Special Contempt of Court Hearing

[Danihel Laurieir]

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Because it is a separate and distinct proceeding, this thread will be devoted exclusively to the special contempt of court hearing arising from the Woolley v. Martüc case.

Because of the circumstances involved in this particular contempt of court case, the Cort will likely allow no direct postings to this thread from the defendant. Transcripts of the Cort proceedings will be published here as expeditiously as possible.

At present, and for the foreseeable future, only Justices to the Cort will be allowed to post in this thread.

The Cort will be making more announcements related to this case soon.

Danihél Lauriéir
Acting Senior Justice of the Cort pü Înalt

[Danihel Laurieir]

CORT CONTEMPT COMPLAINT, REPORT AND RULES ARE MADE PUBLIC

The Cort sent the following memorandum, containing this Cort's contempt complaint, its report on its investigation into the circumstances surrounding the display of contempt and rules relating to the conduct of this special hearing, to Ups Antônio Martüc (the Defendant) just before 9:00 PM Eastern Time on this day.



TO: Ups Antônio Martüc
FROM: The Talossan Uppermost Cort
DATE: May 15, 2006 9:00 PM ET
RE: Cort Contempt Complaint, Report and Rules


IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT YOU READ THIS IMMEDIATELY.

Mr. Martüc please carefully read the three documents below, and respond accordingly. If you have any questions, please feel free to email all three members of the Cort. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

A copy of this email will be published immediately in the Courtroom forum on the "Special Contempt of Court Hearing" thread.



CORT CONTEMPT COMPLAINT

The Cort, after having conducted a careful investigation (see Report on Cort Investigation), has determined that Talossan Ups Antônio Martüc, the Defendant in the Woolley v. Martüc case, did fraudulently usurp the Wittenberg password of Talossan citizen Bruce Jones to post on April 17, 2006 an obscene message in the Kingdom's Courtroom thread.

The Cort has also determined that:

--Fraudulently assuming the identity of another Talossan to make a computerized communication is a violation of Talossan law (see Wisconsin Statutes 947.0125 (3)(e) and (f);

--The message posted was obscene and therefore is a violation of Talossan law (see Wisconsin Statutes 947.0125 (3) (a)).

--The message posted violated rule #6 of the Rules of the Courtroom requiring that all posts in the Courtroom conform to general Wittiquette.

--The Defendant lied to the Cort about posting the message and therefore committed perjury (see report for details) which is a violation of widely accepted principles of justice and a violation of Talossan law (see Wisconsin Statutes 946.31 (1) (a).

Further, the Cort has determined that, if these findings hold after hearing evidence and arguments from the Defendant in accordance with Article XIX: 9th Covenant of the Organic Law, these violations would constitute a clear, blatant and extreme form of contempt for this Courtroom and of the laws and rules that govern the Kingdom of Talossa.

If found in contempt, the Cort has the authority to impose any appropriate punishment including—if all three justices concur—revocation of citizenship.

The Cort therefore issues a judicial order to Ups Antônio Martüc (the Defendant) to show cause why this Cort should not hold him in contempt.



REPORT ON CORT INVESTIGATION

On April 17, 2006, this message, under Bruce Jones' name, was posted in the Courtroom forum's Woolley v. Martüc thread:

"UPS IS INNOCENT FUK U BITCH SLUTTTTTTTT ERRRRRRRR I QUIT TALOSSA SO FUK UUUUUUUUUUUU"

Shortly afterwards, the Wittenberg administrator, Sir John Woolley, in his capacity as an administrator of Wittenberg, suspended the Wittenberg posting privileges of Ups Antônio Martüc, accusing him of having usurped Mr. Jones' Wittenberg identity and of posting the message himself. Sir Woolley based his accusation on the fact that message in question came from an IP address used by Mr. Martüc.

Later that same day, Mr. Martüc sent a message to the Cort denying Sir Woolley's accusation. His email to the Cort reads in full:

"That was not me!!! I was a guest lurking the board when all that happened, Woolley probably looked at the people logged in and naturally thought that it was me because I was logged in as guest!!!! There was like 4 guests at the time, bruce jones, woolley, x pol briga (sp), then i saw that post and there was 3 guests online and nomore bruce jones. that was not me!!!!!!"

Given the compelling nature of the evidence provided by Sir Woolley, Mr. Martüc's own acknowledgement of being present on Wittenberg when the message in question was posted, the egregiousness of the message posted in the Courtroom and Mr. Martüc's emphatic denial of having posted the message in question, the Cort opened an investigation into the matter.

As a first step, the Cort questioned Mr. Bruce Jones about the matter. In an April 19, 2006 email to the Cort, he wrote:

"I would like to respond to everyone and say that I am truely sorry for what has happend. I have no idea how my account was broken into or how those messages were posted. I wish i could do something to help catch the person that did this. I didnt send the messages and i am sorry for those who were offended by it, i will be more careful in the future when selecting passwords and such.."

That statement combined with the fact that Mr. Jones' usual IP addesses did not match the IP address under which the message in question was posted convinced that Cort that Mr. Jones did not post the message.

The Cort then began to investigate the links between Mr. Martüc and the IP address of the message in question.

According to Wittenberg logs, the IP address (hereafter referred to as "IPA") used by Mr. Martüc when he posted messages on Wittenberg between the dates of April 11, 2006 and April 17, 2006 is the identical IP address under which the message in question—the message allegedly from Mr. Jones—was posted.

Mr. Martüc noted to the Cort that it is possible for the IPA to be assigned to multiple computers especially if they are located in the same area.

In order to adequately answer the question, the Cort questioned its own expert witness, a Mr. Jordan Wiseman (a non-Talossan Internet technology expert selected by the Justices and not known by either Mr. Martüc or Sir Woolley).

Mr. Wiseman affirmed Mr. Martüc's claim was accurate if the ISP (Internet Service Provider) used NAT (Network Address Translation) in its network architecture.

The Cort then tried a variety of means to determine the port number of the posts. That was not possible, so the Cort queried Verizon, the defendant's ISP, as to whether they used NAT. According to Verizon, they do not use NAT. Instead, they use PPPoE on the East Coast and DHCP on the West Coast. Because Mr. Martüc's lives on the East Coast, it means that he receives a single static IP address for the duration of his on-line session.

Given these facts, the Cort is convinced that the message originated from a computer that Mr Martüc uses to communicate on Wittenberg. The Cort acknowledges that it is possible that another person in the same general geographical area as Mr. Martüc could have posted the message. But given the fact that by his own account, Mr. Martüc was online at the same time the message in question was posted and that the message posted came from the exact same IP address that Mr. Martüc was using at the time, it does not seem likely that someone other than Mr. Martüc posted the message. Furthermore, even if Mr. Martüc had not acknowledged being online at the time the message in question was posted, given the limited number of IP address available, the number of customers in that area, and the usual methods of assigning IP addresses, Cort has determined that it would be reasonable—on these bases alone—to conclude that Mr. Martüc posted the message in question.

The Cort, therefore, feels compelled to conclude that Mr. Martüc did in fact post the message in question.

[All three Justices contributed to this report.]



CONTEMPT PROCEEDING RULES

This contempt proceeding, while adhering to the rights and freedoms guaranteed in Article XIX: Covenant of Rights and Freedoms, is a separate and distinct hearing from the Woolley v. Martüc proceeding. It is separate and distinct not only in being a proceeding about a different matter than the Woolley v. Martüc case, but is also distinct in that it is a contempt proceeding (as opposed to a hearing as in Woolley v. Martüc). The rules of this contempt proceeding (any violations of which will result in a default finding of contempt) are as follows:

Deadlines. From the time the Cort has posted this Complaint in the Martüc Contempt Proceeding thread in the Courtroom forum, the Defendant will have ten full days to prepare a brief showing cause why he should not be held in contempt. (The Cort will email the complaint and these instructions to the Defendant as well.) If this brief is not conveyed to the Cort by the end of the eleventh day, the Defendant will be held in contempt of Cort. (According to the Cort's calculations, the deadline for the Defendant to post his brief is Friday, May 26, 2006 at 9:00 PM Eastern Time.)

Communication via email. Because of the circumstances involved in this particular contempt of court case, the Cort allow no direct postings to this thread from the Defendant. Transcripts of the Cort proceedings will be published here as expeditiously as possible.

Witnesses. In preparing his brief, the Defendant may submit a single list of initial questions to the Cort and to any hostile or friendly witness (including any technical experts) he chooses. The Cort will order such witnesses to reply to the questions promptly. After receiving replies from the witnesses, the Defendant may submit a single list of follow-up questions to the Cort and to the witnesses. The Cort will assume that all witnesses are sworn; and will hold them liable for fraudulent statements. The Defendant's questions to witnesses—and the witnesses' replies—are
to be copied to the Cort.

Assistance of counsel. If the Defendant wishes to do so, he may represent himself or seek the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Defendant's brief. When the Defendant's brief is due to the Cort, the Cort expects that the Defendant will have prepared and delivered (via email) a brief that responds to the arguments and evidence cited in the Cort's contempt complaint and report. The brief may contain statements or summaries of statements from the witnesses. The purpose of the Defendant's brief is show cause why the Cort should not find him in contempt.

Courtroom rules apply. The Rules of the Courtroom as pinned at the top of the Courtroom forum apply in this contempt hearing, of course.

Signed,

Danihél Lauriéir
Acting Senior Justice of the Cort pü Înalt

[Danihel Laurieir]

SPECIAL CONTEMPT OF COURT HEARING IS CLOSED

As previously published in the Contempt Proceeding Rules (see earlier post in this thread), the deadline for the Defendant in this hearing to file a brief with this Cort was Friday, May 26, 2006 at 9:00 PM Eastern Time. That deadline has passed. The Cort has received no brief from the Defendant nor any other communication whatsoever from him. The Cort declares this contempt proceeding closed. The Cort will now deliberate.

Danihél Lauriéir
Acting Senior Justice of the Cort pü Înalt

[Danihel Laurieir]

CONTEMPT OF COURT RULING OF MAY 2006

May 30, 2006

Decision by Acting Senior Justice Lauriéir, joined by Justice Siervicül and Justice Tecladéir

Justice Lauriéir delivered the decision of the Cort:

Background

On April 17, 2006, during the proceedings of the Woolley v. Martüc case someone posted an obscene message in the Courtroom thread devoted to that case. The Cort, which regarded the message as an unambiguous display of contempt for the Kingdom's judiciary and the rule of law, suspended the proceedings of the Woolley v. Martüc case to open an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the posting of the obscene message.

Because an act of contempt of court is a violation of the law that is separate and distinct from any prior or original court proceeding in which in occurred, on May 14, 2006 the Cort established a Special Contempt of Court Hearing to air any charges arising from the contempt displayed during the Woolley v. Martüc case. In doing this, the Cort opened a new case—although a special type of case with a set of rules and procedures appropriate for its circumstances (more about the significance of this later).

On May 15, 2006, the Cort determined that—after a careful investigation—Ups Antônio Martüc (hereafter the Defendant) despite denying having done so did in fact post the message in question and did so under the fraudulently assumed identity of another Talossan citizen. The Cort also determined that the Defendant, if ultimately found guilty of having posted the message in question, would have committed the following violations of Talossan law:

1. Fraudulently assuming the identity of another Talossan to make a computerized communication, which violates Talossan law under Wisconsin Statutes 947.0125 (3)(e) and (f);

2. Posting of an obscene message, which violates Talossan law (see Wisconsin Statutes 947.0125 (3) (a)).

3. Posting of a message that does not conform with Wittiquette standards of conduct, which violates rule #3 of the Rules of the Courtroom (requiring conformity to Wittiquette standards of conduct) and therefore also violates Rule #6 of the Rules of the Courtroom, which stipulates that violating any Courtroom rules is contempt of court.

4. Committing perjury by lying to the Cort about posting the message, (see report below for details) which violates widely accepted principles of justice and Talossan law under Wisconsin Statutes 946.31 (1) (a).

The Cort noted that such violations of the law would constitute a clear, blatant and extreme form of contempt, and warned the Defendant that revocation of citizenship was a possible punishment for such crimes.

The Cort presented the Defendant with its report, its charges, the rules of the special hearing and a clear deadline for filing a defense brief. In full accordance with the presumption of innocence and the other rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Organic Law, the Cort gave the Defendant an opportunity—including the right to seek legal assistance and to confront hostile witnesses—to defend himself against the charges before any verdict would be rendered. The Cort offered the Defendant ten full days to present a brief to defend himself, to show cause to the Cort why it should not find him guilty of contempt.

The deadline for filing a defense brief—9:00 P.M. Eastern Time May 26, 2006—passed without the Cort receiving such brief from the Defendant. Nor has the Cort received any other communication from the Defendant during or—so far, even—after the period of this Special Contempt of Court Hearing.

Decision

Because of the Defendant's failure to defend himself, the Cort is entitled to issue a default judgment against him. In other words, the Cort could rule that the Defendant's failure to respond to the Cort's order is sufficient reason by itself to rule against him. But in this case the Cort refuses to rely solely on that justification for its decision.

Given not only the lack of any objection from the Defendant to the charges against him, but—most significantly—given the clear fact pattern of the case against him (see the Cort's Investigation Report appendix for details), the Cort the Defendant, Ups Antônio Martüc, guilty of all four charges

The Cort observes that the contempt displayed by the Defendant was of an extreme nature. Not only did the Defendant post an obscene message in the Courtroom despite having been warned of the consequences of doing so, the Defendant also lied to the Cort about having posted the message—and most troublingly—the Defendant fraudulently assumed the identity of another Talossan to post the obscene message.

In other judicial contexts—for example, in the United States—contempt of court does not usually rise to the status of a high crime, though it is treated as a very serious crime. But Talossa is a far smaller community and one that is almost exclusively woven together through messages exchanged on the Internet. Talossa is vulnerable to the socially corrosive damage—distrust, rancor, disengagement—that fraud and the use of abusive, insulting and obscene language can inflict on a community to a much higher degree than most other nations of the world. In the context of Talossa, lies and insults must be strongly discouraged or the community will unravel.

In the context of conduct in the Kingdom's courtrooms, such behavior—especially the noxious combination abusive obscenity and fraud—must be regarded as a high crime. To vomit forth crude, witless and misspelled obscenities and then to bald-facedly lie about having done so in a courtroom of law—where truth and dispassion must prevail if justice is to be served—is surely one of the "extreme circumstances" that Article XVI, Section 12 of the Organic Law contemplates as warranting the imposition of a severe penalty. It is imperative for the Cort to protect the integrity of the Kingdom's judiciary and the rule of law.

With these considerations in mind, and because of the extreme form of contempt for the Cort shown by the Defendant, the Cort hereby imposes—with the unanimity required by Article XVI, Section 12—the penalty of revoking the Defendant's citizenship. As of the time of the posting of this decision, and under the authority invested in this Cort by the Organic Law, this Cort declares that Ups Antônio Martüc is no longer a citizen of the Kingdom of Talossa.

In addition to considering Article XVI, Section 12 in determining an appropriate penalty in this case, the Cort also heeded Talossan statutory law, specifically 35RZ34, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 2006. Section (2) (b) of that law authorizes the Cort to order the punishment of revocation of citizenship for felonies and, if certain conditions hold, for misdemeanors as well.

The crime of perjury (count #4 cited above, Wisconsin Statutes 946.31 (1) (a)) is a felony offense. The crimes of fraudulently assuming the identity of another person (count #1 cited above, Wisconsin Statutes 947.0125 (3)(e) and (f)) and of posting an obscene message (count # cited above, 947.0125 (3) (a)) are misdemeanors. The crime of violating the Cort's procedural rules is not classified as either a misdemeanor or a felony.

Under Section (2) (b) (ii) of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 2006 Section, the Cort may impose the penalty of revocation of citizenship "only if the court determines, based on the offender's potential for rehabilitation and any aggravating circumstances of the offence (s), that any lesser punishments is unlikely to deter the offender from repeating his or her criminal behavior."

For reasons already cited—his fraudulent use of another Talossan's identity, his posting of an obscene message in a trial about (in part) the posting of other obscene messages and his perjury about his actions—the Cort determines that the Defendant's potential for rehabilitation is slight at best and that any lesser punishment is unlikely to deter the offender from repeating such acts in the future.

Possible Objections Answered

Because this decision causes a Talossan to lose his citizenship, the Cort—while attempting to give brevity its due regard—feels compelled to carefully justify its decision. In this section, the Cort will briefly answer some possible objections to this decision and clarify some of its intentions.

Possible Objection #1: Contempt of court is not a serious enough of a crime to warrant the punishment of revocation of citizenship.

The Cort's Reply: The main, relevant thrust of the Cort's response to this possible objection—that the extreme form of contempt shown by the Defendant undermines values vital to the health of Talossan society—is presented in the body of the decision above. In this reply, the Cort will confine itself to noting that Talossa law (in large part because of the unique circumstances of the Kingdom itself) has at its disposal very few effective ways of defending itself against damaging criminal behaviors by its citizens. Banishment, revocation of citizenship and restricting access to Wittenberg are the only tools the Kingdom has to protect its fragile society from irresponsible and dishonest citizens. In the Cort's view, the contempt displayed by the Defendant for the Kingdom's judicial processes evinced an attitude and set of behaviors that would—if not appropriately responded to—risk involving the Kingdom in a destructive cycle of distrust, rancor and finally widespread disengagement.

Possible Objection #2: The Defendant's right to a presumption of innocence was violated.

The Cort's Reply: Under the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms (Article XIX, Seventh Covenant) "any person charged with an offense shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty…" Did this Special Contempt of Court Hearing, which required the Defendant to show cause why the Cort should not hold him in contempt, violate his right to a presumption of innocence? In this case, it did not.

The order to show cause did not violate the presumption of innocence because the order essentially meant that it appeared to the Cort that there was enough actual evidence against the Defendant to overcome the presumption. Furthermore, the Cort gave the Defendant ample opportunity to point out any weaknesses in the case against him. This possible objection might have had more force if the Cort's order had violated his right not to bear witness against himself, but the order did not require him to provide any potentially incriminating evidence.

A defendant has a right not to present a case, but the Cort does not necessarily violate this right by pointing out that, given the state of the evidence, it might not be in the defendant's best interest to exercise it if he or she is aware of any evidence or arguments that might help him or her.

Of necessity, a contempt of court proceeding involves the court having to play dual roles—that of a prosecutor and of a jury. In such circumstances, the Court is not hearing charges filed by a third party, listening to the defense and then—after weighing the evidence—issuing a verdict. What's different in a contempt hearing is that the court is filing the charges. Having the court that makes the charges be the same court that hears the charges is awkward, but necessary. If this were not the case, an unscrupulous defendant could indefinitely extend his trial by triggering an endless cycle of contempt hearings. The Covenant of Rights and Freedoms (Article XIX, First Covenant) does specifically allow for reasonable limits to the other rights and freedoms enumerated in the Covenants, and clearly places value on maintaining "peace, order and good government" while protecting fundamental civil liberties.

More to the point, however, is this consideration: the Cort in this hearing did follow a procedure—though appropriately condensed and streamlined—that closely mirrored a traditional trial. The Defendant was presented with charges, allowed the full range of rights to defend himself with and was not officially found guilty of any crime until after having been given the opportunity to defend himself.

Possible Objection #3: The Cort never defined what constitutes an obscene message.

The Cort's Reply: The Cort does, prima facia, take the message in question—"UPS IS INNOCENT FUK U BITCH SLUTTTTTTTT ERRRRRRRR I QUIT TALOSSA SO FUK UUUUUUUUUUUU" to be obscene and abusive. The Cort will not attempt to undertake defining what constitutes an obscene and abusive message, except to say that context and intent will play determinative roles in so classifying a statement. In this case, the Cort regards the message—with its use of expletives and derogatory terms clearly uttered with abusive intent—as obscene. The Cort, however, is not saying that even the use of expletives or words that are often used with a derogatory intent are always to be considered obscene: context and intent are key. The Cort notes that because the Wittenberg forum is privately held, this decision may not necessarily restrict the ability of the Wittenberg administrator from applying a different—more lax or stricter—understanding of what constitutes obscenity.


Note: The Cort's Report on its Investigation is published an appendix to this decision.

[Danihel Laurieir]

APPENDIX

Appendix: The Cort Investigation Report

On April 17, 2006, this message, under Bruce Jones' name, was posted in the Courtroom forum's Woolley v. Martüc thread:

"UPS IS INNOCENT FUK U BITCH SLUTTTTTTTT ERRRRRRRR I QUIT TALOSSA SO FUK UUUUUUUUUUUU"

Shortly afterwards, the Wittenberg administrator, Sir John Woolley, in his capacity as an administrator of Wittenberg, suspended the Wittenberg posting privileges of Ups Antônio Martüc, accusing him of having usurped Mr. Jones' Wittenberg identity and of posting the message himself. Sir Woolley based his accusation on the fact that message in question came from an IP address used by Mr. Martüc.

Later that same day, Mr. Martüc sent a message to the Cort denying Sir Woolley's accusation. His email to the Cort read in full:

"That was not me!!! I was a guest lurking the board when all that happened, Woolley probably looked at the people logged in and naturally thought that it was me because I was logged in as guest!!!! There was like 4 guests at the time, bruce jones, woolley, x pol briga (sp), then i saw that post and there was 3 guests online and nomore bruce jones. that was not me!!!!!!"

Given the compelling nature of the evidence provided by Sir Woolley, Mr. Martüc's own acknowledgement of being present on Wittenberg when the message in question was posted, the egregiousness of the message posted in the Courtroom and Mr. Martüc's emphatic denial of having posted the message in question, the Cort opened an investigation into the matter.

As a first step, the Cort questioned Mr. Bruce Jones about the matter. In an April 19, 2006 email to the Cort, he wrote:

"I would like to respond to everyone and say that I am truely sorry for what has happend. I have no idea how my account was broken into or how those messages were posted. I wish i could do something to help catch the person that did this. I didnt send the messages and i am sorry for those who were offended by it, i will be more careful in the future when selecting passwords and such.."

That statement combined with the fact that Mr. Jones' usual IP addesses did not match the IP address under which the message in question was posted convinced that Cort that Mr. Jones did not post the message.

The Cort then began to investigate the links between Mr. Martüc and the IP address of the message in question.

According to Wittenberg logs, the IP address (hereafter referred to as "IPA") used by Mr. Martüc when he posted messages on Wittenberg between the dates of April 11, 2006 and April 17, 2006 is the identical IP address under which the message in question—the message allegedly from Mr. Jones—was posted.

Mr. Martüc noted to the Cort that it is possible for the IPA to be assigned to multiple computers especially if they are located in the same area.

In order to adequately answer the question, the Cort questioned its own expert witness, a Mr. Jordan Wiseman (a non-Talossan Internet technology expert selected by the Justices and not known by either Mr. Martüc or Sir Woolley).

Mr. Wiseman affirmed Mr. Martüc's claim was accurate if the ISP (Internet Service Provider) used NAT (Network Address Translation) in its network architecture.

The Cort then tried a variety of means to determine the port number of the posts. That was not possible, so the Cort queried Verizon, the defendant's ISP, as to whether they used NAT. According to Verizon, they do not use NAT. Instead, they use PPPoE on the East Coast and DHCP on the West Coast. Because Mr. Martüc's lives on the East Coast, it means that he receives a single static IP address for the duration of his on-line session.

Given these facts, the Cort is convinced that the message originated from a computer that Mr Martüc uses to communicate on Wittenberg. The Cort acknowledges that it is possible that another person in the same general geographical area as Mr. Martüc could have posted the message. But given the fact that by his own account, Mr. Martüc was online at the same time the message in question was posted and that the message posted came from the exact same IP address that Mr. Martüc was using at the time, it does not seem likely that someone other than Mr. Martüc posted the message. Furthermore, even if Mr. Martüc had not acknowledged being online at the time the message in question was posted, given the limited number of IP address available, the number of customers in that area, and the usual methods of assigning IP addresses, Cort has determined that it would be reasonable—on these bases alone—to conclude that Mr. Martüc posted the message in question.

The Cort, therefore, feels compelled to conclude that Mr. Martüc did in fact post the message in question.

--Justices of the Cort

[Danihel Laurieir]

ANNOUNCEMENT

Before adjourning this case, as Acting Senior Justice of the Cort, I would like to offer special thanks to Justice Tecladéir for agreeing to pinch-hit for the Senior Justice (who recused himself). Little did he know that this game would go into so many extra-innings.

This Cort is adjourned.

Danihél Lauriéir
Acting Senior Justice of the Cort pü Înalt