Post by Munditenens Tresplet on Jan 6, 2013 4:46:00 GMT -6
Your Honour,
I respectfully and humbly present this amicus curiae brief for your consideration:
I: In Support of Defendant Litz Cjantscheir’s Motion to Dismiss in Part:
1. As stated in Defendant Cjantscheir’s motion, the Plaintiff seeks extraordinary relief for which no legal precedent exists.
The Plaintiff seeks an impeachment of all the Defendants, even though two of which (Dame Cjantscheir and himself) no longer hold the offices specified in his original complaint.
2. Retrospective impeachments are directly opposite to the observed principals of Anglo-American Law.
Article XVI, Section 5 of OrgLaw outlines the circumstances under which Cort’s may rule, saying:
Furthermore, Article XVI, Section 10 of OrgLaw clarifies that the Cort’s decision must base from Anglo-American, or Common, Law:
Plaintiff/Defendant Grischun, in his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, incorrectly argues:
Under past American precedent, which this Cort is explicitly authorized to use as a judicial basis for its decisions when no other basis exists, the opposite is true: When a public official leaves office, they no longer can be impeached. In 1974, when United States President Richard Nixon was due to be impeached by the House of Representatives (impeachment being a separate process from removal of office under Anglo-American Law--see Section II of this brief), he resigned as to not face the trial by the Senate. Following Nixon’s resignation, the 93rd House of Representatives passed H.R. 1333, recognizing that the Judiciary Committee was going to recommend to the full House the impeachment of President Nixon (H.R. 803), but because Nixon no longer held the office of the Presidency, there would be no vote taken on the actual Articles of Impeachment. (US Congressional Record, volume 120, pages 29361-62.)
Thus, under past American precedent, upon the leave of a public official from office, he or she can no longer be impeached, which makes the complaint and relief sought by Plaintiff Grischun moot. (Which in this case means obsolete; outside of America “moot” takes on a different meaning.)
II: In Support of Plaintiff/Defendant Grischun’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss in Part:
1. Defendant Cjantscheir incorrectly argues that Grischun’s original September 2011 filing is invalid as there is no public record of such filing.
According to Section 1 of 42RZ4, the Clerk of Cort:
and according to Section 5, the Clerk must also:
Plaintiff Grischun, in his January 2012 complaint, asserts that he filed his original complaint with Bradley Holmes, the Clerk of Cort, and received a confirmation of his filing on September 22, 2011. Holmes, upon receiving his complaint, should have assigned it a docket number within 72 hours of the receipt, but instead assured the Plaintiff that he would docket the complaint when:
Bradley Holmes, in his stated defence in case 12.01 (of which he is both the Clerk and a Defendant), admitted his inaction saying:
Notwithstanding whether or not Plaintiff Grischun’s original complaint (which differs from Case 12.01) is still valid and has yet to be assigned a docket number, Grischun cannot and should not be held liable nor should his complaint(s) suffer from the admitted inaction on the behalf of the Clerk of Cort.
2. Plaintiff/Defendant Grischun correctly asserts, and Defendant Cjantscheir incorrectly rebuts, that “impeachment” of a public official does not necessarily guarantee his or her removal from office.
First off, Grischun is correct when he asserts that “impeachment” is not defined anywhere in Talossan Statutory Law, Organic Law, or legal precedent, and thus it is within the Organic scope of the Cort to define such a term, within the realm of Anglo-American Law. (OrgLaw Article XVI, Sections 5 and 10)
Under American Law, “impeachment” is separate from the act of removal from office in that the House of Representatives has the:
Defendant Cjantscheir, in her Counter Arguments to the Opposition to her Motion to Dismiss, argues that:
III: The Rt. Hon. Istefan Perþonest should be permitted to intervene, and not just be amicus curiae, in this Case.
1. Under Anglo-American Precedent, an Intervener differs from being amicus curiae, in that he has locus standi in the Case, and has the full rights in proceedings (such as making motions, cross-examinations) as do the named parties.
Istefan Perþonest clearly specified that he wished to intervene, saying:
In the United States, however, there does. United States law 5 CFR 1201.34, sub-section (a) (which applies solely to US Federal Courts), defines Interveners as:
Sub-section (c1) states:
Sub-section (c2) states:
Traditionally, outside of US Federal Courts but throughout Anglo-American precedent, Interveners are permitted at the sole discretion of the presiding judges. Justice Flanagan in the Appellate Court of Indiana wrote in one of his decisions:
I respectfully submit this to the Cort for its consideration to reverse its decision to classify Perþonest’s filing as an amicus curiae brief, and allow him to intervene in this case.
I hope that my amicus curiae was able to straighten out some of the rather complex legal notions brought in this Case. I would like to point out that my use of American law (outside of American Case law) was simply to show comparison. I wish the Cort all the best in its judgement.
If this format isn't readable (kind of small text), I would be happy to provide a .pdf link to the Cort and to the parties.
Munditenens Tresplet
Dated as filed.
(EDIT: I keep seeing typos--I typed this up between 1-6AM my time, they were bound to happen. Fixed...again...and again.)
I respectfully and humbly present this amicus curiae brief for your consideration:
Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the Motion by Defendant Litz Cjantscheir to Dismiss in Part;
in Support of the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Plaintiff/Defendant Éovart Grischun in Part;
and in Support of the Right of Intervention by the Rt. Hon. Istefan Perþonest in Case 12.01.
in Support of the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Plaintiff/Defendant Éovart Grischun in Part;
and in Support of the Right of Intervention by the Rt. Hon. Istefan Perþonest in Case 12.01.
I: In Support of Defendant Litz Cjantscheir’s Motion to Dismiss in Part:
1. As stated in Defendant Cjantscheir’s motion, the Plaintiff seeks extraordinary relief for which no legal precedent exists.
The Plaintiff seeks an impeachment of all the Defendants, even though two of which (Dame Cjantscheir and himself) no longer hold the offices specified in his original complaint.
2. Retrospective impeachments are directly opposite to the observed principals of Anglo-American Law.
Article XVI, Section 5 of OrgLaw outlines the circumstances under which Cort’s may rule, saying:
“Where there is an exact precedent, a court shall rule according to law. Where there is no exact precedent, a court will make a rule to fit the case, either by reinterpreting an old rule (statutory or otherwise) or by applying what it considers principles of justice, consistent with the Covenants of Rights and Freedoms...”
Furthermore, Article XVI, Section 10 of OrgLaw clarifies that the Cort’s decision must base from Anglo-American, or Common, Law:
“Any judge or justice may issue court orders or injunctions according to the generally accepted principles of Anglo-American law...”
Plaintiff/Defendant Grischun, in his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, incorrectly argues:
“...Retrospective impeachment of charges can still occur, otherwise any person breaking laws while acting in an official capacity may simply leave office and escape trial...”
Under past American precedent, which this Cort is explicitly authorized to use as a judicial basis for its decisions when no other basis exists, the opposite is true: When a public official leaves office, they no longer can be impeached. In 1974, when United States President Richard Nixon was due to be impeached by the House of Representatives (impeachment being a separate process from removal of office under Anglo-American Law--see Section II of this brief), he resigned as to not face the trial by the Senate. Following Nixon’s resignation, the 93rd House of Representatives passed H.R. 1333, recognizing that the Judiciary Committee was going to recommend to the full House the impeachment of President Nixon (H.R. 803), but because Nixon no longer held the office of the Presidency, there would be no vote taken on the actual Articles of Impeachment. (US Congressional Record, volume 120, pages 29361-62.)
Thus, under past American precedent, upon the leave of a public official from office, he or she can no longer be impeached, which makes the complaint and relief sought by Plaintiff Grischun moot. (Which in this case means obsolete; outside of America “moot” takes on a different meaning.)
II: In Support of Plaintiff/Defendant Grischun’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss in Part:
1. Defendant Cjantscheir incorrectly argues that Grischun’s original September 2011 filing is invalid as there is no public record of such filing.
According to Section 1 of 42RZ4, the Clerk of Cort:
“...shall receive and file actions brought by individuals or their representative attorneys and assign to each requested action a docket number...”
and according to Section 5, the Clerk must also:
“...acknowledge the receipt of any filing and shall, within 72 business hours of said acknowledgment, assign a docket number and make a judicial assignment...”
Plaintiff Grischun, in his January 2012 complaint, asserts that he filed his original complaint with Bradley Holmes, the Clerk of Cort, and received a confirmation of his filing on September 22, 2011. Holmes, upon receiving his complaint, should have assigned it a docket number within 72 hours of the receipt, but instead assured the Plaintiff that he would docket the complaint when:
“...construction [of the Courthouse] is complete. (Hopefully much sooner than later)...”Once the Courthouse was completed, Grischun’s original complaint was never docketed, and thus in January of 2012, he filed a new complaint, which was given the docket number 12.01.
Bradley Holmes, in his stated defence in case 12.01 (of which he is both the Clerk and a Defendant), admitted his inaction saying:
“...There was no conspiracy or action of any type - only inaction. Which I acknowledge and for which I apologize...”
Notwithstanding whether or not Plaintiff Grischun’s original complaint (which differs from Case 12.01) is still valid and has yet to be assigned a docket number, Grischun cannot and should not be held liable nor should his complaint(s) suffer from the admitted inaction on the behalf of the Clerk of Cort.
2. Plaintiff/Defendant Grischun correctly asserts, and Defendant Cjantscheir incorrectly rebuts, that “impeachment” of a public official does not necessarily guarantee his or her removal from office.
First off, Grischun is correct when he asserts that “impeachment” is not defined anywhere in Talossan Statutory Law, Organic Law, or legal precedent, and thus it is within the Organic scope of the Cort to define such a term, within the realm of Anglo-American Law. (OrgLaw Article XVI, Sections 5 and 10)
Under American Law, “impeachment” is separate from the act of removal from office in that the House of Representatives has the:
“...sole Power of Impeachment...”(US Const. Article One, Section Two), but the Senate has:
“...the sole Power to try all impeachments...”and its:
“...Judgement in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office...”(US Const. Article One, Section Three). In other words, a public official may be impeached but not removed from office. This was the case with US President William (Bill) Clinton, who was impeached by the House of Representatives, but a 50-50 vote in the Senate prevented his removal from office.
Defendant Cjantscheir, in her Counter Arguments to the Opposition to her Motion to Dismiss, argues that:
“...the widely accepted definition to impeach someone is ‘to charge, that person, a public official with a public crime for which the punishment is removal from office’...”Cjantscheir fails to define “impeachment” through Anglo-American legal precedent, and thus her assumed definition is invalid.
III: The Rt. Hon. Istefan Perþonest should be permitted to intervene, and not just be amicus curiae, in this Case.
1. Under Anglo-American Precedent, an Intervener differs from being amicus curiae, in that he has locus standi in the Case, and has the full rights in proceedings (such as making motions, cross-examinations) as do the named parties.
Istefan Perþonest clearly specified that he wished to intervene, saying:
"I, Istefan Éovart Perþonest, acting on my own behalf, do hereby seek to intervene in Case 12-01 before this most Honourable Court. I claim a direct interest in this case because the plaintiff's case calls into question my right to my seat in the Cosa, per the assignment of a vacant seat by the Common Sense Party leader on March 2nd, XXXIII.", and never explicitly said, or implied in his filings that he wished to file as simply amicus curiae. There exists no Talossan precedent under which citizens are allowed to intervene in a case in this manner.
In the United States, however, there does. United States law 5 CFR 1201.34, sub-section (a) (which applies solely to US Federal Courts), defines Interveners as:
“...organizations or persons who want to participate in a proceeding because they believe the proceeding, or its outcome, may affect their rights or duties...”
Sub-section (c1) states:
“Any person, organization or agency may, by motion, ask the judge for permission to intervene. The motion must explain the reason why the person, organization or agency should be permitted to intervene.”
Sub-section (c2) states:
“A motion for permission to intervene will be granted where the requester will be affected directly by the outcome of the proceeding...”
Traditionally, outside of US Federal Courts but throughout Anglo-American precedent, Interveners are permitted at the sole discretion of the presiding judges. Justice Flanagan in the Appellate Court of Indiana wrote in one of his decisions:
“An intervener is ... one who is seeking to become a party to a suit for the purpose of protecting an interest of his own which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is interested in protecting. Strictly speaking, he is not in any sense a party to the suit until permission to intervene is granted."
I respectfully submit this to the Cort for its consideration to reverse its decision to classify Perþonest’s filing as an amicus curiae brief, and allow him to intervene in this case.
I hope that my amicus curiae was able to straighten out some of the rather complex legal notions brought in this Case. I would like to point out that my use of American law (outside of American Case law) was simply to show comparison. I wish the Cort all the best in its judgement.
If this format isn't readable (kind of small text), I would be happy to provide a .pdf link to the Cort and to the parties.
Munditenens Tresplet
Dated as filed.
(EDIT: I keep seeing typos--I typed this up between 1-6AM my time, they were bound to happen. Fixed...again...and again.)