Owen Edwards
Puisne Justice
Posts: 1,400
Talossan Since: 12-8-2007
|
Post by Owen Edwards on Aug 11, 2014 18:06:21 GMT -6
I thank your Honour for your forbearance. I shall attempt keep these remarks very brief. The question at hand is not one of guilt – the defendant has returned to the nation to face justice and has expedited that process by pleading guilty. His stated wish is to see this situation resolved. Staying away would have left it unresolved, a cloud both over his head and over this nation. I hope the Cort takes the defendant's plea into account as it sentences. This Cort case has closed a sad chapter in both our nation's history – and the defendant has played his part in closing it.
Mitigating circumstances that I should like to bring to the Cort's attention centre on the life circumstances of my client at the time of his crimes. He was going through a divorce and a nervous breakdown at the time. He is a long term depressive and the effects of those circumstances upon his already fragile mental state can only be guessed at. I do not believe this constitutes any form of legally diminished responsibility but I do believe it ought to be considered in mitigation of the severity of the crimes.
I have consulted with my client as to the specific sentencing recommendations provided by the Crown. My client believes them to be entirely fair. He recognizes that he is unlikely to be considered trustworthy again in our nation so far as such sensitive roles go. Though Chancery's counsel's remarks on my client almost suggested some sort of demented agenda on the part of that counsel, one can hardly deny that my client has destroyed any reserve of trust he had. My client asks for no mercy as to the bans on office-holding in immigration or electoral services. I would only demur so far as to suggest a time limit on the ban – perhaps 5 or 8 years in each case. However that is only a hope for mercy – not an expectation.
As for the fine, my client believes that he can afford to pay a relatively small one – so long as any financial repercussion was in manageable instalments (given his other post-divorce financial arrangements). A monetary fine is unprecedented in modern Talossan legal history but my client recognises the enormous waste of time he caused the College of Arms. He has previously offered assistance to the CoA as a form of community service but was (understandably) rejected. Perhaps a fine paid to the College may be some small token of his regret.
My client's crimes are serious. His chief desire is to see this matter cleared up. However, any Talossan with a spirit of mercy must hope for the possibility of his redemption amongst us. He has worked on our language, our national culture, has written extensively on political philosophy, and even been the national leader of a Talossan state. He has been of great value to us in the past. Our nation – I believe – has a duty to live out a life of both justice and mercy in the eyes of the world. If my client could one day once more be of service to his nation, this Cort will have accomplished that duty amply.
Whatever the result of this Cort's sentencing, my client thanks it for its attention to his case. He also reiterates his sincere regret for his actions. Perhaps now Talossa's blood can run clean again.
|
|
Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă
Puisne (Associate) Justice of the Uppermost Court
Fraichetz dels punts, es non dels mürs
Posts: 4,063
Talossan Since: 9-23-2012
|
Post by Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă on Aug 11, 2014 18:18:30 GMT -6
Thank you Conselor. Sentencing will be announced shortly.
|
|
Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă
Puisne (Associate) Justice of the Uppermost Court
Fraichetz dels punts, es non dels mürs
Posts: 4,063
Talossan Since: 9-23-2012
|
Post by Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă on Aug 11, 2014 19:14:03 GMT -6
In the Matter of
People v. Eiric S. Börnatfiglheu
Magistrate Txec dal Nordselva, presiding
Sentencing of the Defendant There is little doubt that the trust placed in S:reu Kildow by the nation was shattered, perhaps irreparably, when it was revealed the sheer magnitude of his crimes against the Kingdom. The Court is not lacking in mercy but it also understands that an example must be set. Therefore, the Court sentences the convicted as follows: For each of the 17 counts of violating 36RZ10, S:reu Kildow is sentenced to 8 months of civic disability per conviction to run consecutively beginning from today, August 11, 2014 thereby totaling 136 months wherein the defendant shall not hold any national office including Member of the Cosa, Senator, Member of the Cabinet, Seneschal or any office of the Royal Household, including subsidiary positions or any created national office for the duration of the sentence (any questions about whether an office falls under these guidelines may be revisited at the request of any party to this action.) For each of the 15 counts of violating Wisconsin Code 947.0125, S:reu Kildow is sentenced to 90 days per conviction of civic disability, to run consecutively following the previous sentence totaling 45 months wherein the defendant shall not hold any national office including Member of the Cosa, Senator, Member of the Cabinet, Seneschal, or any office of the Royal Household, including subsidiary positions or any created national office for the duration of the sentence (any questions about whether an office falls under these guidelines may be revisited at the request of any party to this action.) Additionally, the Court imposes of fine of $100 to be paid by the end of the calendar year 2014 to the Burgermeister of Inland Revenue. The convicted may work out whatever arrangement is necessary with the Court and the Burgermeister. Additionally, the Court sentences S:reu Kildow to complete 500 hours of community service within five years to be supervised by the Court or its appointed agent. Arrangements for and acceptable forms of the community service shall be completed between the Court and the defendant upon conclusion of this trial. Finally, the Court hereby revokes the citizenship of S:reu Kildow. The order of revocation is suspended under the following conditions: that S:reu Kildow fully pays his fine by 12/31/2014, that S:reu Kildow makes no attempt at creating another account for any reason, that S:reu Kildow fulfills the terms of his sentence in whole and also that no other criminal convictions occur in any Court of Talossa against S:reu Kildow. At the conclusion of his civic disability, the Court orders the revocation of citizenship to be dismissed. Total civic disability and length of suspended sentence to equal 181 months. Once the matter of the injunction is resolved, the defendant will be released on his own recognizance.
|
|
Owen Edwards
Puisne Justice
Posts: 1,400
Talossan Since: 12-8-2007
|
Post by Owen Edwards on Aug 11, 2014 19:43:22 GMT -6
Your Honour - if you'll permit me -
I beg you reconsider the specific condition of the suspension relating to Cort filings - the condition means anything from a minor civil suit to a malicious invented prosecution could trigger the revocation without my client actually being proven guilty. In point of fact no justice need ever agree to sit a case for the revocation to trigger - even a refusal to sit would count as the charges having been filed.
Thankyou for your indulgence.
|
|
|
Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Aug 11, 2014 20:02:51 GMT -6
Your Honour may wish to defer consideration of my remarks here until after sentencing is concluded. That would seem orderly, and would not seem to interfere with the course of justice.
I will reply point-by-point to the arguments of the Attorney-General.
1. The Honourable Attorney-General asserts that the Government believes that they are unable to bring suit against a non-citizen. I would argue two points to the contrary, one of which has been admitted by the Government and by this cort.
Firstly, as the Attorney-General states, the defendant has placed himself within the jurisdiction of the cort willingly, and even if there was no ability to compel his attendance, he has provided it without constraint. It cannot be justly argued that this injunction is necessary as a matter of jurisdiction, then. Since no one disputes this fact, the argument that the injunction is necessary for jurisdiction should be entirely discarded.
Secondly, this also provides ample opportunity for our corts to clarify the facts of the matter. There is only offhand precedent and guidance from previous cases, and our common sense and the necessities of law suggest that this cort should step forward and state in no uncertain terms that the bounds of Talossan law do not end with citizenship. For reasons of practicality or treaty, we may normally restrain our prosecutions, but a Talossan citizen, who has submitted to our laws by his immigration, does not have the ability to nullify any crimes by renouncing that citizenship. We may fairly state that a Canadian citizen cannot be held accountable for breaking our laws, unless within a future jurisdiction of a sovereign Talossan state, but a Talossan citizen is bound by the law, and cannot flee misdeeds by tearing up his metaphorical passport. Let us not sidestep this issue again: the nation needs clarity on this matter.
I note that the Attorney-General does not, anywhere, satisfactorily address the issue of standing. This is of extraordinary importance, yet the only answer that the Government can give to the question of standing is that they "believe it was issued illegally."
The merit of the Government's motion has no bearing on the question of standing, to put it succinctly. This is the distinction between criminal and civil law that was highlighted by the Chancery's brief: the Government may have standing to bring criminal charges against any wrongdoing they notice, as the honour of the Crown must be protected and offenses to the nation must be righted, but the Attorney-General is arguing that the Crown has universal standing to bring civil complaints, as well. This is abhorrent to justice, and gives the Government a sweeping active interest in every aspect of our lives.
The errors here may be illustrated in a simple hypothetical: if Roibeard and Txec sign an agreement to share the profits from their business, and Roibeard takes all the profits for himself, then who has standing to bring a civil suit or request an injunction? Certainly only the injured party, Txec. It would be wholly intrusive for this cort to rule that the Government has standing to file suit on behalf of Txec, or to ask for an injunction in the case. Txec is the master of his own life, and if he wishes no publicity or some other reason, he has the right not to file suit.
Simply put, this cort risks drastically expanding the Government's powers to an extraordinary degree. There is no law stating that the Government may intervene in anyone's business whenever they find it necessary. The Ziu has no power to make such a law.
If for no other reason, then, this injunction must be dismissed. The Government has no standing to request it in these proceedings.
2 (and 5). The Attorney-General argues, rather extraordinarily, that the existence of a statement in which the defendant resigns his citizenship could not have any bearing in the question of whether or not the defendant resigned his citizenship. Needless to say, this claim is without merit. It is perfectly clear that the Attorney-General does indeed feel that his request is valid for several reasons, but the fact remains that he attempted to conceal what is arguably the central item of evidence from this cort, while at the same time attempting to privately convince the Secretary of State not to contest the injunction. The Secretary of State was without benefit of counsel at this time, and an adverse party. And while the Attorney-General has stated that the Secretary of State knew that the Attorney-General was the "opponent in the case" at the time the Chancery asked for an explanation of the injunction, it is absolutely clear that the Chancery did not understand the nature of the proceedings. It is farcical to argue that the Secretary of State understood the matter, when the Attorney-General was trying to convince him not to contest the injunction, when the entire conversation was predicated on the Secretary of State's request to know what the issue might be.
The Attorney-General filed suit and asked for an injunction against a party he would normally represent in cort: the Chancery. He omitted the central piece of evidence, and it has become clear that this was done intentionally. He did not appoint counsel for that party, and when they wrote him and asked what was going on, he attempted to privately persuade them not to contest his action.
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough just what a travesty of justice it would be if this style of practice were to be rewarded by the requested injunction. In several ways, it represents a gross miscarriage of the law and infractions of the honour of this cort. Either misdeed should be sufficient to have such a request dismissed, with a stern reprimand. Both actions taken together, knowingly, and in pursuit of an injunction for which he has no standing and which has no merit, should lead to an immediate dismissal and contempt of cort.
If the Attorney-General was just accidentally trying to pleasantly persuade an unrepresented adverse party to his point of view, implying potential consequences against a third party if he was assisted, all in an attempt to be polite, then his judgment in this matter is so poor that it is difficult to distinguish from malice, and should be dealt with to a degree only mildly mitigated. It is uncertain whether this degree of malpractice is better, or worse, than an intentional attempt at collusion.
To grant this injunction recognizes this behavior as legitimate and proper. This cort should not stain so stain justice.
3. The Attorney-General states that the defendant did not actually ever intend to sever his connection with our nation. This is not a credible statement. As evidence, the Chancery points to the defendant's own repeated statements to the contrary, the statement of His Majesty, and the fact that the defendant attempted to re-immigrate, rather than suing to have his Writ overturned.
We are given two versions of events.
In one version, a serial fabulist and criminal was caught red-handed, publicly exposed, humiliated, and undone. Confronted by the nation in the person of the head of state, His Majesty the King, he heard mention of possible foreign prosecution and sort-of-perhaps-under-duress-maybe renounced his citizenship to Talossa - but not really. After six months, he lied and said that he did renounce and explained his actions. A year later, he again lied and further explained, and re-applied for citizenship (even though he never renounced), and didn't bring this up at all. Arriving in cort, the Attorney-General, on his behalf, suddenly joined with him and argued that he never renounced.
This is possible, in the same way it is conceivably possible to have a pleasant Sunday picnic within the nuclear maelstrom of the Sun's fires.
In the Chancery's version, a serial fabulist and criminal was caught red-handed, publicly exposed, humiliated, and undone. Confronted by the nation in the person of the head of state, His Majesty the King, he crumbled and renounced his citizenship immediately and with shame, in the most public avenue available to him at the moment. After six months, he revisited the matter, spinning a version in which he was "testing" the immigration system with what had begun as a virtuous intent. A year later, in a manner perfectly in sync with his own self-interests, he had a version that was again slightly more in his favor, and it's now certain in his mind that he was somehow forced to not-really renounce.
The Chancery would suggest that this is, perhaps, more credible.
4. If the Government wishes that these fraudulent citizens be struck from the rolls, then that is a different matter and the Attorney-General has erred in his previously-stated wishes. Fortunately the cort has recognized this fact already, and the Chancery will not further take up time with the issue.
To summarize: 1. If the Government has standing here, then they have standing everywhere, and this cort has granted them an active interest in all private matters; such a decision would constitute the essential elimination of standing in Talossa, and would certainly be overturned on appeal. Regardless of the merit otherwise of this injunction, these proceedings cannot grant it. 2. An attorney bringing suit may not knowingly hide the central piece of evidence and attempt to privately persuade a layman without benefit of counsel to resign his interest in the suit, with the appearance of making an offer of a political arrangement. If an attorney does this, they should not be rewarded with their desired outcome, free of consequences. Regardless of the merit otherwise of this injunction, this behavior - certainly unethical and possibly criminal - cannot be granted when sought by such means. 3. The defendant clearly intended to renounce his citizenship by the most public means immediately available to him, by his own prior admissions.
|
|
Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă
Puisne (Associate) Justice of the Uppermost Court
Fraichetz dels punts, es non dels mürs
Posts: 4,063
Talossan Since: 9-23-2012
|
Post by Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă on Aug 11, 2014 20:04:22 GMT -6
Your Honour - if you'll permit me - I beg you reconsider the specific condition of the suspension relating to Cort filings - the condition means anything from a minor civil suit to a malicious invented prosecution could trigger the revocation without my client actually being proven guilty. In point of fact no justice need ever agree to sit a case for the revocation to trigger - even a refusal to sit would count as the charges having been filed. Thankyou for your indulgence. You are correct. The wording is awkward. The court intends it to read conviction and the order is amended accordingly.
|
|
Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă
Puisne (Associate) Justice of the Uppermost Court
Fraichetz dels punts, es non dels mürs
Posts: 4,063
Talossan Since: 9-23-2012
|
Post by Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă on Aug 11, 2014 20:22:38 GMT -6
The Court thanks the Chancery for its rebuttal. The Court has considered over the course of this trial and in its deliberations regarding the injunction quite similar arguments as presented by the Chancery and has systematically rejected all save for the issue of the renunciation. The Court has previously stated that both law and Uppermost Cort precedent are clear: to issue a Writ of Termination of Citizenship, a public renunciation must occur from the renouncer. It may be seen as a technicality but the Court cannot get past the fact that no such public renunciation occurred as prescribed by law and precedent. While the Court believes that S:reu Kildow did intend to renounce, the form of the renouncement should not have given cause for the Chancery to terminate his citizenship until it received a valid renunciation.
Therefore, the Court lifts its stay on the injunction.
This Court is adjourned.
|
|
|
Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Aug 11, 2014 20:28:24 GMT -6
Thank you, your Honour, for your consideration. I would ask that you reinstate the stay on the injunction, while I consult with my client about whether or not he intends to appeal your ruling to the Uppermost Cort, as is his right.
|
|
Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă
Puisne (Associate) Justice of the Uppermost Court
Fraichetz dels punts, es non dels mürs
Posts: 4,063
Talossan Since: 9-23-2012
|
Post by Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă on Aug 11, 2014 20:38:20 GMT -6
Thank you, your Honour, for your consideration. I would ask that you reinstate the stay on the injunction, while I consult with my client about whether or not he intends to appeal your ruling to the Uppermost Cort, as is his right. The Court understands the reasons behind the request for a stay, however, the Court denies the request.
|
|
|
Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Aug 11, 2014 21:03:58 GMT -6
I'd ask some leeway in fulfilling the injunction, then, until I can determine whether or not we will seek, and whether the Uppermost Cort will grant, a stay pending appeal. The Chancery has every intention of complying, but it would seem cruel to yo-yo the defendant in and out of citizenship.
|
|
Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă
Puisne (Associate) Justice of the Uppermost Court
Fraichetz dels punts, es non dels mürs
Posts: 4,063
Talossan Since: 9-23-2012
|
Post by Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă on Aug 11, 2014 21:14:38 GMT -6
I'd ask some leeway in fulfilling the injunction, then, until I can determine whether or not we will seek, and whether the Uppermost Cort will grant, a stay pending appeal. The Chancery has every intention of complying, but it would seem cruel to yo-yo the defendant in and out of citizenship. The said cruelty is the reason the court will not stay its injunction. The Court will allow the Chancery 48 hours to comply with its order.
|
|
|
Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Aug 11, 2014 21:15:59 GMT -6
I will inform my client. Thank you, your Honour.
|
|
|
Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Aug 12, 2014 6:01:11 GMT -6
My client has informed me that he is eager to appeal to the Uppermost Cort. S:reu Attorney-General and S:reu Edwards, I will inform you when I file.
|
|
|
Post by Marti-Pair Furxheir S.H. on Aug 12, 2014 6:29:43 GMT -6
WHEREAS the courts of our nation have, through due process of law, found this office to have been in error in unfairly penalizing a current citizen who did not legally renounce, THEREFORE the Chancery officially rescinds the Writ of Termination for Eiric S. Börnatfiglheu issued on January 27th, 2013, and restores him to the citizenship rolls with all the according rights and privileges. Done by my hand in the name of King John and under his Royal Seal this 12th day of August in the year of the common era 2014, in the 7th year of the reign of our gracious sovereign King John, and of the independence of Talossa the 34th. Marti-Pair Furxheir, Secretar d'Estat
|
|
Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă
Puisne (Associate) Justice of the Uppermost Court
Fraichetz dels punts, es non dels mürs
Posts: 4,063
Talossan Since: 9-23-2012
|
Post by Dr. Txec dal Nordselvă on Aug 12, 2014 17:44:16 GMT -6
The court is confused as to whether the Chancery is seeking an appeal when it has, apparently, reversed itself on the issue of the renunciation and would like to hear from the Chancery's counsel as to its plans.
|
|