Jul 15, 2013 11:36:00 GMT -6
S:reu Justice, I respectfully suggest that you are in fact issuing legal opinions about a ruling that may soon be appealed to your own Cort. Further, while you may have intended only to comment on the specific ruling made by the Magistrate, your remarks are so wide-ranging and strongly-worded that they present themselves as formed opinions on the validity of the law in question, rather than commentary on a ruling.
To wit: reading what you have written, it seems that you have already formed and issued a strong opinion about 37RZ2, well before any representative of the government has had any opportunity to appear before you and argue on its behalf during a full and legal appeal - an appeal that surely would constitute what the Organic Law describes as "the fullest opportunity for all members assigned to a case to consider the case in question" (Org.XVI.8). It seems clear that during any subsequent appeal, your decision has been made about the Organicity of 37RZ2, well before the appeal even began and arguments could be heard.
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Capt. Sir Mick Preston
Capitán of the Zouaves
Posts: 6,511
Talossan Since: 9-21-2006
Knight Since: 10-12-2010
Motto: Cuimhnichibh air na daoine bho'n d'thainig sibh
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Post by Capt. Sir Mick Preston on Jul 15, 2013 13:54:36 GMT -6
I find it problematic that a sitting Uppermost Court Judge is commenting on a lower court's ruling, before it has a chance to be appealed.
Unless, of course, that Judge plans on recusing himself because of his publicly stated opinions on the issue.
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Sir C. M. Siervicül
Posts: 9,636
Talossan Since: 8-13-2005
Knight Since: 7-28-2007
Motto: Nonnisi Deo serviendum
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Post by Sir C. M. Siervicül on Jul 15, 2013 16:58:31 GMT -6
With respect, I am NOT issuing opinions on the case. I AM, however, issuing legal opinions upon the specific ruling made by one of my Learned Colleagues. At the time of posting, I am still in the course of writing a further comment upon that ruling. But the "specific ruling" would be the subject of any appeal in this case. That is, an appeal consists of claims of legal error in a specific ruling made by the court below.
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Post by Béneditsch Ardpresteir, O.SPM. on Jul 16, 2013 11:38:30 GMT -6
Your Honour,
Whenever the appeal is lodged, it should and definitely would be lodged with an application for appointment of two temporary judges to the CpI.
I would also request all, especially the government representatives, to refrain from voicing their comments any further in the Courtroom.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 17, 2013 6:32:26 GMT -6
Your Honour, Whenever the appeal is lodged, it should and definitely would be lodged with an application for appointment of two temporary judges to the CpI. I would also request all, especially the government representatives, to refrain from voicing their comments any further in the Courtroom. Should the government make such an application, I certainly hope it is aware that under the Organic Law the "substitute justice" must be nominated by the Justice who recuses himself and approved by the remaining Justices.
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Post by Béneditsch Ardpresteir, O.SPM. on Jul 17, 2013 10:11:52 GMT -6
Your Honour, Whenever the appeal is lodged, it should and definitely would be lodged with an application for appointment of two temporary judges to the CpI. I would also request all, especially the government representatives, to refrain from voicing their comments any further in the Courtroom. Should the government make such an application, I certainly hope it is aware that under the Organic Law the "substitute justice" must be nominated by the Justice who recuses himself and approved by the remaining Justices. Your Honour, As and when such steps are required to be taken, it is needless to say that all necessary formalities would be complied with. With this I would request this case to be closed, and the courtroom cleared. The AG's office is always open to all concerned for any querries and mails may be written to <AG.KOT@LEGALICS.COM> or PMs sent.
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Ián Tamorán S.H.
Chief Justice of the Uppermost Court
Proud Philosopher of Talossa
Posts: 1,401
Talossan Since: 9-27-2010
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Post by Ián Tamorán S.H. on Jul 19, 2013 2:14:09 GMT -6
S:reu Justice, I respectfully suggest that you are in fact issuing legal opinions about a ruling that may soon be appealed to your own Cort. Further, while you may have intended only to comment on the specific ruling made by the Magistrate, your remarks are so wide-ranging and strongly-worded that they present themselves as formed opinions on the validity of the law in question, rather than commentary on a ruling. To wit: reading what you have written, it seems that you have already formed and issued a strong opinion about 37RZ2, well before any representative of the government has had any opportunity to appear before you and argue on its behalf during a full and legal appeal - an appeal that surely would constitute what the Organic Law describes as "the fullest opportunity for all members assigned to a case to consider the case in question" (Org.XVI.8). It seems clear that during any subsequent appeal, your decision has been made about the Organicity of 37RZ2, well before the appeal even began and arguments could be heard. Since there is doubt being voiced here as to what my comments are about I shall, for the moment, not complete them. I wish to make it clear that I was NOT (and am not), in those comments, making any statement about the Organicity of 37RZ2, but (amongst other things) pointing out that the judgement itself, as given, did not itself consider certain things - in particular, the Organicity of 37RZ2, the dictionary meanings of words, the environment within which past acts of the Ziu were framed, and the moral implications of our Talossan law. I shall also restate here: I am NOT considering any of the case's arguments: I AM observing that my learned colleague, in issuing the judgement, did not clearly state and show that those arguments had been fully considered - along with other things it is incumbent upon those seated in judgement to consider.
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Post by Martì Prevuost on Jul 19, 2013 19:18:29 GMT -6
The Cort is not displeased by the interest shown in this case, nor by the discussion of the opinion.
While the Cort appreciates the Attorney General's request that the case be closed and the Cortroom cleared, the Cort is sufficiently capable of exercising discretion on matters of decorum, specifically within its own jurisdiction.
For the record - the case has been closed as is evident by the opinion issued by the Cort. Discussions following the opinion, while perhaps more appropriate in the Witt forum or The Chat Room, are nevertheless not INappropriate in this forum as long as they are conducted with the concurrence of the presiding Magistrate. As the presiding Magistrate entertained the requests for clarification, the questioner had the concurrence of the Cort.
Discussion having died down, the case having been resolved pending appeal, and the Cort adjourned - I propose the bailiff and I retire to the nearest bar wherein Hool has a tab where we shall "strike a blow for liberty."
M.A.G. Prevuost Magistrate
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