Vuode Proposals

[Viteu Marcianüs]

1) I think one of us (specifically, Sen. Grischun, he's more likable right now) should reach out to Sir T and other citizens of the United Provinces to get them to declare their spot in the EX.

2) I intend to nominate Sen. Grischun as Premier of the United Provinces.

3) In regards to our constitution, I read it as creating parliamentary supremacy similar to the system in the United Kingdom. Our Constitution's function is less substantive and more procedural, establishing a mechanism by which we may decide law; it does not, however, guarantee any type of law. Hence, as in the UK, the voters function as the check. Further, the only check we have against laws that may violate civil rights (if they were to happen), would be the Organic Law. I only go through this to get to my proposal. As the UP's system resembles the British system, it is well within the power of the EX to devolve some powers, as long as it remains the final arbiter, even if the EX chose not to act as such. Therefore, I would like to propose the following law:



The Judiciary Act of 2017

Whereas the Constitution of the United Provinces of Vuode and Dandenburg ("the Constitution") provides the mechanism by which the people of this great province may enact legislation;

Whereas the Constitution remains the sole source of provincial law in the United Provinces;

Whereas Art. VI of the Constitution bestows all judicial powers to the Estats Xhenerais;

Whereas there exist no provision that the Estats Xhenerais cannot devolve some responsibility to another body; and

Whereas it is desirable to devolve judicial responsibility to an separate institution;

THEREFORE, the Estats Xhenerais enacts the following legislation:

Section I. The Supreme Court of the United Provinces of Vuode and Dandenburg

(a) The Estats Xhenerais establishes the Supreme Court of the United Provinces of Vuode and Dandenburg ("the Supreme Court").

(b) The Estats Xhenerais recognizes the competences of the Supreme Court to resolve disputes in law and in equity between the citizen of Vuode and others; to provide judicial interpretation when applicable; and to recognize and apply the Common Law.

Section II. Appeals and Parliamentary Supremacy

(a) All parties may move to appeal a decision of the Supreme Court to the Estats Xhenerais, which may grant leave to appeal as it sees fit.

(b) The Estats Xhenerais remains the final authority of provincial law in the United Provinces, and the Supreme Court cannot override a statute of the Estats Xhenerais, except as described in subsection C of this section.

(c) In matters that concern a statute that may violate the Organic Law of the Kingdom of Talossa, the Estats Xhenerais recognizes an appeal as of right directly to the federal judiciary.

Section III. Definitions

(a) “Law” means any statute passed by the Estats Xhenerais, or any applicable national law.

(b) “Equity” means those instances where the principles of equity require a fair and equal holding.

(c) “Judicial Interpretation” shall only mean those instances where the parties are in dispute as to how to apply a statute.

(d) “Common Law” means those customs and judicial precedent that provide a basis for law that has not been codified by the Estats Xhenerais. The source of common law as applied by Supreme Court must first establish if the matter in question is one left to the provinces by the Organic Law: if it is reserved for the province, provincial jurisprudence is supreme, if the Organic Law provides national preemption on the issue, national common law is supreme. In the absence of common law from the United Provinces or Kingdom, the Court may look to other common law jurisdictions for non-binding, persuasive authority.

Section IV. Justices and Attorneys

(a) Justices.

i. Individuals who preside over disputes in the Supreme Court shall take the title of “Justice.”

ii. The Estats Xhenerais may appoint as maximum of three justices to the Supreme Court.

iii. A Justice can be recalled by the Estats Xhenerais after two consecutive sessions where an act to recall the Justice has passed with 2/3s of the voting Councilors.

iv. A Justice is automatically recalled after five election cycles.

v. A justice may be reappointed as many times as the Estats Xhenerais feels it necessary.

vi. An individual may sit in both the Estats Xhenerais, and may nominate themselves to the Court, which must be approved by a simple majority of voting Councilors, with the nominee abstaining.

vii. A Justice must abstain from all appeals by the Estats Xhenerais.

(b) Attorneys.

i. Any individual may bring a pro se claim to the Supreme Court.

ii. The Supreme Court retains the authority to set out its own procedure, which the Estats Xhenerais may override if necessary with appropriate legislation.

iii. An individual does not have to be a licensed attorney to sit on the Supreme Court.

iv. An individual does not have to be a licensed attorney to represent a client in the Supreme Court.

---------------------

I appreciate we're a small province but I thought it would be fun and help us get some activity by having a separate court. Finally, I decided to borrow the names from the NY court system, mostly because they're odd but they do create a sense of uniqueness (e.g., our trial court is the Supreme Court and our highest court is the Court of Appeals). 

As always, I'm open to debate on this. I tried to cover everything I could think of but I likely missed something. 

[Eðo Grischun]

Yes, indeed, the constitution is heavily influenced by United Kingdom systems and, yes, lend nicely to avenues of devolution.

The entire idea was to keep the Absolute legal requirements as simple as possible, stripping things to a skeletal framework with just enough Absolutes, institutions and mechanisms to keep things from falling apart. We would then attach 'lesser' laws which would be easy to implement and easy to change. It seen almost all (if not all) procedural elements removed from the constitution, including, judiciary, but specifically allowed for the creation of a court system if we felt we ever needed one.

But, you already know this hence the Bill.

Initial thoughts.
I like the Bill.
Staffing 3 spots on the bench would be remarkable.
I note the use of the word 'MAY'. The EX may appoint up to three justices. Am I reading properly that the minimum requirement then is zero judges and the powers can be devolved and recentralized at whim on a flexible basis (ie: anywhere between zero and three judges, appointed and removed at whim of the EX, when the number equals one to three then judicial powers are devloved to a Bench and when that number equals zero the powers are vested in the EX)?

[Eðo Grischun]

And, no, the final check isn't really the voters in a strict sense, seeing as we don't elect our council. The Premier is elected from within a single chamber made up of whoever wants in. In theory, the constitution has very few safeguards against tyranny. In fact, it could be argued that the system lends itself to tyranny seeing as a single councillor in a chamber of one can elect himself Premier assuming the entire functions of government or that a corrupt Premier only needs the protection of a majority 'mob' within the council to keep power.

However, it was intentional that the system could run on a single engine if required. The constitution in a sense has proven is robustness against extreme lows in activity levels. Could it be considered tyranical that a single councillor in a chamber of one can elect himself Premier and assume the entire functions of local government? Yes. However, this is a specific feature written in on purpose, so that when activity drops to one or two people, those one or two can still get on with doing stuff. If people ever come along in the future and disagree with the decisions made they can seek Organic relief in the UC. The only true check under our current system, as was intended, is the Organic Law (via the UC).


(Just interesting conversation)

[Viteu Marcianüs]

Sorry for not responding sooner.

Yes, I used "may" to allow the court to function without three justices, but max it out at 3. I think I need to tweak the language to better reflect this. Also, as this is a case of devolution, and the legislature is supreme, if we had three justices, but the legislature said, "hey we want another" they could simply pass a new bill expanding the number. As to an instance of zero justices, I agree with your interpretation, but I will add a clause that identifies that when there are zero justices, then the Court "temporarily" ceases to exist until a justice is appointed, and in that interim, then all disputes would go directly to the EX. Thanks for pointing out that potential issue. :-)

Also, to the second part, I don't know if that would be tyranny per se, as I am of the mind that for there to be tyranny, reasonable recourse is not achievable under the ordinary democratic process. What I mean is that in the hypo you propose, if the next election, two other individuals join the EX, then they could overturn what the previous Premier did; the public still has a check. Also, for him to change the Constitution would require 2/3 of the body and 2/3 of the voters. If, in a circumstance, he is still theo nly one to vote and makes himself "Premier for life," we'd have an issue. But that is just academic, of course.