Request for Relief re. legality of non-Talossan name

[Ián Tamorán S.H.]

Cort will come to order.

This Cort has received a request for relief concerning the alleged use of a non-legal non-Talossan name during an application for citizenship. Since this case concerns personal identity and the preservation of secrecy between Talossan and non-Talossan identity its evidence shall be presented and the case heard in camera.

This Cort realises that the time between the presentation of the request and this first preliminary judgement has been very short and that no opportunity has been given for wider declarations and consideration. Therefore interested parties are invited to make their presentations to this Cort providing any further evidence or arguments which counteract or should serve to modify this first preliminary judgement. Such presentations should be made prior to 12:00 UTC 23 December 2019.  The evidence and initiating request will be made available in camera to any Talossan citizen on application to this Cort.  No remarks shall be made public which identify the defendant.

Thus the statements made here are not in final judgement, but are presented only to indicate in which direction that at this time it seems to this Cort that the evidence points.

The petition for this case turns upon a name used by the defendant during an application for citizenship of this Talossan nation. This case is raised under A.16.1 et seq. which says that an applicant or citizen commits an offence if s/he:

16.1. Makes any fraudulent or dishonest claims or statements on his or her application for citizenship, including his or her claims or statements to the Cort, the Immigration Minister and any deputies of the minister or to Cos. members.
16.2. Uses another person's identity or uses an identity that creates the impression of another person to post or convey messages via email or on any public forum.

This Cort must therefor first consider the question “what is a name?”.

The first and primary meaning of the word “name”, drawn from The Concise Oxford Dictionary (third edition, 1934) is:

“word by which individual person, animal, place or thing, is spoken of or to”.

Primary meanings are not the only meanings used in law, thus we must also consider the legal meaning of the word “name” within Talossan Law.

To quote from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_name#United_Kingdom:

In strict English law, if there is such a thing as a "legal " surname, it is easily changed. In the words of A dictionary of American and English law, "Any one may take on himself whatever surname or as many surnames as he pleases, without statutory licence". This does not always seem to have applied to names given in baptism. As noted by Sir Edward Coke in Institutes of the Lawes of England, "a man may have divers names at divers times, but not divers Christian names." But in modern practice all names are freely changeable.

The above restriction on Christian names clearly does not apply to non-Christian (i.e. non-baptismal) names.

As regards the laws of the USA (quoting from the same source):

“Most states in the United States follow the common law which permits name changing for non-fraudulent purposes. This is actually the most common method, since most women who marry do not petition a court under the statutorily prescribed method, but simply use a new name (typically the husband's, a custom which started under the theory of coverture where a woman lost her identity and most rights when she married).
Most state courts have held that a legally assumed name (i.e., for a non-fraudulent purpose) is a legal name and usable as their true name,”

It is clear that these two other countries which adopt a similar legal structure to that of Talossa, and from which Talossa has explicitly chosen to learn, both declare that an individual’s name is flexible, and at the choice of that individual, provided that no fraudulent purpose is intended. Each of those countries also permits an individual to bear, and use, more than one name – again provided that no fraud is intended.

It is common practice in the U.K. and the U.S.A. and in many other countries besides, that an individual person may have both a professional name and a private name. [Though not relevant to this case, for companies we also have the concept of “trading as”, thus “A.B. Inc. trading as X.Y.Z.”.] The defendant has stated, in accompanying documentation, that his use of one name at the Talossan border and at most times a different name outside of Talossa was in order to separate these two different aspects of his life from non-Talossan prying, so that his non-Talossan identity could not be immediately deduced from outside of Talossa through his Talossan name, and that this was equivalent to the common and usual separation between professional and private names. The defendant has clearly stated that this was entirely without fraudulent intent.  The defendant has also stated that the name used at the Talossan border was, in fact, extensively used outside of Talossa, well prior to his contact with Talossa.

Thus a further question must be considered, which is: was this use of some specific non-Talossan name a fraudulent act or with fraudulent intent?

The legal definition of fraud is not simple, but in this first instance, and as part of the initial considerations being made here, we again draw upon The Concise Oxford Dictionary which defines “fraud” as

“Deceitfulness, criminal deception, use of false representations, … person or thing not fulfilling expectation or description”

If we accept that a person may legally be known by two different names at the same time (as is the case in both the U.K. and the U.S.A. and elsewhere), then the use within Talossa or at the border of Talossa of any of those non-Talossan names is non-fraudulent provided that person does not also use some other non-Talossan name to manifest, within Talossa, as more than one person. Nowhere has it been suggested, either in the invoking petition or in accompanying documents, that such duplicity has taken place, nor was ever intended to take place. Moreover it has been possible, from within Talossa, using standard Internet procedures and personal contact, to link together the two non-Talossan names under discussion.

The “expectation” in this case is that an individual exists outside of Talossa bearing that name, and that the name stated is a “description” of that individual.

I would like to give three non-Talossan examples which may give some light upon this case.

First example: My Talossan name is Ián Tamorán S.H. I live in the U.K. and I hold a British passport, within which my name is stated to be Ian Donald Killeen Kelly. (I was known at work as IDKK). I am also, however, an Irish citizen, and I hold an Irish passport too, within which my name is stated to be Ian Donald Kelly. This is in accordance with Irish regulations which permit only one middle name – my official name in Southern Ireland. So, what is my name?

Second example: My father’s name was Percival John Kelly – or perhaps it was Patrick Joseph Kelly. He was born in Dublin in 1904 – and those of you who know Irish history will note that all of his birth registration documentation was destroyed in the Post Office fire of 1926. When he moved from Dublin to London he stopped calling himself Patrick and called himself Percy, which was how all his friends knew him – though at work he was known as Paddy. He had official documentation in both of those names (Patrick and Percy), but never as two different people. So, what was his name?

Third example: For several years I worked for a French company. I had a colleague whose father was English, and mother French. He too had two passports. His first name in the UK (and on his UK passport) was “Alexander”, but because of French law his name in France (and on his French passport) was “Alexandre”. So what was his name?

The defendant in this case has admitted the use, outside of Talossa, of two non-Talossan names, but has only used one of these names at the Talossan border. From within Talossa it has been possible, as per our “expectation”, to locate the defendant by his border name, that this name is, as required, a “description”. Thus we have for the border-name presented fulfilment of both “expectation” and “description”. We have also received evidence that other non-Talossan names are (or could be) used by the defendant, but those names, not having been used here, are of no consideration within Talossa. Moreover, from the evidence as stated, in first consideration this Cort finds no evidence of fraud or fraudulent intent.

The initial finding of this Cort is that the defendant has committed no offence within Talossan Law as petitioned for this case.

The Cort rises, and awaits any further submissions.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Your Honour,

the defendant has retained me to represent him, and although I have not as of yet received any particular invitation to speak on his behalf in camera, I will make use of the general invitation of interested parties granted by the Cort.

Defendant agrees to the analysis of the Cort, and thereupon moves for a judgement of

a c q u i t t a l

for want of evidence that defendant's actions were fraudulent or dishonest. Defence reserves the right to bring further evidence and submissions, if the motion be not granted.

Submitted on this Sunday, 22nd of Decembre 2019/XL.

[Açafat del Val]

May it please the Cort,

The Right Honorable Cresti Nouacastra-Läxhirescu has seen fit and has elected in his capacity as the Attorney-General to retain me as Counsel of the Government for the resolution of this case. Accordingly I rise in representation of the Government and respond to the preliminary judgement thusly:

==============

The Government wishes to express incredible concern and gross disagreement on this preliminary judgement. It is an earnest belief that the true and common understandings of both names and fraud have been perverted and, worse, that the intent of the actual laws is being undermined.

FIRST, ON THE MATTER OF FRAUD:

The preliminary judgement (hereinafter “the judgement”) depends in large part on a definition of fraud. To wit, this Cort found that the definition be: “Deceitfulness, criminal deception, use of false representations, … person or thing not fulfilling expectation or description”. The Government accepts this, but contends that the judgement has misappropriated the same.

That a person use one name in one place but a different name in another place, but especially if the two names are so distinct as to be commonly mistaken for two different persons, is an inherently and obviously deliberate attempt to confuse, obfuscate, or otherwise hide an identity, no matter whether the cause were benign or malicious.

Perhaps “Paddy” is commonly understood to mean “Patrick”, or “Dick” to mean “Richard”, but no reasonable person would ever construe “Rob” to mean “Alexander”, nor “Danny” to mean “Stuart”.

The two names of the Accused, which have been herein redacted, are so plainly distinct that no reasonable person would take either name to be the same person. This effect was orchestrated willingly and knowingly by the Accused; in fact, he has confessed that his very intentions were to prevent a link between both names — or, in different words, to use false representations and deceive others of his actual identity.

That is fraud, no less according to the very definition of this Cort.

Furthermore, the judgement focuses very much on the intentions, rather than the actual actions, in order to acquit the Accused. That is severely irrelevant to the findings of fact. Intentions may influence the sentence, i.e. the punishment, but have no bearings (and should never have any bearings) on whether a crime were or were not really committed.

To say so another way: If a person could not commit fraud solely because he did not intend to commit fraud, as would be the result of the judgement of this Cort, then there would never be a remedy for the injustice.

The facts are that the Accused has already confessed to the intent to deceive the nation of Talossa with regard to his true and real identity, and did so knowingly and willfully. Therefore, the Accused has done an act of fraud.

SECOND, ON THE MATTER OF NAMES:

This Cort has asked, What is a name? A name is a form of address which refer to the identity of an entity or, as has been stated, the “word by which an individual person, animal, place or thing is spoken of or to”.

The Government recognizes and agrees with this Cort that under the common law of Talossa a person may resolve to change his name one, several, or many times, and may do so even without having committed fraud. However, the judgement of this Court ignores not only the inherently obvious desire of Talossa, but also the statutory requirements, that the State (comprising the King, the Government, the Secretary of State, and other organs) know and be provided the real, true, actual, permanent and traceable identities of its citizens.

Without such a person may change their name on a whim in order to avoid creditors collecting a debt, defeat or evade taxes or contracts, or even commit fraud, all while escaping justice and leaving victims without a fair remedy for their harms. For this reason, in the case of name changes as one example, any State (whether Talossa, Canada, or the United States) has or would have the records of the previous names of a person in order to establish the long-term identity of that person in spite of those changes.

To say that the Accused may have a right to refuse to disclose a name which reveal his permanent and true identity is to violate the sovereignty of Talossa in enforcing its laws, which plainly and obviously require such disclosure, as well as open the doors to further foulplay, by others if not by the Accused.

After all, why should the State consent at all to give up custody to its treasury or other important facets of government unless the custodian were at least willing to give up his name? How else than the full disclosure of an identity (among other things) would Talossa make itself whole again, if the custodian ran off with treasury funds (or, in another example, misused an official Twitter account) and faced no consequences merely because Talossa had been deceived of his identity in the first place?

The name which the Accused provided on his citizenship application has, in the words of A.16.2, ‘created the impression of another person’.

Therefore, it is grossly irresponsible of the judgement of this Cort to suggest that a name used within Talossa preclude or make unnecessary the disclosure of the name(s) used outside Talossa.

THIRD AND FINALLY, ON THE MATTER OF REMEDY:

The Accused has confessed to the act of fraud, and specifically the intent to defeat the laws (A.16.1 et seq.) of Talossa.

The Government has proved that the State has bona fide causes to know the true and permanent identity of the Accused, and that the name which he offered up on his citizenship application defeated the State and violated its laws.

The Government also recognizes and honors the heretofore done public services of the Accused, no less to the benefit of Talossa and without any remuneration for them. We are grateful for and humbled by his contributions and aid.

For all the above so enumerated, the Government reiterates its request and prays that the Cort do find the Accused guilty of fraud and afford such punishment as may be deemed sufficient for due remedy.

The Government reserves its right of appeal in case an unfavorable final judgement be rendered.

Having laid the case before this Court, the Government sits and awaits further judgement.

==============

/s/
Açafat del Val
Counsel of Government

[Viteu Marcianüs]

May it please the Cort, 

Please find the amicus curiae of Viteu Marcianüs available for download here: Amicus Curiae by Viteu Marcians.pdf (186 KB)

Respectfully Submitted, 

Viteu Marcianüs

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Your Honour,

defence objects to the submission of amici curiae at this point, and furthermore objects to the misappropriation of the maxim of eiusdem generis. Due to the highly personal, and precarious nature of the information contained within the unredacted files, the Cort cannot have meant any Talossan citizen whatsoever. The phrases in question must be inferred to mean interested parties in the legal sense. Defence would object to the disclosure of such sensitive information to any party not legally involved in the proceedings. The prosecution itself has filed a motion to suppress to that effect.

Since the Cort has not explicitly allowed for amici curiae, and since amici curiae are extraordinary in nature and, absent an explicit request from Corts, require either a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae, or the consent of the interested parties within a trial, we move again that the Cort reject the amicus curiae improperly submitted by a non-interested party, namely Viteu Marcianüs.

[Açafat del Val]

May it please the Cort,

The Government rises in response to the said objections of the Accused and his Counsel against a submitted amicus curiae brief.

It should be noted that the preliminary judgement said, in part: “The evidence and initiating request will be made available in camera to any Talossan citizen on application to this Cort.”

If the evidence may be made available to any Talossan citizen, then surely any Talossan citizen may also submit an amicus curiae brief?

Moreover, the submission was made by an honorable Talossan who is a bona fide member of the Bar, a learned jurist of our laws, and has previously served as the Attorney-General of our Government. His brief not only would benefit the final judgement which this Cort may render, but benefit the general application of justice in this case.

That is not to say, of course, that this Cort may find the brief agreeable or ultimately use it as any basis for opinion, but it is to recognize the value of hearing more than two sides in this dispute.

The Government suggests cordially that, if the Accused or his Counsel take issue, perhaps they should secure or should have already secured like briefs in their favor, rather than suppress ones not in their favor.

The Government sits and awaits further judgements.

/s/
Açafat del Val
Counsel of Government

[Ián Tamorán S.H.]

This Cort requests that all communications with the accused that relate to his application for citizenship between the dates 14 August 2013 and 19 February 2014 be made available to this Cort. This information must be presented privately, protecting the anonymity of the accused.
(Viteu Marcianüs , Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun , Açafat del Val )

Ián Tamorán S.H.

[Ián Tamorán S.H.]

The Cort thanks Viteu Marcianüs for the submission of his amicus curiae, but rejects his request for formal submission. However this Cort will attempt in its judgements and considerations to take into account many of the informative points and pertinent questions raised therein by my learned colleague.

[Eðo Grischun]

Dec 29, 2019 13:06:35 GMT -6 Ián Tamorán S.H. said:

This Cort requests that all communications with the accused that relate to his application for citizenship between the dates 14 August 2013 and 19 February 2014 be made available to this Cort. This information must be presented privately, protecting the anonymity of the accused.
(Viteu Marcianüs , Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun , Açafat del Val )

Ián Tamorán S.H.

Your Honour,

Regrettably, this current Minister of the Interior does not have access to the communications requested by the Court. The immigration official that dealt with the particular case at the time in question appears to have been Béneditsch Ardpresteir, O.SPM.

Apologies for intruding the Court without explicit invitation, however I felt the need to reply so as to tag the relevant person required.

[Ián Tamorán S.H.]

This Cort will be open to receive any further information concerning this case prior to 12:00 hours UTC Monday 6 January 2020/xli

Ián Tamorán S.H., C.J.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Your Honour,
my client periodically, and after the passing of an appropriate amount of time, discards old conversations, e-mails, and the like. The earliest date that your Honour requests is nearly six years in the past, and I believe the Cort will also agree that citizens should not be obliged to keep records of concluded official business indefinitely. Defence therefore apologises for the inconvenience, but we have no such documents to submit to the Cort.

[Açafat del Val]

May it please the Cort,

The Government regrets but has had no success in discovering the requested evidence. Neither other Cabinet officers nor the Seneschal, whether actual or previous, have maintained such type of records going so far back as 2013/XXXIV. It appears, in a manner of speaking, that the documentation has disappeared out into the annals of time immemorial.

/s/
Açafat del Val
Counsel of Government

[Ián Tamorán S.H.]

The Cort thanks all who have sought for the documentation requested. The Cort is, however, able proceed without that verified information, relying upon evidence and submissions already made.

[Ián Tamorán S.H.]

Request for Relief re. legality of non-Talossan name

The Cort will come to order.

Those present may be seated.


This Cort thanks all of the participants in this case for their professionalism, politeness and
integrity: an excellent example has been set here.

The full judgement for this case is in LegalityOfNon-TalossanNameJudgement.pdf (270.49 KB)), which is the primary source for this text.  What follows in this posting is an informal copy that is more quickly readable on the screen.  


1. The Base for This Case

1.1 The petition for this case turns upon a name used by the defendant during an application for
citizenship of this Talossan nation. This case is raised under El Lexhatx A.16.1 et seq. which says
that an applicant or citizen commits an offence if s/he:

    16.1. Makes any fraudulent or dishonest claims or statements on his or her application for
citizenship, including his or her claims or statements to the Cort, the Immigration Minister
and any deputies of the minister or to Cos. members.
    16.2. Uses another person's identity or uses an identity that creates the impression of
another person to post or convey messages via email or on any public forum.
    16.3. Creates, for purposes of claiming citizenship or with the intent to deceive or mislead
other Talossans, more than one identity for use in the Kingdom of Talossa, excepting
name-changes that replace an earlier name previously held by the same person.

2. Clarification of Terms

2.1 Clear discussion requires clear definition of the terms used in that discussion. The petition for
this case turns upon a name used by the defendant, and therefor this Cort must consider the question
“what is a name?”, for without a clear Talossan legal definition and description of a “name”
statements made in this case would be ambiguous, or, at worst, without any meaning.

2.2 It is a specifically Talossan definition and description of a “name” that we must seek. Talossa
is subservient to no other country and Talossa is proud to be in this modern world of many other
nations. We cannot arbitrarily assume the definition of “name” used in some other nation without
either a clear statement in Talossan Law as to which country, or, barring that clear statement, an
interpretation taken by a Cort in the deciding of some case. The term “name” does not appear to be
defined within Talossan Law, but is a term used without full description within that Law,
presumably under the supposition that its meaning can be known without further reference. But this
is not the case, as there are many different, and incompatible, uses of the word “name” both in law
and in colloquial usage around the world.

2.3 The question “what is a name?” may appear, at first sight, to be trivial, but it is one whose
answer is difficult, and, as we have already seen, controversial. The question is neither vacuous nor
trivial.

2.4 There is considerable discussion in philosophical literature analysing the concept “name”. A
proper name can be taken to be a reference to a given external object (e.g. “Ián Tamorán”) or to an
entity which exists and whose proper name is a description (e.g. “the morning star”) or to an entity
which may or may not exist, and is known by description external to the proper name itself (e.g.
“Atlantis”). We may look at statements which describe some property of the object referred to by
name, but not the name itself (e.g. “Ián Tamorán is bald”, “Atlantis does not exist”), and also
statements which relate external objects by means of their names, both descriptive (e.g. “the
morning star is the evening star”) or by nomination (e.g. “Ian Kelly is Ián Tamorán”). The case
being considered here in this Cort turns upon a specific name used by the defendant both at the
Talossan border, and subsequently within Talossa (when not using the Talossan name). Thus we
have to be sure, in our considerations here, of the answer to the question “what is a name?”.

2.5 There are some linguistic analyses which state that there can be grammatically correct but
meaningless statements, for which Noam Chomsky gives the example “Colourless green ideas sleep
furiously.” [Chomsky, Noam (1957). Syntactic Structures. The Hague/Paris: Mouton. p.15. ISBN 3-
11-017279-8]. The words “colourless green ideas”, as given in that analysis, cannot, although
syntactically correct, describe anything real or possibly real, and therefor cannot take the status of a
name (in this case the subject) of any meaningful sentence. An alternative analysis, however, may
be found on pp. 140-141 of Ian D. K. Kelly Unremembered Future, 2009, Agrintha Books, Exeter,
ISBN 978-0-9553399-4-3 (available from lulu.com) in which that very sentence is given a concrete,
and possible, meaning (see also the discussion given in, and references from
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorless_green_ideas_sleep_furiously ). In several alternative
analyses (specifically that by Kelly), by exemplification the words “colourless green ideas” are
given a context in which they refer to something possibly real, and thus function as a (common)
name, in this way contrasting with Chomsky’s earlier discussion on the syntax/semantics divide.
(See also references to W.V.O. Quine in (Quine reference) ).

2.6 The first and primary meaning of the word “name” in this Cort’s first statement was drawn
from a respectable and scholarly dictionary. In considering that legal definition of “name” attention
was drawn to the technical meaning of that word within the laws of England and Wales in the
United Kingdom, together with the stated freedom of the holder in that jurisdiction of any name, to
be known by any other name (within certain limits, stated within precedent and local law).


3 Defendant’s Admitted Actions

3.1 The defendant has stated that the name used at the Talossan border was one by which the
defendant was and is regularly known, outside of Talossa. This Cort has independently verified that
this is the case, and can trace very public and frequent use by the defendant of that name back to
May 2013/xxxiv, with the possibility of usage prior to that. One of the links known to Talossa, and
freely given to Talossa by the defendant, is the registered external email address. Cursory
examination of that address is sufficient to give rapid access to a clear, non-Talossan, link to strong
and public evidence of the frequent use of that border name by the defendant. That particular link
was, in fact, used by one Talossan citizen, in 2014/xxxv, to make a brief non-Talossan contact
verifying the external reality of that citizen, who is in this case the defendant. That verification in
no way relied upon any accidental lapse by the current defendant in protecting their identity, nor did
it in any way require voice matching or visual comparisons. The correctness of this verification
was at that time acknowledged by the current defendant in personal email.


4 Alleged Contraventions of Talossan Law

We consider here each of the clauses of El Lexhatx A.16, under which this case has been raised.

4.1 Clause 16.1

4.1.1 We ask whether the defendant

16.1 – “Makes any fraudulent or dishonest claims or statements on his or her application for
citizenship, including his or her claims or statements to the Cort, the Interior Minister and any
deputies of the minister or to Cosa members.

4.1.2 Was the use by the defendant of the name as quoted at the Talossan border, and used
subsequently, either fraudulent or dishonest? Since this Cort has independently verified the
frequent prior and subsequent use of that name, external to Talossa, by the defendant it cannot be
found to be dishonest. The request made to an applicant on entering Talossa is (from
(Talossa name request) as recovered from
(Archive Talossa name request) )

“Your full and actual given name is required by this form.”

4.1.3 There is no indication given, or promise made by Talossa that this version (or, indeed, any
version) of the actual name will be kept confidential. It is clear, from much past activity visible in
this and other the membership applications, that this actual name given is not, in fact, at all times
kept confidential. There is some discussion later in this judgement of the relevance of online
anonymity in this 21st century, which at some future time this Talossan nation needs to consider.

4.1.4 Meaning of the Name Request

4.1.4.1 The meaning of the words “full and actual given name” vary in different non-Talossan
countries: and we must, in this case, consider only the Talossan meaning of those words. There is
no explicit definition of those words within Talossan Law, and especially within Talossan Law as
visible from outside of Talossa at the time of the defendant’s membership application, that this Cort
has been able to locate.

4.1.4.2 Without effect upon this case, and only as a matter of record, this Cort would welcome any
clarifying reference to such (specifically Talossan) explicit definitions as may have existed at the
time of the alleged offence, and which could have been known by a prospective citizen or which
were shown at or before time of citizenship application to this defendant. Deductions from any
such explicit definitions, however, are separate from those definitions, and would require their own
separate consideration in the light of those definitions, and of other external precedent, both
lexicographic and legal.

4.1.4.3 The meaning of the words “full and actual given name” are taken in this case by this
Talossan Cort to be substantially similar to their meaning within the law of England and Wales in
the United Kingdom. It is not possible for Talossa to use as its Laws the laws of all other nations,
nor should that be attempted: Talossa’s Laws are the Laws of Talossa itself, and are subservient to
no other nation. There are specific clauses within Talossan Law that point to the laws of one part of
another country, but outside of those specific references, Talossa is not bound to any other nation’s
laws. It is, of course, up to the Ziu, after due consideration, to give Talossa’s definition of the words
“full and actual given name”, and this action is suggested to the Ziu, but until that has taken place
this Cort is using the most general definition used in the founding nation for Anglo-Saxon law.

4.1.5 Change of non-Talossan Name

4.1.5.1 If we consider the words “full and actual given name” within the context of the law of
England and Wales in the United Kingdom, then an individual’s name can be whatever that
individual chooses it to be. For an individual whose birth is registered in the United Kingdom there
is an initial name, given by an outside party: for an individual entering the United Kingdom, and
whose birth has not been registered within the United Kingdom, then this first externally given
name may, or may not, exist. There is no specific requirement that any name change be publicly
registered, though there are situations in which such registration would be of use. Note: “of use”,
not “mandatory”. Provided that no fraud or deception is practised (as defined by law), a simple
deed poll suffices.

4.1.5.2 To quote (Legal guide, deed poll) :

If you prepare the deed poll yourself, you should make sure you sign it only when a witness is
present. This person has to add his or her name, home address and current occupation. If you
wish to have your deed poll enrolled, you will need two witnesses. It is important that the
deed poll states that it has been ‘signed as a deed and delivered’.

Enrolling a Deed Poll

The Supreme Court Central Office is the body responsible for the enrolment of a deed poll,
and a small cost is levied for the use of the service. This is not essential, but going through the
process of enrolling a deed poll ensures that the name change is on public record. The name
change is announced in the London Gazette, too.

4.1.5.3 That same reference specifies the (simple) format of a deed poll. A deed poll may be
privately drawn up and may, optionally, be enrolled as a matter of public record. Once more, it is to
be noted specifically that enrolment is entirely optional, not mandatory.

4.1.5.4 We cannot, within Talossa, require a citizen or prospective citizen in determining their name
to use the laws within any of their non-Talossan countries of normal residence, nor to use the laws
of any non-Talossan countries to which, outside of Talossa, that Talossan citizen or prospective
citizen may be subject – that would be impossible to do: Talossa’s jurisdiction does not extend
beyond Talossa. What, however, we can and must do is use Talossa’s Laws, which apply equally to
all person’s in the world, irrespective of their originating nations, to define what we in Talossa
require to perform a link to the outside, non-Talossan world. Those requirements needs to be
explicit within Talossan Laws, and made clear to any applicant. Because there appear to be no prior
Talossan definitions and descriptions in Talossan Law as visible from outside of Talossa to a noncitizen,
or indeed any such Talossan legal definitions at all, in this case under discussion this Cort is
using the vocabulary of the laws of England and Wales in the United Kingdom.

4.1.6 Names Requested at the Talossan Border

4.1.6.1 No request is made at the Talossan border for all the names by which the individual is
known or addressed, nor can it be. For example, my personal non-Talossan list of names would
include “Ian Donald Killeen Kelly”, “Ian Donald Kelly”, “Ian Kelly”, “Mr. Kelly”, “Kelly”, “Sir”,
“Ian”, “Darling”, “Daddy”, “Love”, “Ponger”, “GaGa”, “Grandad”, “Ned”, “Ian Kelly, B.Sc.” and
even (on stage) “Widow Twanky” and “Bearded Sister” – and more besides. Such names, both
formal and ludicrous, and forms of address (which cannot always be easily distinguished from
names), are in themselves of no interest within Talossa: what is of interest, though, is the ability,
from within Talossa, to make a reasonable link to some specific individual outside of Talossa.

4.1.6.2 Talossa, in line with the world’s other nations, has to be able to deal with individuals whose
most used names are normally written in non-Roman characters: for example our citizens and
visitors from Russia, Japan, India and China – with many other nations – cannot in the requesting
fields enter their local and most used forms of their names. In this current case, a public and
externally-used name was given in full by the defendant, in the Roman alphabet, without diacritical
marks, so any questions of transcription and transliteration do not need to be considered here. This
name, which was stated by the defendant as being commonly used outside of Talossa to identify the
defendant is, and was, declared by the defendant to be one of the defendant’s actual names. It has
subsequently made known to this Cort that it is not the defendant’s only and singular actual name.
As is clear from the laws of England and Wales, it is perfectly possible – and in particular within
those countries perfectly legal – to have more than one actual name, without those names having
been publicly recorded (except insofar as a private deed poll is public).

4.1.6.3 Again, drawing from the laws of England and Wales, a name may be “given” by the very
holder of that name: there is no stated requirement that the name be “given” by any other party. In
this case, the defendant has declared that the stated name was one personally given by the defendant
to the defendant. The defendant at the time of application did not declare that this was the
defendant’s only actual name, nor were they asked to do so: considerations of pseudonymity were
not (and still are not) included in Talossan Law.

4.1.6.4 Because of the problems of
(1) varied transliteration from non-Roman alphabet forms of names,
or (2) of the impossibility of listing all possible actual names,
or (3) there being no way in which Talossa can or should impose upon its citizens or prospective
citizens the use of particular forms of name-change laws in other non-Talossan nations,
it is not possible for Talossa to presume that it knows, or even can know, all such actual names.
Moreover, as has been observed in 4.5.1.4 above, there was at the time of the alleged offence no
Talossan Law stating that all actuals names externally used be declared (such a Law, as we have
seen, being impossible to implement), we cannot in Talossa forbid a citizen or prospective citizen
the right of having some non-Talossan name not known to Talossa, provided that we, from within
Talossa, are able to make non-Talossan contact with that citizen or prospective citizen.

4.1.6.5 We have, from within Talossa, using only standard internet tools and from the information
freely given by the defendant been able to connect the two non-Talossan identities under discussion
here. [As an aside point of information, this linkage between the two non-Talossan identities was
known (informally) within Talossa in 2014/xxxv, and is not the linkage recently performed and used
in raising this case.] It was known within Talossa, at the time of application for citizenship, that the
border-stated name was one in common non-Talossan public use well prior to that application for
Talossan citizenship. Thus the defendant freely gave a name, and other information, from which the
existence and use of that border-name outside of Talossa could freely be verified, and was indeed
verified in 2014/xxxv.

4.1.6.6 Therefor the defendant gave their “full and actual given name”, as requested. That name
having been given, no fraud can be deduced. Under this part of the discussion here it would seem
that there has been no contravention of clause 16.1, quoted above.

4.1.7 The Legality within Talossa of an External, non-Talossan Name

4.1.7.1 My learned colleague Açafat del Val, Counsel of the Government, has stated in his opening
submission for the prosecution:

That a person use one name in one place but a different name in another place, but especially
if the two names are so distinct as to be commonly mistaken for two different persons, is an
inherently and obviously deliberate attempt to confuse, obfuscate, or otherwise hide an
identity, no matter whether the cause were benign or malicious.

Here we have to determine whether the defendant’s actions, in wish for “preservation of
anonymity”, fall into any of the categories listed by my learned friend, and whether any of those
categories were in fact part of the Talossan Laws then extant.

4.1.7.2 It is my learned friend’s suggestion that the defendant’s actions were, and are, to hide an
identity with the potential qualifiers “confuse” and “obfuscate”. If this was the defendant’s
intention then in this the defendant was unsuccessful: we have, from within Talossa, using only
standard internet tools and from the information freely given by the defendant been able to connect
the two identities under discussion here. There is no clear description within Talossan Law as to the
extent of the “also known as” (a.k.a.) which must be included. As can be seen from the personal
example given in 4.1.6.1 above, such a list might be unsupportably long. In this case, from the
information freely given by the defendant at time of application, an adequately significant part of
this a.k.a. list was simple to obtain: it is inherently impossible to derive, or even know, a complete
a.k.a. list.

4.1.7.3 Talossa’s Laws apply only inside Talossa: that is the nature of national law. Only
International Law and the Law of Natural Justice apply to all nations, and they are not in question
here. The defendant has stated that linkage between the two identities under consideration should
be impossible, or at least inherently difficult, to deduce from outside Talossa. We know that linkage
from the border-given name to another a.k.a. name was reasonably simple to gather from
information inside Talossa. In Talossan Law we can consider what takes place only inside Talossa,
with the exception of external criminal acts such as breach the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, or are of a wholly repugnant and immoral nature, into neither of which categories this
alleged offence falls.

4.1.7.4 It must be noted, once more, that the request made at the Talossan border was for “Your full
and actual given name is required by this form.”: no request was made for a legal name, but for an
actual name. A legal name will differ from nation to nation, or may not even exist within some
nations, thus Talossa cannot request a legal name within the meaning of those words in some other
nation, but only an actual name, in the common meaning of those words – a name that is used.

4.1.8 False Representation

4.1.8.1 My learned colleague Açafat del Val has also stated for the prosecution, re. the defendant:

...he has confessed that his very intentions were to prevent a link between both names — or,
in different words, to use false representations and deceive others of his actual identity.

4.1.8.2 The action of hiding a link between two names would be false representation only if the
name as stated were a name not used outside of Talossa. We have seen that this was not, and is not
the case: the name given by the defendant at the Talossan border is one by which the defendant is
commonly known, and was commonly known. The name given, together with the reinforcing email
address, cannot therefor have been a deceit.

4.1.8.3 Another (non-border) external name used by the defendant was located, from our actions
within Talossa, without recourse to any “hacking” or other dubious computer activity, based upon
knowledge known only within Talossa. That second non-Talossan name may also be an actual
name, but its knowledge was not, and is not, necessary for Talossa to make contact with the
defendant. We have been able to make contact with the defendant, and have frequently done so,
outside of Talossa, without knowing that other non-Talossan name. The border-name as given was
not, and is not, a false representation: it was, and is, a name by which the defendant can be traced
outside of Talossa.

4.1.9 Intention rather than Action

4.1.9.1 In the same submission it is said of the preliminary judgement from this Cort that
the judgement focuses very much on the intentions, rather than the actual actions

4.1.9.2 On further examination of what was said by this Cort, it is admitted that this may well have
been the case. There are, in the law of several countries, situations in which the accused’s
intentions are indeed part of the accusation. For example, one of the (many) differences between
“murder” and “manslaughter” is the intention of the accused to kill. This does not apply in fraud.
In this case my learned friend’s observation is of relevance, and therefor all references to fraudulent
intent are struck from the previous preliminary judgement. Note that this does not, in any way,
affect that judgment’s statements about fraud itself, which is still judged therein to have not taken
place.

4.1.10 Suggestion of Prior Confession

4.1.10.1 It was also said in the same submission for the prosecution that

The facts are that the Accused has already confessed to the intent to deceive the nation of
Talossa with regard to his true and real identity

4.1.10.2 By examination of the documents as presented to this Cort that statement is in error: the
accused has at no time confessed to deceiving the nation of Talossa, but of using one of his
verifiable non-Talossan identities in such a way as to obscure to non-Talossans the link between the
Talossan and another non-Talossan identity.

4.1.11 Rights to Limit Name Disclosure

4.1.11.1 A further paragraph in the submission for the prosecution suggests:

To say that the Accused may have a right to refuse to disclose a name which reveal his
permanent and true identity is to violate the sovereignty of Talossa in enforcing its laws,
which plainly and obviously require such disclosure, as well as open the doors to further
foulplay, by others if not by the Accused.

4.1.11.2 It is agreed – indeed, it is evident – that neither the defendant nor anyone else has the right
to violate the sovereignty of Talossa in enforcing its Laws within Talossa, where those Laws apply.
As ruled in 4.1.8.3 above, “permanent” must be stricken out. It is not agreed by this Cort that the
defendant hid their true identity, as – has been stated several times so far – that identity was
revealed using only information public within Talossa. The border-name received by Talossa has
been shown to answer all requirements of being a traceable and true identity outside of Talossa.

4.1.11.3 There cannot be, within any free nation, a limitation placed upon a new citizen of not
having more than one name in some other nation. Talossa cannot demand that a new citizen has
only one non-Talossan identity: Talossa has no jurisdiction within other nations.

4.1.12 Nature of non-Talossan Name Required

4.1.12.1 Another statement within that prosecution submission suggests:

However, the judgement of this Court ignores not only the inherently obvious desire of
Talossa, but also the statutory requirements, that the State (comprising the King, the
Government, the Secretary of State, and other organs) know and be provided the real, true,
actual, permanent and traceable identities of its citizens.

4.1.12.2 A Cort, and in particular this Cort, cannot immediately consider an “inherently obvious
desire” unless that desire is explicitly stated within the Talossan Laws. The Laws at this point do
not require “the real, true, actual, permanent and traceable identities of its citizens.” but instead
“Your full and actual given name is required by this form.”, which request does not contain “real”,
does not contain “true”, does not contain “permanent” and does not contain “traceable”.

4.1.12.3 (a) An “actual” name, that is, a name which is extensively used outside of Talossa for that
individual is inevitably a “true” name, and since it is used it is also a “real” name.
(b) The stricture of “permanent” would mean that Talossa would take away from prospective
citizens their rights within other nations of performing non-Talossan name changes, thus preventing
the applicant and the citizen from taking some perfectly legal (in some other nations) action,
denying citizenship to any individual who outside of Talossa changes or has changed their name –
they would not have a “permanent” name. Thus “permanent” cannot be part of the name request to
an applicant. Talossa has no jurisdiction outside of Talossa, and cannot have.
(c) An applicant is not asked for a “traceable” name, though in this particular case a traceable name
was given.
(d) An applicant is not asked for all names used by that applicant: such a request would be
impossible to satisfy.

4.1.12.4 The prosecution also states:

The Government has proved that the State has bona fide causes to know the true and
permanent identity of the Accused, and that the name which he offered up on his citizenship
application defeated the State and violated its laws.

4.1.12.5 The Government, in the opinion of this Cort, has not made that proof. What can be
deduced from Talossa’s Laws and from past usage of non-Talossan names is that Talossa has bona
fide causes to be aware of a traceable external, non-Talossan, identity. As has been stated in
4.1.12.3 above the condition of “permanent” must be stricken out. This Cort finds that the accused
did indeed freely reveal to Talossa at the time of citizenship application sufficient actual and true
information for that identification to take place from within Talossa at a time and date well prior to
the raising of this case, and hence did not, in that regard, violate the Laws of Talossa.

4.2 Clause 16.2

16.2. Uses another person's identity or uses an identity that creates the impression of another
person to post or convey messages via email or on any public forum.

4.2.1 The identity declared by the defendant at the Talossan border was (and verifiably still is) that
person’s identity, by which they are commonly and publicly known outside of Talossa, and by
which they may be traced outside of Talossa. This identity has not been used within Talossa to
indicate “another person” but only the defendant. No messages by any alias of the defendant are
claimed to have been conveyed, nor is any identifying Talossan reference claimed to have been
publicly made outside of Talossa. Thus there has been no contravention of clause 16.2, quoted
above.

4.3 Clause 16.3

16.3. Creates, for purposes of claiming citizenship or with the intent to deceive or mislead
other Talossans, more than one identity for use in the Kingdom of Talossa, excepting namechanges
that replace an earlier name previously held by the same person.

4.3.1 No claim has been raised that the defendant at any time has simultaneously used more than
one external identity within Talossa. The defendant has at no time stated a wish to deceive or
mislead other Talossans, but only to obscure the defendant’s Talossan/non-Talossan identity
correspondence (through name match) outside of Talossa. [As a matter of information, that name
match was long known, but informally, within Talossa, since 2014/xxxv,and can still be obtained
from within Talossa, using ordinary means other than those used when petitioning this case.] Thus
there has been no contravention of clause 16.3, quoted above.


5 Further Considerations Highlighted by This Case

5.1 Anonymity Within Talossa

5.1.1 It is this Cort’s advice to the Ziu that further considerations be made here in Talossa with
regard to protection of anonymity and restriction of external access to identifying data. Anonymity
and protection of individual identification across the internet is a topic which is currently being
widely and strongly discussed, worldwide. Pre-technological opinions are having to be
reconsidered and revised. We cannot in the 21st century in Talossa continue to use only viewpoints
proper to the middle of the 20th century and before, and still be considered to be an advanced and
forward-looking nation. We must, as a nation, ensure that we are up to date in this changing
technological world.

5.1.2 Three widely regarded and influential sources could be examined by the Ziu in consideration
of this matter.
(a) The first is the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically clause 8.
(b) The second is
Right to Online Anonymity, which discusses
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Further strongly relevant, and
international, discussion and reports may be found in Open Democracy, right to online anonymity.
(c) The third source which should be examined is
United Nations, Freedom, 2016 from the United Nations,
2016, which links to numerous sub-reports on the subjects of online anonymity and data protection.
5.1.3 There is also an informative description of some attitudes towards internet anonymity in
Wiki, Anonymity . There are pertinent references therein to U.S.A. law, and
U.S.A. court actions in regard to anonymity.

5.2 The European Convention on Human Rights

5.2.1 If we consider first the European Convention on Human Rights, Clause 8, which reads:

Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.

5.2.2 Talossa is not part of Europe, except for the island of Cézembre, and it could be argued that
Talossa can ignore this convention, which, legally, it can. If, however, we want to be seen as a
forward-looking nation that values the freedom of its citizens and visitors, then we should, as a
matter of, reputation, look at this convention which has been adopted by over 513 million people
(by contrast, the U.S.A. is stated to have a current population of only about 330 million people).

5.2.3 It is certainly the stated, and laudable, intention of Talossa to adhere to 8.1 here. What
Talossa needs to consider are the conditions in 8.2 which partially qualify and weaken 8.1, and ask
itself seriously whether national security or public safety are here threatened. It may be Talossa’s
opinion that economic well-being of the nation is relevant, but that will be only for the limited cases
in which a citizen has been given access to any of this nation’s financial resources. In this last
condition it may then be pertinent to be adequately sure of a citizen’s traceable non-Talossan
identity. The conditions of disorder, crime, protection of health or morals or impact upon the rights
and freedoms of others seem, at first glance, to not require any stringent identification with any
identity outside of Talossa (though, of course the Ziu may discuss this, and come to disagree), as
any such actions would be detected within Talossa, independent of the citizen’s non-Talossan name.

5.3 Article 19

5.3.1 This informed report relates to interpretations of and consequences of Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which reads:

Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.

5.3.2 The report contains the following key recommendations, which this Cort urges those in
Talossa, and in particular the Ziu, to consider:

• – States should explicitly recognise in their domestic legislation and practices that the right to freedom of
expression includes the right to anonymity;
• – States should also recognise the right to anonymous speech, the right to read anonymously, and the right to
browse online anonymously;
• – States should repeal those laws, regulations and policies requiring real-name registration which are in
violation of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy;
• – Social media platforms and news sites should not require real-name registration systems, ensuring at the
very least that anonymity is a genuine option;
• – States should adopt laws, regulations and policies that grant the power to remove the right to anonymity only
to courts, rather than law enforcement agencies;
• – Any restriction on anonymity and encryption must fully comply with the three- part test of restrictions to
freedom of expression and should be subject to strong procedural safeguards;
• – States and companies should promote the use of tools such as Tor and https:// protocols that allow encrypted
browsing;
• – States should recognise in their legislation and practices that encryption is a basic requirement for the
protection of the confidentiality and security of information and that, as such, it is essential to the protection of
the right to freedom of expression online;
• – States should repeal laws or refrain from adopting laws requiring government authorisation for the use of
encrypted products;
• – States should repeal or refrain from adopting laws requiring the decryption of encrypted data or the disclosure
of decryption keys in any circumstances other than by court order;
• – States should refrain from adopting measures requiring or promoting technical backdoors to be installed in
hardware and/or software encryption products;
• – States should lift undue import/export restrictions to encryption hardware and software;
• – States should abolish or refrain from adopting key escrow systems;
• – Companies should refrain from weakening technical standards and should roll out the provision of services
with strong end-to-end encryption;
• – States and companies should put programmes in place for the promotion of encryption in internet
communication;
• – States and companies should promote end-to-end encryption as the basic standard for the protection of the
right to privacy online. They should also promote the use of open source software and invest in it so that it is
regularly and independently maintained and audited for vulnerabilities.

5.3.3 None of the above key recommendations are, as yet, part of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights – and, indeed, they may well never be – but none the less they are points that a
modern nation should take in to account in framing its laws and customs in this technological age.
This Cort suggests that all of Talossa should carefully look at them, and that there should be nonbiased,
non-political discussion of them in the Ziu, and beyond.

5.4 United Nations

5.4.1 United Nations, Freedom from the United
Nations, 2016, links to numerous sub-reports on the subjects of online anonymity and data
protection. These reports indicate some of the non-Talossan problems that arise from oppressive
government, including denial of the rights of free speech and denial of the rights of use of
encryption and of anonymity (or pseudonymity). These reports make sobering reading, and this
Cort urges the Ziu to absorb them, and consider what further rights may need to be enshrined in
Talossan Laws.

5.5 Clarification of Laws

5.5.1 This has not been a simple case, as some of the necessary definitions and prior intentions of
the legislators have nowhere been publicly stated. This Cort suggests that the Ziu look at clarifying
references in Talossan Law to “personal names”, always bearing in mind that most people in the
world do not live in the U.S.A. and expect laws of a different pattern from the laws of that other
nation. We have already seen, as an example in prior cases, some Cort confusions in Talossa as to
the use of practices of Indian law, where these were not expected. Completeness of Talossan rules
might serve to avoid some of such confusions.

5.5.2 Talossa is not the U.S.A.; Talossa is not European; Talossa is not Australia, is not India, is not
New Zealand. Talossa is Talossa, and has to fit into this multi-cultural and diverse world in its own
individual and independent way. But it has to fit in such a way as recognises the worth and
contribution of other nations, taking from them lessons of good organisation and protection of
freedoms.

5.5.3 And Talossa has to keep abreast of the times. We are a nation founded in the 20th century, and
flourishing in the 21st century. We are a nation that relies upon advanced technology for its internal
communication. Our Laws and customs need to keep all this in mind. This Cort urges all of us, and
the Ziu in particular, to look at our laws and practices with an eye to keeping them relevant to our
times and our position as a nation in this evolving, multi-national, technological world.


6 Judgement of this Cort

6.1 Examination of the evidence presented to this Cort does not show any contravention of
Talossan Laws at the time of the accused’s application for citizenship. The documents submitted
for this case do not contain any admission of guilt by the accused of the alleged offences.

6.2 In judgement on this case as petitioned:

    The defendant has in no way contravened El Lexhatx § A.16.1.
    The defendant has in no way contravened El Lexhatx § A.16.2.
    The defendant has in no way contravened El Lexhatx § A.16.3.

6.3 The defendant is hereby acquitted.

6.4 This Cort urges the Ziu, and the Talossan people in general, to consider those recommendations
made by this Cort in sections 4.1.4.3 and all of section 5.


The Cort will rise.

Ián Tamorán S.H., C.J.
7 January 2020/xli

[Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN]

Just in case there's a legal tripwire that we're not aware of, this serves as formal notice that the Government intends to appeal this judgement.

Formal documents will be filed in the next day or two by the Attorney General or one of his authorised Deputies.