Your Honour, my brief correspondingly addresses the complete injunctions, since the Attorney-General is standing by his request. You have already indicated that you are not considering that portion that pertains to the fake citizens, but I have nonetheless taken the precaution of addressing them at some small length.
The Chancery is deeply saddened by the necessity to defend a completely legitimate action undertaken by the office of the Secretary of State, and submits the following brief asking that the requested injunctions be denied.
The brief's text is included below, but the PDF version is easier to read and may be preferred:
suit.pdf (34.7 KB)
Sir Alexandreu Davinescu, representing the Royal Talossan Chancery, responds here to requests for injunctions by the Attorney-General of the Kingdom of Talossa.
The Attorney-General has requested two successive injunctions from the Chancery, asking that the cort issue an injunction invalidating the original termination of citizenship issued to Eiric S. Börnatfiglheu and his many “sock puppets” (fake identities created for the purposes of fraudulent immigration and voting) and that the cort then issue an injunction directing the Chancery to once again terminate the citizenship of the sock puppets, but not that of S:reu Börnatfiglheu.
The Chancery opposes both injunctions, on grounds both substantive and procedural. As indicated in cort, the Secretary of State would prefer to be left entirely out of these proceedings, and sees no purpose or merit to injunctions that would set dangerous precedents and which were approached through improper methods.
1. The Attorney-General has no standing to act on behalf of S:reu Börnatfiglheu for his citizenship. The Government may not bring action to compel the Chancery to reconsider a decision unless they have a compelling interest in the decision – they may not volunteer S:reu Börnatfiglheu to challenge his expulsion when S:reu Börnatfiglheu has made no such move for himself or through his attorney. S:reu Börnatfiglheu has the right to make his own decision on whether he wishes to challenge the Chancery's Writ of Termination of Citizenship. If he does so decide, then he may bring his own suit. But whether he does so or not, the Government has no grounds on which to claim that they represent him and that they may challenge decisions about his life on his behalf in this suit.
There may have been grounds to make such a request on the basis of jurisdiction, but the Attorney-General has already specified that he believes that charges may legally be brought against non-citizens; the Government cannot claim that they have any compelling interest in S:reu Börnatfiglheu's citizenship. We must consider the precedent, otherwise – in this instance the Government may not be opposed by the individual in question, who has already pled guilty, but what if they likewise wish to appeal a Writ to bring down punishment on a different former citizen? This is an instance of maintenance (though not champerty), and we should not allow it to be set in precedent for our cort.
2. The Attorney-General has misrepresented to the cort some essential material facts that strengthen his request for an injunction, sullying these proceedings and the complaint, which might otherwise not have been accepted in this regard. The complaint states that after the posting of Item B of evidence (details the scandal of S:reu Börnatfiglheu's actions) that the Chancery proceeded to issue the Writ of Termination. However, this omits the rather central fact that S:reu Börnatfiglheu sent his renunciation of citizenship to His Majesty the King, addressing it to “All,” with the explicitly stated intent of ending his Talossan citizenship.
Dear All,
Let me start by saying I'm sorry. Apologies don't make things all better, and that's most certainly the truth, but hopefully it can project something of my sorrow at my actions.
For the past while, I've been creating hand puppets. It began with a idle wonder on my part as to whether I could get away with it and then extended to see just how far it could get pushed. I don't know whether I did it to make a point, and if I did I'm not sure what it would be. I don't think I did it in a perverse desire to seize power. In all honesty, I don't know why I did it. Straight up, hands down, cards on the table. Nobody else knew of my actions.
I often thought to myself that I should knock this off. But I didn't and now the time has come to pay the piper. Pay a price that is too high for what amounts to screwing around but is regardless justly earned. In this I have betrayed those I came to consider friends and meddled in a living community of real people.
And that's the worst part of what I have done. And hearing a person's voice on the other end of the phone brought that home. Anonymity kills, please don't remain anonymous to one another.
As a matter of form, please consider this my renunciation of citizenship. It is something for which I am unfit.
In regret,
EricHis Majesty posted this renunciation publicly, and only at this point did the Chancery act in good faith to end the citizenship of S:reu Börnatfiglheu.
It is difficult to say exactly whether or not this extremely serious omission, which significantly strengthens any allegations that the Writ of Termination was wrongful, was done intentionally. The Attorney-General himself was not a citizen during this time, although his correspondence with the Chancery indicates that he seems to be aware of the renunciation. The Distain of the Government, however, Dame Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN, who has stated publicly that she is working on the briefs in this case and advising the Attorney-General, was demonstrably aware of the public renunciation. Shortly after it was made and recognized with the Writ, she spoke to S:reu Börnatfiglheu (a long-time friend of hers) and reported back to the nation that, “Eric has been in touch with me. He withdraws his renunciation of citizenship and declares himself willing to face Talossan justice.”
These statements may be seen here:
talossa.proboards.com/thread/7996/eiric-rnatfiglheus-renunciation-citizenship?page=1 As can be seen, the fact that this was intended as public renunciation by someone unable to post for themselves was universally accepted by all commentators, S:reu Börnatfiglheu, and his friends. Its existence or validity was not challenged in any respect, either now or then.
Whether or not the Attorney-General and Distain willfully attempted to hide this information from this cort is unknown, although the Chancery assumes good faith and that it was an accident. Regardless, however, the fact that a public renunciation took place is not only pertinent, but absolutely central to any allegation that a Writ of Termination was improperly issued without a public renunciation. It seems unlikely that the portion of these proceedings that is moved against the Chancery would have been permitted to continue in any regard, or that the injunctions would have even been considered, had this material fact been included in the Government's charges. The omission of this fact, accident or no, irreparably sullied any request for an injunction, and it would be improper to permit the suit to continue in this portion.
3. As shown in the preceding point, a public renunciation of citizenship was made by S:reu Börnatfiglheu, and accepted as such. Sending such a renunciation to the Head of State to post was the only avenue available to a citizen whose Wittenberg account had been suspended, and its validity is unchallenged. Neither is it in dispute that the many “sock puppet” fake citizens were his own creation, or that he was certainly entitled to speak on their behalf because of their lack of independent existence. It would be entirely contrary to the honour of the Royal Talossan Chancery, the Secretary of State, and the Kingdom of Talossa for the Chancery to state that a public renunciation and valid Writ of Termination was invalid, or to issue a new Writ of Termination. It would set a dangerous precedent for the Chancery to do so on the request of the Government, since it has long been considered the privilege of every Talossan to sever their connection with our great nation when they choose to do so.
4. The Attorney-General has several times implied or stated that the public renunciation was illegitimate in some fashion. However, this is insufficiently demonstrated, and cannot be sustained as fact. S:reu Börnatfiglheu has said that he feels he was “bullied” into renouncing, in some obscure fashion, by the mention of possible judicial action in foreign courts. And while it is true that the revelation of his renunciation prompted public outcry along those lines (Ministreu Mximo Carbonel demanded foreign prosecution in immediate and certain terms, in the very first response to the renunciations), his suggestions that this might have been the case can carry no weight.
In the first place, there is the issue of credibility. It is difficult to imagine someone whose word could carry less weight than that of S:reu Börnatfiglheu, who has just pled guilty to a level of deception that beggars belief. It is no exaggeration to call this individual the most impressive fabulist that Talossa has ever seen, and attempts to justify his renunciation after the fact, for his own benefit, should be taken with a peck of salt.
In the second place, even if the allegations were true and S:reu Börnatfiglheu felt constrained to renounce (difficult to believe, considering how self-serving such an account would be), it is difficult to see how that would make his renunciation less valid. If His Majesty mentioned the fact, during a conversation, that the scope of S:reu Börnatfiglheu's crimes might lead even to foreign prosecutions, this was – lest we forget – a completely accurate statement. Cautioning a criminal about the potential consequences of his actions is not a threat.
5. There are no grounds and no purpose to restoring the citizenship of the “sock puppets,” when a second injunction simultaneously notes that they do not exist and asks that their citizenship once more be stripped. It is not only illegal, since there is no dispute over the fact that these individuals do not and never have really existed, and thus it was absolutely legitimate to issue a Writ of Termination for their citizenship, but it also would needlessly complicate matters in these proceedings. The law clearly provides that “no sentence of banishment or revocation of citizenship recommended by a Magistrate's Court shall be effective unless approved by a unanimous vote of the Uppermost Cort” (Lex.G.10.5), so this second injunction would need to be confirmed and approved by a unanimous vote of a different cort – one that is notoriously much slower-moving than this one.
The Attorney-General asks the Chancery to restore the citizenship of numerous individuals who do not really exist and have never existed, and whose creator publicly renounced his own citizenship, without disputing these facts. The Chancery can see no way that this should be permitted, even if it is contingent on the possibility of a second injunction, which would need to be confirmed by the Uppermost Cort, that would again strip them of their citizenship. It takes only a moment's thought to reflect that such a request is not only unusual, but foolhardy. Are these non-entities, who have no reality, to be legally recognized citizens while confirmation of the injunction is pending? Do they have a vote? Are their votes, uniformly registered for a party that is currently in Government, to be returned as valid? And what if a procedural problem means that a second injunction is rejected? It seems rather certain that we may rely on Sariah Gipson's silence, but it would be years before “she” would lose her citizenship. In every way, the thinking here is flawed.
6. The Attorney-General and Distain have attempted to collude with the Royal Talossan Chancery in an attempt to arrange that situation to their own political advantage during the course of these proceedings, before the Chancery had retained counsel, and this improper behavior, represented in the injunctions requested, should be entirely rejected by this cort as unbecoming an officer of the cort and a representative of the people of Talossa.
During the course of these proceedings, the Chancery was not initially served. This was extremely improper, as legal action was being proposed against it to compel its action, but it was a reasonable error and shortly remedied. However, when the Attorney-General served the Chancery, several days later, the Secretary of State replied with a question, asking:
What is the injunction exactly?
What is it about? What I am supposed to be defending?In response, the Attorney-General replied as follows:
Well, it's about the fact that Iustì terminated ESB's citizenship illegally.
We are requesting that the court find that the Writ of Renunciation was issued illegally (you can read all about it in the attached documents), since it can be shown that ESB was goated into renouncing by the King, as he stated, and it can be seen that he wants to return to Talossa, thus hinting at us that he never wanted to renounce originally.Following up shortly thereafter, and without prompting, the Attorney-General further wrote:
And, by the way, you CAN defend the termination of the citizenship, if you think that it was correctly issued. But you can also opt not to defend it - you would not be punished in any way, since you have not issued the writ of termination of citizenship and therefore cannot be held liable.
Iustì, on the other hand...It is known that the Attorney-General is generally presumed to be responsible for defending the Government and the Royal Household from legal action, when necessary. When unable to personally do so, or when action is brought against those entities by the Attorney-General, then it seems proper that counsel should then be appointed on their behalf. In this instance, the Attorney-General opted not to do so, prompting the Chancery to seek outside counsel. Whether or not that was wise, it was certainly improper for the Attorney-General, a member of the Bar, to be giving legal advice to someone he was suing before they had gotten someone to represent their best legal interests. He could not possibly foresee that my client could not be held liable in any way, and should not be giving such advice to someone whose interests in this matter may oppose his own.
It was far more improper, on the other hand, to attempt to persuade my client not to contest two injunctions of questionable merit by assuring him that he would not be held liable – a claim that he could not guarantee or reasonably make, given that his time in office will end within a month – while simultaneously hinting that Sir Iustì Carlüs Canun, UrGP, could then suffer consequences. It is unclear what offer is being made in this email, beyond a promise that holds no weight. Did the Attorney-General think that my client had some animus against Sir Canun, that he might be eager to agree to these injunctions, to help set him up? Does the Attorney-General believe that the Chancery does not hold past Secretaries of State to have been shielded by the office, in the normal good-faith performance of their duties, and that they would be subject to prosecution as private individuals after their departure from the office? It is difficult to say. It is certain, however, that there are many aspects of the way in which this offer was made and the way the Attorney-General has pursued this case. In the light of this approach, agreeing to the injunctions would open the Chancery up to later action; these injunctions would be fruit of a poison tree, and the honour of the Chancery doesn't permit such fare.
To summarize:
1. The Ministry of Justice has no standing to appeal the citizenship status of a private individual, and permitting it to do so would set the precedent that the Government has an acting interest in all such matters.
2. The request for an injunction specifically omits the public and prominent fact that a public renunciation occurred, which sullies the entire request; due equity demands that the injunction be denied.
3. The Chancery cannot justly over-rule a valid renunciation that has been duly recognized in the normal course of events, since this would set a precedent that would infringe on the privilege of a citizen to renounce.
4. There is no reasonable basis to think that the renunciation was invalid.
5. Procedural reasons and common sense preclude returning citizenship status to fake individuals, even for a brief time.
6. The manner in which the Attorney-General has approached the Chancery has been completely improper in many ways, and contains the very strong appearance of an attempt to collude with a public official against a private citizen in arranging the legal circumstances in such a way as to advantage a later prosecution that would otherwise be impossible; agreeing to issue the injunction would be offensive to the dignity and honour of the Secretary of State and his office, and would possibly be subject to later action.
For the above reasons, the Chancery hereby asks that the requests for injunctions by the Attorney-General be denied.
Sir Alexandreu Davinescu, on behalf of the Royal Talossan Chancery.