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Post by Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun on Jan 26, 2014 8:00:01 GMT -6
Your Honour,
I beg this Court to consider allowing me to answer to the defence's argumentations. Therefore, however I ask for a respite until the 6th of January, for careful consideration to be made by the prosecution. The unusually lengthy period is due to the arrival of my family to Barcelona El Prat airport in a few hours. During that period, I will naturally be preoccupied. I will return to Germany on the night of the 30th of January. Until such time, I am afraid I can't satisfactorily respond to the reasonings brought by the defence.
I call upon the leniency of this Court to grant the motion and apologise profusely for my approaching semi-absence.
Submitted this Sunday, the 26th of January, in the common era 2014/XXXV ART at 15:00 (GMT+1)
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Jan 26, 2014 8:13:25 GMT -6
Your honour, I believe the plaintiff means the sixth of February. The defence has no objection.
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Owen Edwards
Puisne Justice
Posts: 1,400
Talossan Since: 12-8-2007
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Post by Owen Edwards on Jan 26, 2014 11:27:33 GMT -6
Given the plaintiff's earlier generosity, I see no reason not to grant said 11 day extension. So granted.
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Post by Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun on Feb 1, 2014 16:23:39 GMT -6
Your Honour, thank you for the extension. For the record; I did mean the 6th of February, my apologies to the Court and the honoured Defence. It may well be that plaintiff was outraged by the statement of the defendant and, indeed, thus would the evidence brought by the defence suggest. Furthermore, plaintiff does admit to have been concerned by the statement of defendant to endorse lenient punishment by Indian Courts of Justice, when murder is committed as cause of libel. This statement was, in the plaintiff's beliefs, unbecoming of an Attorney-General, the Minister of Justice. Different factors had added up, such that plaintiff grew impatient with the defendant's behaviour, and thus was compelled to making statements that might be conceived abusive. (I ask for forgiveness from the defendant. I wished not to hurt the defendant's feelings with my words written, but rather to give vent to my feelings, than to appear uncourtly.) The complainant could have resigned from being a TALOSSAssistant to make it clear, in a more honourable fashion, that he felt dismayed by the defendant's behaviour. However, plaintiff perceived the de iure employment under the defendant not to be a burden, for he had never contacted plaintiff in any capacity pertaining unto his honourary work as a TALOSSAssistant and it seemed not as though he would contact the plaintiff for such matters, showing a genuine indifference for the business of the New Citizens' Committee. Indeed, plaintiff was not even aware of the fact that the Committee, in which TALOSSAssistants work, was a bureau of the Ministry of Immigration and that he worked under its minister, until such time that the defendant dismissed plaintiff da Lhiun. The defence reasons that the dismissal due to insubordination was rightful, owing to some perceivedly offending statements by plaintiff submitted to evidence. However, the ground for dismissal brought by the defendant does not state insolence, but "insubordinate activities". The reasoning brought by the defence is unsatisfactory, since insubordination includes not alleged terms of abuse. Dismissals on grounds of conduct are sensible when the entrepreneur feels that trust has been irreparably broken by an employee's misbehaviour. Yet the defendant has withdrawn this basis, for the reinstatement of plaintiff into a higher position would suggest that a (mis-)behaviour to definitely breach confidence has not taken place, and furthermore has stated the dismissal to be due to insubordination. I cite the definition of insubordinate from Merriam Webster: Furthermore, I quote the Oxford Dictionaries' definition of insubordination: Your Honour, there is no labour law per se in Talossan Legislation, and that what is existent is unsatisfactory in protecting the rights of jobholders, especially in the government sector. The only action an allegedly unrightfully dismissed employee can take is contest the dismissal, however lacking explicit legal foundation. The plaintiff has been dismissed on the basis of insubordination after, what the defence eloquently stated, bilateral "acrimony", even though no insubordination has taken place and apparently, defendant has not felt offended (Bear in mind the simultaneously promotion to "JuDeImMin"!). It is the prosecution's belief that defendant, with malicious intent, wanted to ridicule and defame Complainant M.É. da Lhiun by alleging insubordination. Furthermore, it is firmly believed that the dismissal was a subliminal threat by the defendant to demonstrate his might and a warning better to not alienate him, or else the ridicule plaintiff had encountered could become worse. To put it simply, he showed plaintiff to be his puppet. S:reu Ardpresteir thus disregarded and endangered the good of the nation, for he gambled with the prospectives' interest and immigration process and misused the powers vested in him by the previous government. This circumstance shows, in the prosecution's perspective, the defendant's criminal intent of power abuse for prevailing over plaintiff in a petty dispute, by toying with plaintiff and ridiculing him. Furthermore, even though the Court has established so, the prosecution submits, for the satisfaction of the defence, to the record that according to Martin, 15 Wis.2d 452 (1962), 460-61, in libellous defamatory charges, special damages need not be proven, but general damages are presumed: The prosecution finally moves that this most honourable Court consider not the demur submitted by the defence and, if no further questions arise, render a judgement to impose the penalties bespoken and produce the relief requested. The prosecution rests it case.
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Feb 1, 2014 17:03:14 GMT -6
Your Honour: I will not, I think, require any significant period before I can present my counter to the prosecution's rebuttal. If it is acceptable to the court, it will be ready and presented within a couple of days.
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Owen Edwards
Puisne Justice
Posts: 1,400
Talossan Since: 12-8-2007
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Post by Owen Edwards on Feb 1, 2014 17:39:53 GMT -6
Of course - consider the 6th of February as a cut-off point.
The Cort does note, re the plaintiff's comments, that it pretends to no authority to remedy the perceived lack of employment security in Talossa, and does not intend to use this case to effectively legislate by the back door. The plaintiff may of course bring his concerns to the legislature.
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Feb 1, 2014 18:37:20 GMT -6
Your Honour:
The plaintiff argues that he has been defamed, because he was publicly fired for insubordination even though he had not been insubordinate. He has also argued that he was wrongfully terminated, for the same reason. In response, I have presented evidence that the plaintiff was indeed extremely insubordinate, publicly and prominently.
In reply, the plaintiff has admitted that he "was compelled to making statements that might be conceived abusive." He has graciously offered an apology for the abusive behavior he showed towards his employer. These are key elements to which I want to draw the court's attention: the plaintiff admits that his statements could reasonably be construed as abusive, and he has apologized for that wrongdoing.
Given the fact that the plaintiff has admitted that he was abusive towards his employer, how then does he justify this suit? He appears to offer two excuses, both of which are, in my opinion, insufficient:
1. The plaintiff seems to suggest that because he was not aware that the New Citizens' Committee was a division of the Ministry of Immigration, and because he had never communicated with the defendant with regards to the TALOSSAssistant program or his role within it, that he could not have been insubordinate. This is plainly untrue. This can be illustrated by transposing this sort of logic into virtually any other situation: can we really accept that it is wrong to be fired for verbally abusing someone who is your boss, just because you didn't know they were your boss?
It is also tenuous in the extreme for the plaintiff to argue that he had never communicated about his specific office with the defendant, when we already have in evidence the sweeping statements in which the plaintiff declared that he would launch a personal crusade to strip the defendant of "any and all offices." These sentiments admit of no exceptions or hedging, and while it is good that the plaintiff has now, during this lawsuit, seen fit to offer an apology, they certainly included the Ministry of Immigration and its constituent parts. The fact that stewardship of the New Citizens' Committee was not specifically included in "any and all offices" does not mean it is excluded.
Clearly, the plaintiff was verbally abusive to his employer - his ignorance that this was his employer makes the abuse ill-considered, not innocent.
2. The plaintiff argues that verbal abuse does not constitute "insubordination" per se, citing two dictionaries as support. The defence can offer its own dictionary definition as support:
Collins English Dictionary: "1.not submissive to authority; disobedient or rebellious"
Abusive verbal language is certainly rebellious. Particularly in this case, when the plaintiff had declared a personal agenda against his employer. This is just about the very soul of rebellion.
USLEGAL: "Insubordination is generally defined as a willful or intentional failure to obey a lawful and reasonable request of a supervisor. It may also be an action which constitutes lack of respect or harassment directed toward a supervisor."
Abusive verbal language certainly indicates a lack of respect.
But more than this, we should refer to our common knowledge of the term as it is used. Someone is insubordinate when they are in defiance of their employer. The plaintiff was in open and angry and public defiance of his employer, in the clearest and harshest terms. And this was not just an unrelated disagreement: the plaintiff, let us remember, went well beyond the bounds of the discussion, and declared an ongoing and sweeping vendetta: "I will make it my personal agenda to bring you down, S:r Ardpresteir"; "I will petition the King myself, beseeching him to strip you of any and every office you possess". The plaintiff even mused about bringing punitive lawsuits to punish the defendant: "Wish, I could sue his derrière! Maybe I will do that..."
The plaintiff stated that he would oppose his employer in every way and in every field, and that he would "bring him down." Beyond dictionary definitions, which may quibble, let us turn to our common sense of the word: this was insubordinate language and insubordinate behavior, in the plainest way.
But even if we bend over backward to try to justify this sort of behavior from an employee to an employer, then we still must account for the fact that the defendant might have reasonably thought it to be insubordinate, even if we quibble over the precision of his terminology. I think, however, that the plaintiff might instead thank the defendant for describing the offenses for which the plaintiff was fired in such kind words. "Insubordinate activities" might well have been, instead, "fired for his angry and unwarranted verbal abuse and his declarations of vendetta and personal destruction."
This is supported by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling in Martin v Outboard Marine, cited by the plaintiff, which calls for consideration of "the surrounding circumstances under which the alleged slander or libel was published must be taken into consideration," and which states that "the meaning of [allegedly libelous] words in their natural and ordinary meaning understood by lay persons reading the newspaper is proper but in determining whether a communication is defamatory, the whole context of the communication should be construed with the alleged particular words of defamation if there is an integral relationship between the contents and the alleged words."
The plaintiff's two excuses do not suffice. The plaintiff's actions were offenses for which he could and should be terminated, and so he was terminated rightfully. The plaintiff's actions were offenses that can reasonably called insubordinate, and so he was not defamed when he was called insubordinate.
I would like to call the court's attention to Storms v Action Wisconsin (2008 WI 56, 750 N.W.2d 739), which notes that defamation requires three elements: "(1) a false statement; (2) communicated by speech, conduct or in writing to a person other than the person defamed; and, (3) the communication is unprivileged and tends to harm one's reputation so as to lower him or her in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him or her." Further, though, "When a public figure is the person defamed, actual malice must also be proved."
The plaintiff is clearly a very public figure. At the time of the alleged defamation, he was already in several public offices, both on a provincial level and on a national level. Accordingly, all four elements must have been present for the statement to have been defamation.
I believe that I have adequately established that the charge of insubordination was true, and so the first element did not apply. Similarly, the third element does not apply because it could not be construed, within the "surrounding circumstances" and "whole context" commended to us by Martin v. Outboard Marine, as defamatory when the plaintiff was being simultaneously lifted to an even higher office.
The fourth element necessary also does not apply: no malice has been proven in this circumstance. The plaintiff has made plenty of allegations about his beliefs and theories about the alleged defamation, but not a single shred of proof has been supplied to show that there was any malice involved here. This was, instead, the very reasonable action of an employer who had just had his employee declare a personal crusade against him.
To summarize, then:
We have already entered into evidence the abusive statements of the plaintiff towards his employer. The plaintiff has admitted his language was abusive, and has even apologized for his wrongdoing.
The plaintiff was rightfully fired for the sweeping attacks he made on his employer. Ignorance that this was, in fact, his employer is no excuse. Nor is the quibble about whether or not these sweeping attacks were insubordinate or just heinously abusive - any reasonable person would call this insubodinate language in the highest degree.
The plaintiff is a public figure, and so he must prove four elements before any charge of defamation may be upheld: falsity, a public venue, harms reputation, and malice. The alleged defamation was true, no evidence has been presented to even suggest it was malicious, and, when the communication is considered in context, it could not present a reasonable threat to reputation.
There was no defamation here. There was only an abusive employee and a just termination. I request that the court find in favor of the defendant.
The defense again rests.
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Post by Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun on Feb 1, 2014 19:18:08 GMT -6
Your Honour, if I may clarify:
I believe the defence to have misunderstood me when I brought up the fact that I was not even aware of the defendant being my employer: I did not use it an "excuse" for any action I undertook. But the prosecution did, in fact, stress the circumstance that the defendant was uninterested in TALOSSAssistants and the whole Committee, to point out that my removal has indeed been more of an extension of the dispute to the work place, rather than a perceived impotence to continue working together. I can only reiterate that the promotion to a higher position under the same employer who dismissed me due to insubordination is a key point in proving that the dismissal was malicious and served the purpose of prevailing in an argument.
As to the apology: I have been taught to apologise, even if I have not done any wrong, if someone else feels truly hurt, be they so reasonably or not; or if, in a contretemps, my manners were less present than normally. I try to honour my family by upholding this virtue instilled in me. Be it known unto the defence that I find the statements submitted to the evidence neither inappropriate nor abusive - they may be conceived so in a heated discussion when the opposite side was already angry enough to enunciate death threats. I do agree, however, that the words were less cordial than they may have been, but in no way does this justify a dismissal on grounds of insubordinate behaviour.
It is dangerous to advocate that, especially as a public figure, calling for the resignation of a Minister and, as a citizen, threatening action before a Court of Law against a person consists of insubordination and I beg of the highly esteemed Court to reflect on this fact when rendering judgement.
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Feb 1, 2014 22:41:51 GMT -6
I strenuously object to the prosecution having both the first and the last word. The plaintiff has already rested.
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Owen Edwards
Puisne Justice
Posts: 1,400
Talossan Since: 12-8-2007
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Post by Owen Edwards on Feb 2, 2014 14:50:49 GMT -6
I take the plaintiff's last submission to be largely immaterial to the specific facts under review in any case (justification of apologies as courtesy, defence of the right to critique those in authority, etc), though the defence counsel is quite right - the defence usually has the ability to rest its case last.
As I presume there will be no further submissions, I will withdraw to deliberate the matter before rendering a judgement. Thankyou to all parties, especially the plaintiff and the defence counsel, for the generally excellent manner in which the case has been conducted.
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Feb 10, 2014 9:57:00 GMT -6
I emphatically do not want to rush the court, but in the interests of letting my client know how much longer this will hang over him, would it be possible to get a date on when your Honour will render his judgment?
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Owen Edwards
Puisne Justice
Posts: 1,400
Talossan Since: 12-8-2007
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Post by Owen Edwards on Feb 12, 2014 11:50:12 GMT -6
I thank the counsel for his question, and apologize for the slight delay - I've been away on academic duty since the middle of last week. I expect to render judgement this week or at latest early next week. I'll keep you up to date.
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Feb 21, 2014 13:48:08 GMT -6
Thank you, your Honour.
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on Apr 28, 2014 15:14:55 GMT -6
I don't want to press you, Your Honour, and I know you have had some personal issues, but is there any chance you could give us a new date on when you might be able to issue your ruling?
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Owen Edwards
Puisne Justice
Posts: 1,400
Talossan Since: 12-8-2007
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Post by Owen Edwards on Apr 28, 2014 15:25:26 GMT -6
I'm intending to write it and post it by Saturday. Thanks for your forbearance.
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