The How About This? Amendment

[Gaglhen Fortaleça]

But is that a bad thing? A revision by the Ziu could help spot fatal flaws within the bill or ideas that are trying to be sneaked through

[Ian Plätschisch]

Jun 16, 2015 6:03:08 GMT -6 Gaglhen Fortaleça said:

A revision by the Ziu could help spot fatal flaws within the bill or ideas that are trying to be sneaked through

The language of a bill cannot be changed once it leaves the Hopper, so nothing could be corrected between the first and second votes (unless I am mistaken).

The way I see it, there are two parts to this bill:

1.  28-day wait in the Hopper

2.  Two separate votes

The second step sounds very redundant, as hopefully any fervor would have died down by the time the bill can leave the Hopper, and the only time the bill would go before two different Zius are the ones that were proposed in the 6th Clark.

The first part, however, sounds like the smartest way to let irrationality die down without having to wait for a longer time than necessary

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

The problem is that the Ziu almost never spots EVERY fatal flaw of a bill before passing and implementing it. Only application of the law will show the legislators, and the citizens, flaws in wording, etc.

[Sir Alexandreu Davinescu]

The problem is that this is not an effective check on the Ziu's power to amend the OrgLaw, when one considers that plebiscites always pass.

[Ian Plätschisch]

Let me be a peculiarist for a second and assign the Cort a power I am well aware that real courts don't have...

If the Cort rules that an amendment was written and passed in the midst of undue fervor or a wave election, the amendment will be delayed until the next Cosa goes back and passes it again.

How is that for a check on the Ziu's power to amend the OrgLaw (just throwing it out there)?

[Sir Alexandreu Davinescu]

That's actually quite clever! Wow, that's a seriously novel suggestion... I'm not sure I've ever heard of that one.

A quick note, though: that's not peculiarist in my book. It's only a cargo-cult derivativism that thinks we should just blindly mimic larger countries that don't have our same problems and assets. Derivativists like myself believe that Talossa should act as a real country -- and that means making the choices that work best for us! We can always look to larger countries for examples and ideas, but hard derivativism is a form of realpolitik. To hell with convention, if it helps the country.

So, all that being said, you are proposing a form of prior judicial review. The Cort pu Inalt would review all amendments, under your proposal, and determine if they were passed in haste or something?

[Eðo Grischun]

Now, THAT is interesting.

So, in effect we take the Royal veto and somehow turn it into a Judicial veto of sorts? Although, not so much an after the fact veto, but more a before the fact review? There could also be scope to include the Chancery, somehow, in the review, but that could be overkill.

I like the principle.

NB: I also agree with Alex. I don't think this is strictly a 'peculiar' idea.

[Sir Alexandreu Davinescu]

I personally like my own idea, of course, where the King can just send it back for a second plebiscite that needs a 2/3 majority, not just a simple majority. Most referenda have passed with 70% of the vote, as far as I can recall, but I still think it would be the best and smoothest way to do it.

That said, I'm not married to the idea, and this is certainly a clever new approach. I'm trying to think of possible problems now.

[Eðo Grischun]

Jun 16, 2015 22:03:06 GMT -6 Sir Alexandreu Davinescu said:

I personally like my own idea, of course, where the King can just send it back for a second plebiscite that needs a 2/3 majority, not just a simple majority. Most referenda have passed with 70% of the vote, as far as I can recall, but I still think it would be the best and smoothest way to do it.

That said, I'm not married to the idea, and this is certainly a clever new approach. I'm trying to think of possible problems now.

As I've stated already, I don't like the idea of asking the entire population to have to go through two referendums on the same issue.

Hell, I really wish we didn't have to hassle everyone with multiple referenda during every single election, but, hey. It is what it is.

[Sir Alexandreu Davinescu]

I know you're not a fan, Etho, but it seems the best solution to me. I am open to new ideas, though, be they this one or another.

[Sir C. M. Siervicül]

Jun 16, 2015 19:25:20 GMT -6 Ian Plätschisch said:

Let me be a peculiarist for a second and assign the Cort a power I am well aware that real courts don't have...

If the Cort rules that an amendment was written and passed in the midst of undue fervor or a wave election, the amendment will be delayed until the next Cosa goes back and passes it again.

How is that for a check on the Ziu's power to amend the OrgLaw (just throwing it out there)?

I'm not sure how a court would go about deciding what degree of fervor is due or undue or whether a particular election is a wave election. These things would be impossible to define objectively, and I'm not comfortable giving the judiciary a subjective role in the legislative process.

I can see an argument that any royal veto of an amendment to the Organic Law ought to come before a public referendum rather than after it. If we were to change the OrgLaw to work that way instead, it might make sense to have such a veto be suspensive in nature, along the lines of this idea. I've drafted such an amendment myself, as a personal exercise. In my latest BT article, I mention that under Norway's Constitution of 1814 provided that the king could no longer withhold assent if three consecutive Stortings passed the identical bill. The liberal 1791 constitution of the Kingdom of France had the same mechanism after the French Revolution, before the radicals took over and started chopping everyone's heads off.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

Jun 17, 2015 16:41:06 GMT -6 Sir C. M. Siervicül said:

Jun 16, 2015 19:25:20 GMT -6 Ian Plätschisch said:

Let me be a peculiarist for a second and assign the Cort a power I am well aware that real courts don't have...

If the Cort rules that an amendment was written and passed in the midst of undue fervor or a wave election, the amendment will be delayed until the next Cosa goes back and passes it again.

How is that for a check on the Ziu's power to amend the OrgLaw (just throwing it out there)?

I'm not sure how a court would go about deciding what degree of fervor is due or undue or whether a particular election is a wave election. These things would be impossible to define objectively, and I'm not comfortable giving the judiciary a subjective role in the legislative process.

I can see an argument that any royal veto of an amendment to the Organic Law ought to come before a public referendum rather than after it. If we were to change the OrgLaw to work that way instead, it might make sense to have such a veto be suspensive in nature, along the lines of this idea. I've drafted such an amendment myself, as a personal exercise. In my latest BT article, I mention that under Norway's Constitution of 1814 provided that the king could no longer withhold assent if three consecutive Stortings passed the identical bill. The liberal 1791 constitution of the Kingdom of France had the same mechanism after the French Revolution, before the radicals took over and started chopping everyone's heads off.

Don't worry. As Moderate Radicals, we'll only put flowers on everyone's head.


... but we will still take over.

[Ian Plätschisch]

Jun 17, 2015 16:41:06 GMT -6 Sir C. M. Siervicül said:

Jun 16, 2015 19:25:20 GMT -6 Ian Plätschisch said:

Let me be a peculiarist for a second and assign the Cort a power I am well aware that real courts don't have...

If the Cort rules that an amendment was written and passed in the midst of undue fervor or a wave election, the amendment will be delayed until the next Cosa goes back and passes it again.

How is that for a check on the Ziu's power to amend the OrgLaw (just throwing it out there)?

I'm not sure how a court would go about deciding what degree of fervor is due or undue or whether a particular election is a wave election. These things would be impossible to define objectively, and I'm not comfortable giving the judiciary a subjective role in the legislative process.

Valid points.  I'll try to answer them, and expand on my idea.

Of course, there is no objective way for the Cort to decide what is or is not undue fervor or a wave election.  However, I propose that, in order for the Cort to act on an amendment, an affected party (possibly the Royal Family) would have to first petition the Cort to act.  In order to guard against the Cort ruling based upon partisan disagreements, we may have to ban Justices from being members of political parties (which, IMHO, is not a bad idea anyhow).  This is not a ridiculous amount of power to give the Cort, though, because it is a delay veto rather than a blocking veto.  If another Cosa passes the amendment again, the Cort can do nothing