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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 12, 2020 11:05:35 GMT -6
RZ1: Për RZ2: Për RZ3: Contrâ RZ4: Për*
*Absolutely necessary given recent developments.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 10, 2020 19:57:57 GMT -6
Senator Pinatsch,
I appreciate your time and patience. The last two days for me have been filled with appearances in my personal life that either unexpectedly took all day (today), or involved a portion where I could not have personal devices such as my laptop (yesterday afternoon). In rush hour traffic, it can take almost two hours to get back to my office. I share this because there is an obvious delay from when you took the floor to my answer to your initial questions. That delay prejudices you and your Guest, and I fully support an application to extend your time. No part of me thought that my past conduct would not be discussed, and I have not attempted to gloss over the topic. You have asked me to go much deeper into myself as a human being, with a lot of introspection to your questions. I will strive to answer your questions in that context.
(1) I do not agree with your characterization that the amicus curiae that I filed in your matter was “unsolicited.” I stated the basis for how I interpreted the Cort’s invitation in the brief and respectfully refer to the Committee to the opening section of the brief for that basis. But it should not be overlooked that Chief Justice Tamoran, in the ESB matter, which is similar to yours, invited public commentary on the issues. Relying on the Chief Justice’s historical approach and his wording in the preliminary order, I felt it was appropriate. Also, amicus curiae are, in many instances, initiated by the interested party themselves, which is why many courts have explicit procedure for them, which may require a party making a motion or asking for leave to file the brief. In that regard, most amicus curiae, even when accepted, are unsolicited.
I will refrain from commenting on your subjective view of my prior conduct, but will say that I do not genuinely delight in first-hand provocation or second-hand schadenfreude. I delight in spirited, honest, and straightforward debate. I do not shy away from contentious circumstance. And, well, New Yorkers are generally misunderstood for being a bit brash.
Turning now to your question, I have the utmost respect for Justice Tamoran’s intellect and commitment to justice, both personally and as a Talossan jurist. I had the wonderful pleasure of sharing a pint with him when I visited England last March. He’s certainly a learned individual that can hold his own in a number of topics.
The Chief Justice is not undeserving of his position. He most certainly can render fair and just decisions. My issue with the Chief Justice stems from the lack of procedure and what I view as the cort overstepping boundaries. I do not think that the Cort should be in the business of arguing a case for a party. Now, that is not to say I am opposed to a more inquisitorial style system than an adversarial one, but we need clear procedure on that. In your case, Chief Justice Tamoran acted less as an impartial jurist and more as an advocate. To the best of my knowledge, your counsel did not appear nor did he put in any filings on your behalf regarding arguments on “what is a name” and whether the statute in question is Organic. Rather, the Cort did it on its own accord, and stated, that notwithstanding your confession, it was already inclined to dismiss the complaint. That dismissal was not because of a defect on the face of the charging instrument, but on the merits of the matter. Nobody raised legal sufficiency. But when you read the charging instrument, the preliminary order was an argument against it. The Government then responded to the Cort’s arguments. Then the Cort got the final say in its final order that dismissed the matter. You did not have to argue at all. This is evidence by your counsel’s filing that says, not verbatim, “what the cort said.” That’s a problem. The Cort proved your case; you did not.
In my estimation, that undermines the Rule of Law. Justice Tamoran also decided the ESB matter but did not raise these issues. So now we are left with inconsistent rulings. What is the main difference between you and ESB? Well, you’re popular and have done a lot of good things; at that time, ESB was not. The Rule of Law requires that the courts treat everyone the same and issue impartial decisions. The parties should know what to expect when they walk into the courthouse, and not get blindsided through procedural departures or the cort acting as an advocate. The essential element of the Rule of Law is that the people trust the court’s to act as they should. I think many people feel that the Cort, in your matter, did not act as it should. This erodes trust in the corts and obviates the Rule of Law.
As it relates to the Chief Justice, I firmly believes that he thinks he is engaging in justice. I do not think how he has approached matters render him undeserving or lacking of legal acumen. I only wish that he would realize that law and equity equal justice, and that justice is not a distinct, third category. Ultimately, I believe that the Cort abused its discretion. Does that make the Chief Justice undeserving or lacking of legal acumen? Absolutely not. Abuse of discretion is a basis for an appeal. A higher court would overturn the lower court’s decision. The lower court’s judge is not relieved. But hey, sometimes a single judge makes a mistake, and it takes those reviewing everything from an impartial perspective to reign it in. Judges are human, too, and make mistakes. If their legal conclusion is wrong, they are subject to being reversed. That does not mean they are in want of skill.
The recent events do not only concern your case, but the actions of other justices. Whether it’s failure to appear or decide matters, or creating matters out of thin air, or being removed, etc., recent events support a more thorough vetting process.
Some criticisms that I have made of the Cort in the past were shared by a significant part of the public—such as against former Justice Ben-Ard (the Ziu voted to remove him), and of the Cort in your case. It goes without saying that one can criticize and disagree with the Cort without being accused of questioning whether the justice deserves to have the seat or has the legal acumen—questioning the wisdom of a court’s decision is not a personal attack on the person who made the argument or the party that received the favorable determination.
(2) I must confess, I am slightly put off by the use of “in our lives” in your question. Since I have returned to Talossa, I have worked tirelessly to jumpstart the judiciary and advocate for individual rights. My focus has primarily been to share my passion of the law with Talossa and to see that it has the judiciary that it deserves. When asked my thoughts on something, I offer it. I am not afraid to get to the nuance of an argument or legal theory. When arguing before the Cort, I have attempted to incorporate as much authority on the matter and offer clear legal standards. Where Talossan law is silent, I do not limit my search to U.S.-based or U.K.-based standards, but try to incorporate as much of the broad spectrum of Anglo-American principles of law by looking at how the issue has developed internationally. This is very much in line with how courts throughout the world work (the US did this a lot prior to Justice Scalia, and unfortunately it is not the favored approach anymore). I try to provide my thoughts on what the law is or where it should go with a solid basis. If Talossa has not addressed an issue, how has the law in other countries developed? Should we let them lead or forge our own path? Should we establish a clear legal principle for everyone coming after to follow? These are the questions I try to employ here in Talossa.
No one deserves a powerful and prestigious role. We should not assign seats to the Uppermost Cort based on popularity. Talossa gets to decide if an individual has the qualities it requires to sit as a Justice, and those qualities may change over time. Certainly Talossa is well equipped to remove someone who is hurting the cort when it is necessary, and has in the past. I think my hard work, experience, and approach would benefit Talossa.
(3) I do not view Talossa as a role playing scenario. In fact, many of the arguments I have put forth regarding the judiciary originate in my concern that the courts, at times, function too informally and too much like this is a role playing scenario. While I realize now that Talossa does not need the rigid formality of other jurisdictions, it needs some procedure and activity in the judiciary.
I am earnestly trying to answer your question, but like some of the others, it assumes facts and characterizations. I offer no explanation as to my so-called “awful and erratic” behavior because I do not necessarily see it as such.
I cannot fully answer this question because I do not believe that I “act in dysfunctional ways that wouldn’t be tolerated in the real world” or that my behavior has been “awful and erratic” for the duration of my time in Talossa. I have stated before—I am pretty straight forward with my approach; I am candid and do not enjoy dressing things up in unnecessary drag. I appreciate when someone is straight forward with me and does not hide behind innuendo. I think the worst kind of insult is the one masked as a compliment, or the one in window dressing that, to the casual observer, is harmless, but is secretly a dog whistle at a certain audience.
Society claims that it hates lairs. But that’s nonsense. Society hates people that are brutally honest. It prefers non-confrontation. We tell lies every day, “Yes, those jeans look good on you!” “Great hair style.” “Of course I support gay rights.” And then our friend walks around looking like crap and, and Donald Trump becomes president. Do not confuse my point—I am not suggesting that avoiding a fight with your spouse over whether they look bad in an outfit is the same as supporting Trump; what I am saying is that we are so over-concerned with not hurting someone’s feelings through honesty that we deprive ourselves of the ability to have an honest conversation. A person who looks me in the eyes and says, “I have no problem with gays and lesbians” allows me to think that they will support my rights and candidates who support my rights. When “civil society” requires that keep their lack of support for equal marriage to themselves, I do not have a reasonable opportunity to engage them and cater my argument to them. Ironically, the person yelling homophobic slurs informs me of my enemy, and creates the false impression that only an extreme homophobe would dare take a stand against my right to exist in society. So now we have the insane homophobe sprouting horrible slurs, and the civil person who does not want to be equated with them. So they shut up. Suddenly, I am only arguing with the homophobe yelling slurs, when I should be engaging the person that shut up. But I’ve been deprived of that because we value civility more than honesty. At least with the homophobe, I know where I stand. With the other person, both of us have been deprived honest conversation.
I have never suggested that someone walk around and just be rude to people all day. And a lot of things do not translate into written text. A cheeky comment said in jest may come off as incredibly rude and offensive. And personalities do not always translate easily over the internet. I tend to post to Talossa how I speak in everyday life. My tone and circumstance reveal me in person. That is not clear in Talossa. Those who have met me in person can confirm this; and I think when I’ve appeared in the video or voice election debates, the language I use is pretty much the same as I am using now, but you see my facial expressions and hand gestures, and you hear my tone, and suddenly the language is no longer offensive.
I do not think it is fair that you get to characterize my behavior or say it would not be tolerated “in the real world.” Frankly, we live in different worlds. My real world prefers honesty over civility in my daily interactions. Of course that does not mean I am not guilty of telling little white lies to avoid unnecessary confrontation, but I have not been shy about stating what I feel.
Talossa, as this time, favors civility and insults masquerading as compliments than honesty. That’s unfortunate.
Now, how I approach the law and courts is different. It may sound banal but the law and my profession have taken a bit of a spiritual aspect of me. See, contrary to your characterization that I enjoy schadenfreude and am erratic, profane, trolling, peevish, and volatile, I have a bit of history in LGBT activism here in New York. I also work against many injustices I see in society (such as issues with classism, agism, racism, sexism, etc.). When I completed my undergraduate studies, I had no desire to go into law. But then I experienced some discrimination and filed a complaint in the state where I lived at the time. I found the research and the entire process enthralling. The regulatory agency sided with me. In that time I realized how much I wanted to go to law school, and I did.
Law school in the United States does not necessarily teach you legal theory. But it’s there if you go looking. As we read cases that taught us how the law developed (you don’t go to law school to learn the law), I became fascinated with how it is both a shield and a sword to address many of the causes in which I have advocated in the past. So I became obsessed with learning as much about its development as I could.
During law school, I got to work in a well-known court. That experience expanded my understanding of how some courts can be used. After law school, I had the privilege of working in an appellate court, and that distinctly taught me valuable lessons on the role of the court, what is appropriate behavior in the legal profession, and respect for the lower court. Topically, in the United States, appellate courts tend to accept the trial court’s evaluation of a witness. That is because the trial court observed the testimony firsthand, saw their mannerisms, etc. The appellate court just has words on a page. So you generally defer to the determination of the trial court. That was a powerful lesson to learn.
When I am speaking with another attorney, whether it’s on the phone or waiting for an appearance before the court, I am joking with them. We’re both speaking frankly about various things, cursing to some extent. And then we go into the courtroom, and our demeanor and language change. Why? Because we have to be mindful of what we say and how we act—everything gives something away. In my dealings in Talossa’s corts, I have not acted in a manner that is unbecoming of the Cort. That indicates how I view the importance of keeping the court’s appearance as a place of impartiality.
You know, one of my favorite facts about the United States Supreme Court is the relationship between Justice Ginsburg and the late Justice Scalia. They are polar opposites in their legal approach, and Justice Scalia was particularly known for his acerbic wit. Many of times his dissents were offensive. He and Ginsburg would go at it in their opinions and, without any other information, you could reasonably assume they would hate each other. Turns out, they were best friends, took trips together, were known to go to opera together, and enjoyed each other’s company. There’s actually a cheeky opera about their relationship. I love that story, and the idea that you can vehemently and strongly disagree with someone but still chill out together. I love the concept that you can be brutally honest with someone and still go on vacation or take in the opera together.
(4) Allow me to clarify my “solution.” I believe that a Justice must be impartial and believe that a Justice must avoid the air of impartiality. Our laws do not prevent a Justice from also sitting in the Cosa, but they do bar a Justice from being Prime Minister. So we recognize that, given Talossa’s needs, we need to take a slightly different approach but we should not be so blatant. I do not envision that I would disappear from Talossa and not participate in discussions. But I would retire from public life—and by public life I mean in the Ziu, or in a ministry, etc., and other political aspects as well. In that regard, a Justice should act in the same manner as the Crown, with the exception that a Justice should avoid commenting or pending legislation or how they would interpret the law because they do not know what facts will come up.
I will conclude with this, and perhaps I’m wrong, but your questions and characterizations strongly suggest that you in are an unyielding “No V” category. It is my impression that no matter how candid and honest I am, or what I reveal about myself, you would not support me. But I hope, if I be nominated and appointed, to change your mind eventually. While my answers and openness may be futile immediately, at the minimum, I think theyre good for Talossa. At least it will set the tone for future Uppermost Cort nominees.
I started writing this at around 6:00, and now it is 9:00 and I am going to get a text any minute telling me to leave work. If you post follow up questions, or whatever questions your Guest posts, I will respond according to schedule on Sunday. I defer to you and the Chair as to whether an extension for you is in order given my delay in responding.
Thank you Senator,
Viteu Marcianüs
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 9, 2020 11:26:44 GMT -6
Mr. Chairperson ( Lüc da Schir) and Members of the Committee, Prior to this Committee coming to order, I transmitted the following information to the Chairperson: Saturdays are "husband days," and I do not work. I also take this opportunity to mention that I also leave my office every night around 8:30 p.m. and do not resume work until the following day. 1 To the extent I post to Witt during either of those periods, it is generally from my phone while watching TV or under a rare exception that I pass it under the radar. I am making it a point to provide responses from a proper computer to decrease typos, and I do not want to rush anything under the radar. In any event, the scheduled provided by the Chairperson does place the gap days on Saturdays. However, circumstance caused the start time not align with those days exactly. It is not my intention for any Senator to forfeit any part of the time or that of their Guest. Accordingly, and in line with the spirit of rules 19 and 22 of this Committee, that this Hearing be adjourned for 1 day and hours each week starting on Friday at 19:00 TST (Friday at 20:00 EST/Saturday at 01:00 UTC), and concluding on the following Sunday at 10:00 TST (11:00 EST/14:00 UTC). If this occurs when a Senator still holds the floor, their remaining time shall be tolled and shall resume immediately at the foregoing time. Presently, Senator Pinátsch holds the floor till Saturday, January 11th, at 10:00 TST (11:00 EST/16:00 UTC). An adjournment based on the proposed time frame would toll his period 14 hours. Upon resuming on Sunday, January 12th, at 10:00 TST (Sunday at 11:00 EST/14:00 UTC), he would hold the floor until midnight. I am not trying to complicate this, but I know that I will not be available to the extent that I have been in those time frames. Also, if a Senator must yield the floor at 10:00 p.m., which is after I stop working, I would still make a point to reasonably respond to any outstanding questions while immediately responding to the questions posed by the next Senator. I thank Senator Pinátsch for his patience and will proceed with responding to his questions while waiting for a decision from the Chairperson. Respectfully submitted, Viteu Marcianüs 1For quick background--my husband implemented this rule because I will work nonstop and burn myself out. The resultant work-life balance has been a boon to my productivity.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 9, 2020 9:36:32 GMT -6
If the Guest would like to post his questions, I will gladly answer his and then the Senator's today. Please accept my apologies for the confusion.
***Sorry, I did not see the Chairperson's request to wait a moment. I await his instruction.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 9, 2020 8:30:26 GMT -6
Senator Pinátsch,
Thank you for your questions. I do believe that S:reu Davinescu still holds the floor for a short while longer. I will begin preparing my answers but if he posts any before 16:00 UTC, I will respond to this first.
Respectfully,
Viteu Marcianüs
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 8, 2020 16:03:11 GMT -6
S:reu Davinescu,
I appreciate you taking the time to participate in this proceeding.
I hope you excuse the massive amount of typos in my responses. It's a lot, and I am responding while doing other work.
(1)
My experience in the legal profession in the U.S. system has informed me that many miss that the law is, in many regards, based on common sense. This may seem nonsensical to those outside of the profession, but many of the standards developed stem from a common sense approach to ensure a certain degree of fundamental fairness. That fundamental fairness does not always translate easily to those who do not have formal legal training, and the approach will vary by jurisdiction. Also, the courts do not always get it right, and lawyers have a tendency to over-complicate things. But sometimes taking a step back and thinking, “Would a reasonable person receiving this know how to respond?” is incredibly useful.
What is also missed is that the law did not just appear one day. And the common law did not just appear one day. It was developed by members of the community that took an interests that were enthusiasts. I admit that I missed the last part.
I will concede that, in the past, I did not appreciate the unique needs of Talossa and did not appreciate the level of experience of others involved. In many instances, my frustration was not particularly directed at the lack of experience or formal training, but the lack of clear procedure. If I were admitted to practice in another jurisdiction, I cannot expect those courts or those attorneys to adhere to what I have grown accustomed. I have to learn their rules. And when there are no rules but something needs to happen, we offer one with a source from a jurisdiction that has that rule. Naturally, many would rely on their home area. And this is something that, in my estimation, is true beyond the law—when we are confronted with a circumstance that is unfamiliar and how to proceed is unclear, we look for something known to use to inform how to respond.
By any stretch of the imagination, Talossa lacks a fully developed procedure. I have experienced backlash for relying on my home jurisdiction’s procedure, and received backlash for relying on the procedural rules relied upon by an adversary after I read the rules and saw an argument. So that leaves me pondering, what is the issue?
On one side of the coin, the issue is that Talossa needs procedure. It need not be anywhere near as complex and thorough as you might find in New York or England or India, but it needs to be enough that any person can look at the rules and say, “okay I have to do this” or, “okay X has happened, so the Court should do Y now.” It should not require any formal legal training to understand.
On the other side of the coin, and it’s a hard pill to swallow, the answer is that I am being too rigid and formal. So I need to take a step out of my head and remember where I am.
To your first question—thinking off of the cuff regrading making room for enthusiasts, I do not envision a bar exam like what we take in the U.S. I see a more “do it at your own pace” set of worksheets that would explain (1) a basic concept of thinking like an attorney; (2) unique aspects of Talossan law; (3) procedure; and (4) legal research. Self-certification is fine. A bar exam would have a handful (maybe 20?) multiple choice questions focused on Talossan law and procedure, and one closed universe essay that would give you all of the relevant law, a fact pattern, with direction to write a brief that would be filed with the court (of course an example will be provided). If an applicant failed one part, they may pass with the other. Maybe they just need another look at the worksheets. But the idea is to provide them with a preliminary understanding by making each step of the process similar to something they might actually do. Now, maybe that is too much for Talossa’s needs and should be scaled back. Ultimately, I would support any system in which the enthusiast is given a basic understanding of what to expect and what is expected of them.
To your second question—this may not seem obvious, but I think enthusiasts may find my approach more welcoming. If a trial judge, I’d immediately have the parties stipulate to deadlines for when things get filed. If motion practice is there, set the procedure for how that will happen. I’d also adhere to the fairly common US-standard of construing the rules liberally. But there would be rules. Perhaps I am truly unique, but I find it easier to approach something when I know what I can and cannot do. Ultimately, parties in my courtroom would know full well what is expected of them and what to expect next.
Now, as it relates to substance—I am not a big fan of going outside of the record. The parties get to tell me what their arguments are. They get to present the facts and evidence to me. They get to make their motions. If confronted with a situation where there needs to be a legal standard applied, I would look into a few different approaches and propose it to the parties, providing them with the sources (e.g. I would ensure they had PDFs of what I am looking at). If they find a better one, great! This is a particularly old-school British style of when barristers literally picked up law books and read them along with the court. Simply put, everyone knows what is going on. My prior filings in the past has adopted a similar method of looking at the breadth of common-law countries when approaching a topic and not just what happens in the United States. My idea is that Talossans should develop Talossa’s judiciary, and those who step up to assist in that will be encouraged to do so.
None of this means I expect 20 page briefs with proper citations and every propositions cited. All it means is that if there is a Talossan law, cite it. If you can find something from outside of Talossa that is persuasive, include it. It does not mean spending five hours on a filing, but spending at least 30 minutes on it.
At the end of the day, I do think having established procedure and clean rules will solve a lot more issues than people think. You cannot win a game of chess if you do not know the rules. But, through my experience in Talossa, I know I need to tone it down a bit and take a realistic and encouraging approach to those who do not practice law professionally.
(2)
I am familiar with the 2006 Rules of Evidence, 2006 Rules of the Courtroom, and 2006 Hearing Rules and Procedures available in the Courthouse forum. First, I do not know these rules to have been adopted by the Uppermost Cort. And I do not know of the Ziu to have adopted legislation implementing the rules, and if it did, I’m unsure if it could impose rules on the Uppermost Cort. The latter point I have discussed before on Witt given the separation of powers. Second, the Rules of Evidence are decently robust, but they do refer to the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence to supplement. I am not opposed to keeping that but I think Talossa does not need such a strict set of rules. The Hearing Rules and Procedures is minimal and focuses more on criminal proceedings than civil proceedings. It does not do much for motion practice, or how to answer, or when to answer, etc. I have previously posted about this very issue before and about Talossa’s lack of established procedure. The Rules of the Courthouse is more of a general Wittenberg set of rules and not actually rules of civil procedure.
Regarding the supplements by Adm. T.M. Asmourescu, O. Ben., I will confess ignorance to those. I cannot find them on Witt or on the Wiki. Perhaps I am missing them.
(3)
I would not say I have argued “numerous” cases in front of the Uppermost Cort. I have been involved in about four. Where I could find Talossan law, I relied upon it in the reply memorandum of law in response to the first discussion in the ESB matter. In the recent amicus curiae brief cited to the ESB matters. In most of my filings, I try to focus on using Talossan law, and look outside of Talossa where there lacks judicial authority. In that regard, I try to incorporate several common-law countries into my arguments.
I agree that Justices need to do a better job at citing prior decisions. I will say that finding cases is cumbersome. The wiki entry also names certain cases by year. I do not see anything that indicates the areas of law the matter speaks to (except the occasional case name), and searching through Witt for cases can be cumbersome. I am loath to accuse others of failing to properly rely on Talossan jurisprudence when it is not readily available. But this circles back to my answer to your first question—how would the enthusiasts know to use prior case law without some training? In any event, I would hope that the topic I outlined for a possible bar course on Talossan law would include the seminal cases.
Furthermore, and this would take work, if someone could cull through Witt and pull orders from old cases to index in a volume, it would be helpful for legal research.
(4)
If there are English translations available, and we had a clerk that could translate everything into Talossan, I do not see an issue. Although perhaps a goal, I do not foresee a circumstance where the judiciary would be made up exclusively of Talossan speakers with the fluency to sustain the entirety of the law and legal proceedings in Talossan. I have no issue with encouraging dual postings to the best of a party’s ability.
(5)
The suo moto matter, I discussed advisory opinions under Indian law, British law, Canadian law, US law, and Australian law. In another advisory opinion issue, I raised the several different approaches. My goal there was to identify what actually is an “accepted principle of Anglo-American law.” I do not see Anglo-American law as strictly English-American, but common law in general. So I think we examine as much foreign common law as possible to identify common threads. That would be the generally accepted principle. As it relates to advisory opinions, I opined that there is no outright rule against them, but they are generally limited only to government officials even under the most liberal approaches. That was the crystalized Anglo-American principle I could identify. Of course, there was the spectrum – India with the most liberal approach and the US with the most restrictive. The majority of other common law countries were somewhere in the middle.
Although the US and UK take opposite approaches to the burden of proof in defamation cases, US law is likely more influential here. The UK does not have the free speech protections under a codified constitution as the US does. The First Amendment to the US Constitution forms the bedrock of how we approach issues of speech. That is not the circumstance in the UK. So it makes sense in the US that the burden of proof in defamation should be on the party asserting that statement is defamatory. I also think that tracks with emper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit (the burden of proof lies with the person laying the charge). But I do not know enough about the approach in other common-law countries. If such a case came up, it would be similar to what I described above, identify the spectrum and see where the consensus falls. In any event, I have not actually read the matter, but if the summary provided for the lega opinion in Glaca v. Stotanneu (UC 1997) is accurate, there is precedent for Talossa to favor the US approach.
(6)
I cannot other than what I have already said. My role as a Justice would be to apply the facts to the law. I may not personally like a law, but I cannot just strike it down or eviscerate it. I cannot render a decision in such a way to render it obscure or obsolete. I have had the privilege of serving a term as an appellate clerk doing legal research. I may not have liked a party, but I had to give the court objective, neutral reports and not cater my research to where I thought the case should go.
I am not trying to abrogate the King’s authority through a judicial position. Frankly, if the Organic Law is clear on the Crown’s authority, then it should be abrogated through the democratic process. My personal feelings have nothing to do with it.
I mentioned this earlier but I do view these positions as necessarily forfeiting some rights. To maintain impartiality, I would need to restrict my public commentary. I cannot take back what is out there, but I can make it a point to act in the manner that is expect of a Justice if I’m appointed.
Now, again, I do not think I will change many people’s minds on this. But I hope that, if appointed, my conduct would change those minds down the line.
(7)
The only proceedings I have been involved in where in my personal capacity or in as Attorney General. I am a law nerd so I generally have fun with what I’m doing, even when I particularly can’t stand the case. I find the research and writing aspect of it all fun. That does not mean I particularly like my client. How that relates to Talossa—whether you believe his or not, although I liked the research and writing part of it, I was not actually thrilled with the ESB matter. I made it clear on several occasions that I did not question his guilt, but the manner in which the proceeding occurred, and the harshness of the sentence. I’ve taken a liking to ESB subsequently, although I disagree with him on a lot of stuff. So this falls in the cause I liked but person I wasn’t fond of category.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 8, 2020 9:31:47 GMT -6
One of the major elements that sticks out to me in this is the limitations on office that a Justice may hold. Though they are barred from serving in govt, I notice they are not barred from serving in the Ziu. Does the Senator feel that a, so to speak, hat swap is sufficient to insulate the Justice from conflict of interest? I understand completely that there is a need to keep active blood circulating in Talossa, lest the Cort become a place where careers go to die. Further, I understand that we need a shot in the arm in terms of overall personnel. But I fear that the danger does not outweigh the risks here. Might dual service in Cort and Civil Service be sufficient? Section 3 of Article XVI of the 1997 Organic Law presently states as follows, "Neither a reigning King nor his Consort, nor a Regent during his regency, nor the Secretary of State, nor the Seneschal, nor any public prosecutor, nor any Senator shall be a Justice of the Cort pü Inalt." The 2017 Organic Law maintained this exact provision in Section 3 of Article VIII. Presently, a Justice is partially barred from serving in the Ziu. The Justice may serve as an MC but not as a Senator. They may serve as a member of the cabinet, but explicitly not as Seneschal and ostensibly not as Attorney General. I fail to see how a Justice serving as an MC (permissible) materially differs from a Justice serving as a Senator (impermissible). Generally, I would prefer to restrict a Justice from any of these positions, but in realistic terms, considering Talossa's size, I think it would be acceptable for a Justice to be an MC or Senator. Merely being in the Ziu does not mean one is necessarily privy to Government decision making or strategy. The Cabinet, however, differs given its status as "the Government." The potential for exposure to pre-litigation matters or legal strategy for a pending matters involving the Government significantly increases. This may result in more recusals. But, given the size of Talossa, I'm not necessarily married to this proscription and would have no issue taking out the provision barring Cabinet members, with the exception of the Seneschal or Attorney General, from sitting as a Justice.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 8, 2020 8:21:33 GMT -6
I do not shy away from using the word “broken” to describe the present state of our judiciary. Nor do I assign any blame for its problems. The issues plaguing the judiciary include an absent Cort; unclear or incomplete procedure; broad interpretations of Organic Law provisions regarding the Cort’s authority; its unwillingness to recognize its own Organic limitations; and, at times, a that Cort that acts more as an advocate or sees itself as a Legislature. For clarity, I mean “absent cort” to encompass both those matters that never even get before a Justice, or those matters where the Justice appears once or twice but never issues a final decision. I do not disparage any Justice, and I hope that I am confirmed so I can work with them closely to remedy some of those issues. However, the problem is systemic. No part of me doubts that each Justice understands the importance of the Cort. I will not hypothesize as to the cause of why certain Justices have been absent, and we all appreciate that life happens, but we must make it a point to identify the problem in order to fix it. Talossa, generally, is not a litigious country. Nor do I want to see it become litigious. But that the work is not constant does not mean it should be forgotten. I do want to address potential systematic causes under the structure under the Organic Law. In its current iteration, Article XVI of the 1997 Organic Law sets the number of Uppermost Cort justices at five and permits appeals to a panel of three justices. If certain criteria is met, an appeal may go to a single justice but that decision cannot bind a lower court. Honestly, on paper, that system could work, but it requires active Justices. At the moment, we only have four justices, many of which are not accessible or do not appear. I also note that Article VIII of the 2017 Organic Law, as adopted, generally maintains this structure but removes the ability of a single justice to hear an appeal. Talossa is a small country, and there will be no quick or easy fix to the judiciary. But we include too many aspects of the composition of the Judiciary, how it should decide cases, etc. in the Organic Law. What we need is a pragmatic and plausible restructuring to repair the judiciary today, but is also flexible enough to adept to whatever Talossa’s needs are tomorrow. Nothing I am proposing may be successful, I will concede that, but we must at least be willing to discuss changes, implement changes, and give them a try. To that end, many of the provisions in the Organic Law instruct the Uppermost Cort on judicial philosophy. For instance, the provision on unclear or confusing language in the Organic Law is unnecessary. I personally prefer the approach that the Cort should refrain from touching constitutional issues if it can, and only reach the issues necessary to decide the matter. Section 5 (same in 1997 and 2017) is wholly unnecessary and, truthfully, not really followed anyway. Section 13 (Section 8 in the 2017 Organic Law) is largely unnecessary. I would like to see the Anglo-American law reference removed. But just the entire provision is unnecessary, confused, and abused. That is, I do not read “Any judge or justice may issue court orders or injunctions according to the generally accepted principles of Anglo-American law” to mean anything other than, when a party brings a matter to the cort and seeks specific relief, it may then issue an order or injunction. I do not read it to mean the Cort has authority to just issues orders and injunctions carte blanche. Put another way, the Organic Law should set forth the structure of the Uppermost Cort and its authority, permit the Ziu to create inferior Corts, and leave it at that. I am not opposed to provisions that would allow for some type of reprimand for bad behavior (not for bad decisions) up to and including removal. Structural changes I have proposed and am proposing include reforming the Uppermost Cort back to a three Justice panel, which may be increased by statute as Talossa’s needs grow, or reduced if there is no need for more Justices. Because I’m overly concerned with cort packing (I do live in the US after all), I think such an Organic scheme should contain a maximum number of Justices and a minimum. Further, when there is no inferior cort in existence, a Justice can sit as a nisi prius court (i.e. trial cort). The inspiration for this stems partially from our present structure and partially from the US approach to riding circuits practiced from roughly 1789-1869 (two Supreme Court justices and a local district court judge (trial court) would hear circuit appeals instead of having independent circuit appellate judges). Of course, I would prefer a three Justice Uppermost Cort with statutory inferior corts that would act as corts of original jurisdiction. I am mindful that Talossa is small and hence it makes sense to, at this time, permit a UC Justice to sit as a trial judge. But let’s implement a system that will address Talossa’s needs now while containing flexibility to adept as Talossa grows. I think reforming the Cort back to a three Justice panel with permission for a Justice to sit as a nisi prius court when no inferior corts exists may help. Talossa is a small country; it does not need a huge judiciary. It needs a working one. But the Organic Law should not be amended every time the Corts need updating. The Cort also needs to do a better job at checking its authority. If we were to maintain the present structure and instruction in the Organic Law, the Cort needs to actually explain how it is reading something according to the plain meaning of the words, or why it has the most just and equitable understanding of the law. I view the proscription against Senators sitting as a Justice to be questionable. Interesting fact about the present 1997 Organic Law, it proscribes the King from being a Senator, a Member of the Cosa, Seneschal, Secretary of State, and a Justice. It contains 27 references to the Secretary of State and eight to the Chancery, but never says the Secretary of State cannot be a Seneschal. Yes, the Secretary of State cannot be an MC or Senator, but I see (and perhaps I am missing it) no provision that says the Seneschal must be an MC or Senator. A Senator can be Seneschal. (I am not looking at statutory limitations by the way.) That said, it makes perfect sense to me that we would not want the King or Secretary of State or Seneschal sitting on the Cort. That is, at most, three or four individuals. But the proscription on a Senator sitting as a Justice, and thus precluding an additional eight potential citizens, boggles my mind a bit. I think we can potentially find great minds to sit on the Cort if we removed this needless restriction. My recommendations always include some type of term limits that generally favor automatic re-affirmation or a lower threshold to reaffirm a Justice. Talossa exists on a different time continuum than the rest of the world, and a year of events can easily be three years of events in larger countries. Allowing for the Ziu to periodically determine if a Justice is deserving to keep their position without needing to introduce removal legislation is a good thing. It also gives the Justice an easy out if they wish to retire. I am of the mind that we should aim to keep Justices in their position for long periods to allow for development and consistency of law, so I have consistently proposed five-year terms that may be extended to 10. I stand by that proposal. Turning to my next point regarding unclear or incomplete procedure, I think we have seen this come up in a lot of recent cases. Parties post as they see fit, the Cort ostensibly allows everyone to include their thoughts, no one really knows what to expect next. This hurts the Cort and Talossa. Talossa needs codified procedure set and utilized by the Cort. I recognize that the complex civil and criminal procedure found here in the US is not appropriate for Talossa’s needs, but looking at the basic parts of it, such as how to bring a suit, what a complaint should state, general motion practice, discovery, etc. in both criminal and civil procedure, should be published in a clear and concise matter that allows for flexibility when unique circumstances appear. I have been slowly working on something to this effect that I hope to finish in the next month or so to present to the Ziu or, if affirmed, the Cort. Part of that procedure would include “fill-in” forms with explicit instructions of what needs to be contained so that anyone can access the corts and understand what needs to happen. I did touch on my final two points above—namely the Cort not recognizing its own authority and acting more as an advocate. To the first point, the Uppermost Cort needs its own Marbury v. Madison moment. For those who do not know what I’m talking about, it is the seminal US Supreme Court case from 1803 that established constitutional supremacy, that recognized the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review but also that congress cannot restrict or expand the Court’s authority, and the Court cannot expand its own authority. Right now, I think the “order and injunction” clause is understood beyond its breadth and used in an inconsistent manner to justify judicial activism. That should stop. Finally, Talossa has adopted the common law as developed in England, the US, and, basically, the Commonwealth countries. I advocate for the common law because I’m accustomed to it. I also have some reservations about an outright adoption of the civil law system as practiced in France and elsewhere. But I digress. The common-law legal system tends to favor the adversarial proceedings, and the civil law tends to favor the inquisitorial proceedings. But common feature does not, in my mind, connote requisite aspect. In that regard, I would be open to Talossan corts taking on a more inquisitorial role, provided the burdens of proof remain in place, there is explicit procedure on how this will be done, and that all parties are aware that is how the proceeding will continue. At the moment, however, in some matters, the cort seems to be trying to act in both an adversarial and inquisitorial manner that leaves many of us scratching our heads. When it does this, the cort seems to be taking on the role of advocate and allowing another side to put their feet up while their job is done for them. This must end. The Cort must be impartial to all parties, and give every party a reasonable opportunity to make and address arguments, introduce evidence, etc. If I am appointed, I would seek to work within the cort to discuss the merits of different approaches so we can publish advice on how the Cort will hear cases, what it expects of parties, and when it will ask for more information.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 7, 2020 19:26:04 GMT -6
S:reu Chairperson, I do not recall if I heard this in law school or when I began practicing law, but in conversation, it was stressed to never preface an answer to a judge with “that’s a good question Your Honor.” The Judge knows it is a good question, hence why they asked it. I relay this because I would prefer to avoid, to the best I can, prefatory qualifiers.
Appreciating some irony, that’s a really excellent inquiry. The ESB affair was painful for many, and certainly has not escaped Talossa’s collective consciousness; I doubt that it ever will. I do think it is important to qualify what the cort did – the cort vacated those crimes brought under statutes not in effect at the time, affirmed those parts of the statute that were, and partially vacated ESB’s sentence. His criminal record remains intact. I still maintain that seeking this relief was appropriate under the circumstances. The people must know that their rights are not compromised merely because the Government accuses them of criminal conduct. Talossa is bettered by having some authority on harsh and excessive punishment, what can constitute a crime, and how charges should be brought. Experience has taught me that I should have approached the matter differently. I forgot that not everyone in Talossa practices law outside of Talossa. I did not appreciate that even those who do may practice law are not necessarily passionate about it. As the cliché goes, hindsight is 20/20.
My approach was too rigid and formal and did not appreciate that not everyone acted with malice or an intent to deprive someone of their rights. The matter should have been approached differently with the issues narrowed. I needed to take a step out of my head and remember the nature of Talossa and what it requires, and figure out how to explain what I was trying to convey in terms that apply to Talossa. I certainly regret the collateral issues that arose. (*Addendum* I would point out that my employment at the time wholly consisted of reviewing matters for errors such as these.)
I did take exception to how the cort handled the matter, and I think that remains problematic today. Mainly—the cort should not act as an advocate and needs to focus on the record before it. To answer your question—I do feel that the end result was appropriate, but I would change how I handled the matter. There are many positive implications that may not seem obvious, such as those outlined above. But the negative implications are also there. Looking back, we saw signs of the cort potentially getting a bit wayward. That should have been addressed. This needs to be addressed. But, as I stated, ESB remains convicted, and he served a punishment. We also have stronger protections for individual rights.
To your final question, as to whether a similar case came up if I were on the bench, and how would I render a verdict, I am slightly uneasy answering how I would issue a decision because the facts will vary by case. If there is a matter on point, that must guide my decision. Hypothetically, if the initial matter came before me, I would have returned the charging instrument with explicit direction on what needs to be done with leave to refile. If the type of matter that I commenced as A-G came up, I would need to discuss whether the ESB decision is applicable or not. Likely, I would refer it to the whole Uppermost Cort to issue a definitive decision. Also, under the statute passed thereafter, I would have to ensure that special counsel is appointed to argue against the petition.
To the extent I had to render a verdict, it would stay within the law and the parties’ arguments, not other issues I think are important. That means I do not get to strike down statutes I simply do not like. I should not touch arguments that are not raised by any party unless there is a patently organic question that, failing to address, would frustrate the Organic law. If I felt something needs to be address, it should be provided to the parties in a way that does not advocate for one position, and it certainly should not frustrate the statute or obviate its effect.
At the end of it all, the ESB matter resolved that the conduct was still criminal under Talossa law, but the cort should be reasonable in sentencing. I think that's good. However, the cort's handling of the matter showed signs of it overstepping its authority, and it's something I would strive to reign in.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 7, 2020 11:41:41 GMT -6
I was trying to figure out formatting, honestly. I initially had XVI-a, etc. I'm open to using something similar to art. vii section 3, and changing the letters to numbers, although I think using the same type of character leads to confusion (e.g. el Lexh 1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, 1.2.1.3 as off the cuff maybe not actual laws but does happen elsewhere examples)
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 7, 2020 11:38:21 GMT -6
...An applicant must provide a clear photocopy of their present national identification card clearly stating their legal name used for all governmental purposes in their home country to the Interior Minister to verify the simple concept that they are who they say they are, which will be kept confidential by the Interior Minister and destroyed upon verification. FYI, in the United Kingdom there is no such thing as a national identity card. Similarly, there is no one legal name that has to be used by any individual, provided that the individual (a) provides any UK official who has right to know, on request, sight of deed polls (if they exist), and (b) does not hide any connection between pseudonyms, and (c) does not endeavour to pass themselves off as some other individual, and (d) does not deny their use of any pseudonym which they have actually used. There is no single legal name, in the UK, used for all government purposes. (As an example, my own daughter, perfectly legally, uses two different names). Thus the suggested condition might well be impossible for a UK citizen to fulfil. Moreover, the passing across of such sensitive information, is something that no "sane" or worldly wise individual would do. By "sane" here I mean that 1) Talossa, for all that we love her, is - to the outside world - an unknown entity. It is a group of no visible international standing in the commonly accepted meaning of those words. Passing across such sensitive identifying information to an outside body, on the request of that body, is just the kind of thing that scamming requests. The worldly wise will not send us such information. 2) In many nations it is against their national law to make or to pass such copies around. The worldly wise, and the respecter of their own national laws, will not send us such information. 3) An outsider has absolutely no reason to trust Talossa. Thus even though we promise to destroy any such information, and we promise it honestly, someone outside of Talossa has no reason to believe us. The worldly wise will not send us such information. This suggested condition CANNOT (not just "should not") be included in Talossa's Laws. I fixed the national identification card. The US does not issue them either. I was thinking more along of state ID. I disagree with your point about UK law. Respectfully, I appreciate that you are, as a matter of fact, British. And I appreciate that there is a state known as the United Kingdom. But the law of England and Wales is not necessarily the law of Scotland and Northern Ireland, or many of the overseas territories. Scotland, as a matter of law, does record names. But that aside, even in the UK you must record a new name somewhere to start using it on government forms. Relevant to where I live, prior to marriage, my husband and I wanted the same surname, but neither of us were particularly attached to our respective surnames. So we came up with an entirely new name. Under New York law, I could have simply started using that name provided it wasn't for fraud. But what I could not do is get a driver's license, vote, purchase property, open a bank account, or do anything legal with that name because there was nothing legal to tie it to me. So for the lost cost of $60, I filed a petition and got a court order with the new name. I then had to publish my intent to change my name for 60 days, and once I proved to the court that this occurred, the order was entered. Now I had the ability to change my name on social security card (this is a national number that all citizens and permanent residents have) and the DMV (my driver's license). Importantly, once I changed my name on my social security cards, my credit cards were a breeze t update. But you know what I could not do? Update my social security card or any other state issued form with the new name until I got that court order. Why is the court order important? Simple--it creates a clear chain of identity and establishes that I am not taking on a new legal name for the purpose of fraud. This presumption attaches to a marriage license, which is why they can also be used to change a person's name if they take their spouse's surname. The condition would not be impossible for your daughter to fulfill. There is literally, on the form, three spots to enter your actual, legal name, other names you go by, and other aliases. A person could simply state, "yes, this is my name on my identification but this is the name I go by." There is nothing difficult about this. Kindly enlighten us all, if you adopted an entirely new name tomorrow, would NHS, or whatever administrative agency issues drivers license, permit you to just change that name without any formal court order or something else pointing to your permitted use of that name? How does the State ensure that you are not That point of this is, I could have used my new name, but I could not represent it as my true, legal name. You seem to misunderstand this. Please tell me how you think it would go if you moved to the United States and used a name other than what is on your United Kingdom passport on your immigration papers. (1) Maybe, maybe not. (2) I'm calling nonsense on this. Please cite explicit countries that make it illegal to copy a state issued identification card and provide it elsewhere on request. Please cite explicit laws that would make it illegal for a person to produce that copy even if they redacted certain information (certainly, I would redact my home address and NYID number, as well as other information, on my driver's license; or my passport number, etc.). (3) And Talossa has no reason to trust an outsider. Respectfully Ian, your assertions are not based in fact.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 7, 2020 8:50:40 GMT -6
"11.5 At the time of the initial Immigration application, prior to submission of the form, the prospective must be notified in writing that their application will be posted on a forum viewable by other citizens. Further, they must be cautioned not to submit personal information irrelevant to their application but advised of their rights to privacy under El-Lexhátx E.11. An applicant must provide a clear photocopy of their present national identification card a form of identification issued by a legal authority from their country of origin or one in which they reside that clearly stating their legal name used for all governmental purposes in their home country to the Interior Minister to verify the simple concept that they are who they say they are, which will be kept confidential by the Interior Minister and destroyed upon verification."
I'm only supporting this bill if what is in red is included. Otherwise, contrary to other claims, a reasonable person absolutely knew in 2006, 2014, and 2020 that the information not marked "confidential" was susceptible to being published on Witt, and therefore this bill is superfluous and unnecessary.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 6, 2020 22:16:30 GMT -6
Confirmation is not a foregoing conclusion. But if it is, this may be the final bill I try to pass. I tried to fix many of the issues others had with the Judiciary Reform Amendment. This is a rough draft filled with typos. But I think it's a good starting place. To follow- a statute for inferior courts that would go into effect of this is adopted.
Judiciary Amendment of 2020 WHEREAS, in July 2019, the Ziu of the Kingdom of Talossa adopted the Still Into This Amendment in the third Clark (“53RZ18”) over the objections of the King;
WHEREAS the Chancery submitted 53RZ18 as Referendum 1 in the General Election for the 54th Cosa;
WHEREAS the people ratified 53RZ18, with the resultant promulgation by the King occurring by operation of law;
WHEREAS the foregoing is to or will supplant the 1997 Organic Law with 2017 Organic Law upon certification by the Ziu or the elapse of one year from the date of adoption, whichever is sooner;
WHEREAS 53RZ18 was a step towards cleaning up the Organic Law and did not seek to substantively modify the organs of the State;
WHEREAS the Ziu recognizes that the Judiciary of the Kingdom of Talossa must be adaptable and responsive to the dynamic needs of Talossa;
WHEREAS continuity in and of law is tantamount to an effective judiciary;
THEREFORE, the Ziu amends the 2017 Organic Law by deleting in whole Article VIII: The Courts as contained in 53RZ18 and adopted by the people, or, inasmuch as remains in effect, strikes in its entirety Article XVI: The Courts, as contained in the 1997 Organic Law;
BE IT FURTHRE KNOWN, upon amending or striking the foregoing, the Ziu adopts as Article VIII: the Courts the following provisions or, as necessary, Article XVI: The Courts, the following provision;
FURTHER, all justices appointed to the Uppermost Cort at the time that this amendment is adopted and implemented shall continue in that position in the newly constituted Uppermost Cort pursuant to the terms of their original confirmation provided they so desire to do so:
The Courts
Section 1. The Judiciary
The judicial power of the Kingdom of Talossa shall be vested in one Cort pü Inalt, in English the Uppermost Cort, and in such inferior courts as the Ziu may from time to time ordain and establish.
Section 2. Authority of the Judiciary
A. The judicial authority of the Cort pü Inalt shall extend to all matters, in law and equity, arising out of a case or controversy;
B. In all matters affecting ambassadors, public ministers, the State of the Kingdom of Talossa (including its organs), and a Province or other subdivision recognized by this Organic Law, the Cort pü Inalt shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases, the Cort pü Inalt shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact over all inferior corts established by the Ziu. Nothing stated herein shall limit the authority of the Cort pü Inalt from remanding a matter to which the Cort pü Inalt has original jurisdiction to an inferior cort as it deems necessary.
Section 2. Composition of the Cort pü Inalt
A. The Cort pü Inalt shall consist of a permanent seat designated as Chief Justice, and two permanent seats designated as Puisne Justice.
B. The justices shall be ordered according to their seniority on the Cort pü Inalt, with the senior most justice occupying the seat of Chief Justice.
C. The Ziu may enlarge the number of seats designated Puisne Justice to no more than eight, and may decrease the number of seats designated Puisne Justices to no less than two, provided that, in addition to the requirements for other legislation, two-thirds of the Cosa and a majority of the Senate support modification in two consecutive Cosas.
D. Neither a reigning King or his or her Consort, nor a Regent during his or her regency, nor the Secretary of State, nor the Seneschal, nor any other member of the Cabinet shall be a Justice of the Cort pü Inalt.
Section 3. Appointment to the Cort pü Inalt.
A. Any member of the Ziu may nominate a person to an open seat on the Cort pü Inalt. The nominee shall be approved by two-thirds support in the Cosa and majority support in the Senate. Upon such approval, the King shall appoint the nominee as a Justice of Cort pü Inalt.
B. If the King shall decline to appoint a nominee, then, upon approval by two-thirds support of the Cosa and majority support in the Senate, the nominee shall be considered appointed.
C. Every Justice of the Cort pü Inalt shall be subject to a re-appointment in intervals of five years, measured from when their initial appointment. These intervals may be increased two to no more than 10 years provided that any legislation retroactively applies to all sitting members of the Cort pü Inalt and is supported by two-thirds of the Cosa and a majority of the Senate in two consecutive Cosas.
D. Unless otherwise set by law, re-appointment shall be deemed automatic if no member of the Ziu has requested a re-appointment vote in the Cosa immediately preceding the expiration of the Justice’s term; and re-appointment shall only require a simple majority of each house in the Ziu. The Ziu may modify the foregoing provided the requirements of re-appointment never exceed that for appointment.
Section 4. Removal from the Cort pü Inalt.
A. A Justice shall remain on the Cort pü Inalt for the duration of their term, until they choose to retire, or, as prescribed by law, until such time as the Ziu shall remove him or her from their seat or until he or she can no longer perform their duties on account of incapacitation.
B. In the event that a sitting Justice of the Cort pü Inalt acts in a manner that offends the Ziu in their official and individual capacity, or is found guilty or has pleaded guilty to a crime in Talossa, a member of the Ziu may move for a Notice of Reprimand, which shall set forth an individual charge with the stated punishment contained therein, which shall not exceed removal from his or her seat as Justice.
C. To impose the sanction of removal, a Notice of Reprimand must receive, in addition to requirements of other legislation, two-thirds support in the Cosa and majority support in the Senate.
Section 5. Authority of the Cort pü Inalt.
A. Until such time as inferior corts are established, a Justice may sit as a nisi prius cort in all civil and criminal matters.
B. No decision or order issued by an inferior cort or nisi prius cort shall bind a coordinate cort.
C. The decisions or orders of the Cort pü Inalt shall bind all lower corts according to the principles of stare decisis provided that that the panel was composed of no less than three justices after necessary recusals. The Cort pü Inalt may, as it deems appropriate, issue decisions or orders that are non-binding provided that it explicitly states that intention in the decision or order.
D. A nisi prius cort or an inferior cort deviating from binding precedent must state so with clarity and refer the matter for appellate review.
E. Notwithstanding any contrary proscription, the King, the Secretary of State, or the Senechal may refer an issue to the Cort pü Inalt for an advisory opinion provided that any such panel reviewing the position is composed of no less than three Justices after any necessary recusals, there lacks a live case or controversy that would otherwise determine the issue, and there is a reasonably need for resolution of the question.
F. A matter arising under the Covenants of Rights and Freedoms is appealable as of right to the Cort pü Inalt. In all other instances, the Cort pü Inalt may not be compelled to exercise its appellate authority. However, when declining to do so, the Cort pü Inalt must issue an order declaring such, and no such declaration shall be deemed as the Cort pü Inalt adopting or setting as binding precedent the appealed from decision or order.
G. The Cort pü Inalt, and any other cort existing under this article, shall interpret all matters through the lens of the Covenants of Rights and Freedoms.
H. Any justice that is a named party in a matter shall recuse himself or herself from hearing any and all parts of the matter.
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 6, 2020 20:01:48 GMT -6
Distinguished Chair and Members of the Committee:
I am sincerely humbled and grateful for this opportunity to address the Committee of the Whole in connection with my nomination as a Justice of the Uppermost Cort of Talosssa. I also wish to express my gratitude to the Government for putting nominating me to this position.
My excitement at being the first to undergo this type of vetting process cannot be understated. Talossa needs to vet those that would sit on its highest cort, and I applaud the Senats for this initiative. While I lack any clue as to what may lie ahead, and if this process will sink my nomination, at least Talossa will have established a procedure for ensuring that those who sit on the Uppermost Cort are those deserving and with the legal acumen to render fair and just decisions. I think this recent events underscore this necessity more than ever.
I know my nomination has not been without controversy, and I thank those who have come out in support from the onset. It was, however, tamer than I anticipated, but this has not fortified any aspect that it would remain that way. To that end, I thank those who have questioned the wisdom in the nomination. These questions must be raised, and they should not stop at me, but should be raised about anyone that would be appointed as a Justice to the Uppermost Cort. We should not turn away from a situation merely because it challenges us, because it is hard, because maybe we do not like what someone is saying or pointing out. Perhaps those questions will cost me support and confirmation, but the process will have been fair and will have only served Talossa.
In my estimation, there are some who will not be convinced by my statements today, or my testimony in this hearing, or my closing statements. If confirmed, I would endeavor to convince them that of my merit through my conduct as a Justice, both in treating every litigant or party before me with the respect they deserve. This means that what many would label my more raucous nature must be tamed and banished from Talossa. For me to be a successful Justice, to help build the Rule of Law, to gain the trust of those who question my nomination, I must always keep an air of impartiality, decorum, and civility. I must not disparage a party, or any citizen of Talossa, no matter my personal feelings. In the United States, those who accept judgeships, in many states and certainly on the Federal level, understand that they forfeit many rights because they must be viewed as impartial by those who would seek redress from the Cort. That is a trait I should endeavor to emulate if confirmed to the Uppermost Cort.
To that end, confirmation to the Uppermost Cort would retire me from public life. Talossa is a small country and cannot always afford for its citizens to commit to fulfilling one role. However, the role of a Justice is no small task. I do not opine on any sitting Justice and their participation in other activities, and I applaud their ability to keep separate their respective roles in Talossa. But for someone like myself, I believe that a Justice must always keep an air of impartiality and fairness. Speaking only for myself and for no other person, I do not know how I can accomplish that without limiting my involvement to my role as a Justice of the Uppermost Cort.
I do not sit before you today seeking to justify my past conduct, and I am certain that many will disagree with that conduct. But what I will stress is that I am aware that to build trust in the Cort, a Justice must police their public conduct. Every person must feel respected. My feelings about the monarchy become moot when in the Cort, but my feelings must also become measured and quieter in my public conduct to ensure that, if I were to hear a matter involving the monarchy, all parties would trust that my judgment would apply the law to the facts and not stem from my personal notions of justice or be outcome driven.
But many of these will be asked in the interviews, and I want the ability to answer questions honestly and fully when asked, not attempt to answer questions by predicting what may come up. So I will move on.
As alluded to above, many of us are familiar with recent events, and the importance of a Justice to apply the law to the facts. My judicial philosophy is simple – what does the law say? What have the parties argued? What are the facts?
The Cort enjoys the awesome authority to address issues not raised by a party, but it should only exercise that authority in the absolute interest of justice. That means it should be rarely seen and seldom used. The Cort cannot be outcome driven. Of course the Cort may inform a party that its case may be weak, or that more information is needed, but it must refrain from passing early judgments that all but render it an advocate for one side. And in those extremely rare circumstances that justice so demands setting aside those restraints, there must be fully explained and settled procedure and standards for that conduct. It should not vary from one case to the next, but be settled.
Further, the Cort enjoys the burdensome power of judicial review. But that does not mean the Cort displaces the Ziu. It should not write something into the statute that is not there. It should not obviate a statute simply because it disagrees with the statute. It should not seek to render something inorganic simply because it does not agree with the concept. Only those statutes that are plainly inorganic should be struck down. And it should not be for some amorphous concepts of justice, but by a thoroughly explained procedure and legal standard that is easily accessible to every Talossan followed in all cases.
I have taken enough of your time and will close out by highlighting some of what I would hope to achieve as a Justice. First, the Cort must do a better job at explaining itself and its procedure. The procedure must be easy to understand and fully accessible and fit with Talossa’s needs. And the Cort must commit to adhering to that procedure. Presently, the Cort has minimal procedure and seemingly makes it up as it goes. I am working on some basic procedural outlines that I hope to share with everyone shortly, and I would hope that the Cort would adopt.
Next, I would discontinue all matters involving myself and take a close look at all pending matters. That which I am not forced to recuse myself, I would inquire with the Justices about disposition to clean the docket. If the parties were to consent, I would offer to issue a report and recommendation for the presiding Justice to adopt with the appropriate objections. I think this would help get through some backlog.
I would also work to finally establish the National Talossan Bar and get new attorneys admitted. Talossa can no longer acquiesce to the Cort’s dereliction in its duty in this regard.
Additionally, I would work in a public committee with members of any political party that wished to join to come up with the most acceptable ways within the realm of possibility to fix the judiciary.
Finally, and do not let anything I have said suggest otherwise, I would work with all members of the Cort, offering my services and help where welcomed and needed, to foster a collegial environment. The Cort must work as a team, even when we disagree. But our disagreement should be based in our interpretation of law, and if we do include it in decisions, should be fully explained. Talossa deserves, and requires, this.
There is so much I can say, and certainly just under 1,400 words is saying a lot, but I want to invite questions. So with all of this said, I am excited to begin questioning.
Thank you.
Viteu Marcianüs
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jan 5, 2020 19:35:04 GMT -6
S:reu Chair and Members of the Committee:
I sincerely apologise but I had a significant amount of work assigned to me this past Friday afternoon that required my exclusive focus this past weekend. I request a one day extension to post my opening statement.
For the duration of these proceedings, when necessary, I commit to informing the Committee if I will be unable to provide full responses within the time allotted to each member as to allow the Chair, in his discretion, to appropriately extend the period.
Respectfully submitted,
Viteu Marcianüs
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