Istefan Perþonest
Cunstaval to Fiôvâ; Regent of the University of Talossa
Posts: 1,024
Talossan Since: 2-21-1998
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Post by Istefan Perþonest on Apr 27, 2019 11:44:54 GMT -6
My question with this, and excuse me if im showing ignorance of the law here. But why would the case be to default to Wisconsin law? Because Talossa specifically adopted Wisconsin law. El Lexhatx, provision A1:
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Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN
Seneschal
the new Jim Hacker
Posts: 6,635
Talossan Since: 6-25-2004
Dame Since: 9-8-2012
Motto: Expulseascâ, reveneascâ
Baron Since: Feudal titles are for gimps
Duke Since: Feudal titles are for gimps
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Post by Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN on Apr 27, 2019 20:49:17 GMT -6
My question with this, and excuse me if im showing ignorance of the law here. But why would the case be to default to Wisconsin law? Because Talossa specifically adopted Wisconsin law. Yeah, this is something the Government hopes to get rid of, but it's the status quo.
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Ian Plätschisch
Senator for Maritiimi-Maxhestic
Posts: 4,001
Talossan Since: 3-21-2015
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Post by Ian Plätschisch on Apr 28, 2019 16:16:53 GMT -6
I will definitely not vote for it until it is formatted as an amendment to el Lexhatx
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King John
King of Talossa
Posts: 2,415
Talossan Since: 5-7-2005
Knight Since: 11-30-2005
Motto: COR UNUM
King Since: 3-14-2007
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Post by King John on Apr 30, 2019 16:47:00 GMT -6
The criminal law of the State of Wisconsin governs whenever Talossan law doesn't specifically cover a point. That was done so that someone couldn't say "Hey, there's no Talossan law against fraud [or whatever], so the Cort can't convict me of it."
The purpose of this proposed legislation was to take something that's covered in Wisconsin law, but in a way that's not applicable to Talossa, and make our own law about it.
— John R
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King John
King of Talossa
Posts: 2,415
Talossan Since: 5-7-2005
Knight Since: 11-30-2005
Motto: COR UNUM
King Since: 3-14-2007
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Post by King John on Apr 30, 2019 16:47:47 GMT -6
I will definitely not vote for it until it is formatted as an amendment to el Lexhatx I'd be happy to have suggestions on exactly how to do that. :-)
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Ián Tamorán S.H.
Chief Justice of the Uppermost Court
Proud Philosopher of Talossa
Posts: 1,401
Talossan Since: 9-27-2010
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Post by Ián Tamorán S.H. on May 1, 2019 2:50:28 GMT -6
By considering the reference to Wisconsin law in:
it would seem to me (subject to any other arguments to be raised) that only those specific parts of Wisconsin law , as of the date of passing that Talossan Law, are included within Talossan Law, and to be considered by the Corts. Of course, subsequent argument in Cort may give rise to an alternative interpretation, but that is my first, personal, reading of it.
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Post by Sir Alexandreu Davinescu on May 1, 2019 7:49:46 GMT -6
I will definitely not vote for it until it is formatted as an amendment to el Lexhatx I'd be happy to have suggestions on exactly how to do that. :-) THEREFORE be it enacted by the Ziu that the following shall be added to Title J of el Lexhatx: 13. Whoever having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which the law authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true is guilty of the crime of perjury.
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King John
King of Talossa
Posts: 2,415
Talossan Since: 5-7-2005
Knight Since: 11-30-2005
Motto: COR UNUM
King Since: 3-14-2007
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Post by King John on May 1, 2019 12:14:00 GMT -6
We could perhaps simplify the language a bit, like so:
There are four essential elements of the crime of perjury. A statement, either oral or written, is perjury, if and only if 1. It is made in the course of a judicial proceeding, 2. The person making the statement is under oath (or equivalent affirmation) to testify truly, 3. The person making the statement does not believe it to be true, and 4. It is material (that is, relevant to the question under consideration by the court).
Does anyone see any difficulty there, either logical or linguistic?
— John R
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on May 3, 2019 18:53:33 GMT -6
We could perhaps simplify the language a bit, like so: There are four essential elements of the crime of perjury. A statement, either oral or written, is perjury, if and only if 1. It is made in the course of a judicial proceeding, 2. The person making the statement is under oath (or equivalent affirmation) to testify truly, 3. The person making the statement does not believe it to be true, and 4. It is material (that is, relevant to the question under consideration by the court). Does anyone see any difficulty there, either logical or linguistic? — John R What does "does not believe" mean? I know that I'm belaboring the point, but it allows the Cort to read a mens rea into the statute that you may not intend. For instance, under the lowest burden (i.e., the easiest to prove), "does not believe" could mean that the person does not know it is false, but should have known it is was false. How would they know? Is there a duty for them to look into some background information to determine if it were true? Would it not create a situation analogous to English defamation, where a plaintiff only need allege, and a defendant has the burden of proof? What if the Cort read recklessly into the statute? At that point, it must determine if defendant decided to make the statement while disregarding a substantial and unjustified risk. How do we determine unjustified? It's similar to the above standard, but now the Cort must consider whether, we'll call it laziness, a defendant's laziness in not making a probing search, is grounds for perjury. What if the Cort read Knowingly into it? In this circumstance, defendant must be certain that what they are saying is false. I think this is closer to what you try to get at. That is, the person does not merely believe that what they say is false, but that they know for a fact that they are misleading the Cort. What if the Cort when beyond, what I perceive, you intend? That is, they require purposefully. Defendant must purposefully mislead the Cort (that is, there is no uncertainty that they lied). I'm not necessarily unopposed to this, but I wouldn't be opposed to knowingly. Finally, where is the appropriate level of crime? The Organic Law only permits expulsion for "extreme circumstances." Felonies are generally considered more extreme than misdemeanors. Are we comfortable with permitting expulsion if a defendant should have done some research, but was lazy, failed to, before making the statement? I'm not comfortable with that.
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Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN
Seneschal
the new Jim Hacker
Posts: 6,635
Talossan Since: 6-25-2004
Dame Since: 9-8-2012
Motto: Expulseascâ, reveneascâ
Baron Since: Feudal titles are for gimps
Duke Since: Feudal titles are for gimps
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Post by Miestrâ Schivâ, UrN on May 3, 2019 23:58:09 GMT -6
I'm not sure I follow the legal argumentation, but surely the crime of perjury can only apply to uttering knowing untruths under law. If someone swears to something and they're honestly wrong about it, surely that can't be a crime.
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King John
King of Talossa
Posts: 2,415
Talossan Since: 5-7-2005
Knight Since: 11-30-2005
Motto: COR UNUM
King Since: 3-14-2007
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Post by King John on May 24, 2019 15:08:52 GMT -6
I'm not sure I follow the legal argumentation, but surely the crime of perjury can only apply to uttering knowing untruths under law. If someone swears to something and they're honestly wrong about it, surely that can't be a crime. You're exactly right. Every definition I've found hinges on the *belief* of the witness that his testimony is in fact not true. — John R
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on May 24, 2019 16:13:12 GMT -6
You're talking about belief. I'm talking about motive and legal duty.
If it's just, "the person didn't believe they were making a false statement" how do we prove otherwise? I'm speaking about "mental state." Also, did they have a duty to ensure that what they said under oath was truthful?
What I've seen with perjury is that a witness who "honestly believes" the statement is true did not perjure themselves. But a person who knowingly makes a statement they know to be materially false is guilty of perjury. That is, they had the mental culpability to mislead.
Finally, i don't see why there is so much resistance to simply changing "willingly" to one of the four accepted types of mens rea? Like, it's one word really. I've already addressed the problems that arise out of "willingly."
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King John
King of Talossa
Posts: 2,415
Talossan Since: 5-7-2005
Knight Since: 11-30-2005
Motto: COR UNUM
King Since: 3-14-2007
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Post by King John on May 24, 2019 17:34:49 GMT -6
I wasn't trying to resist, just trying to find language that says what we want it to say. In my original post, I had pretty much copied the U. S. Code, with an eye to Black's Law Dictionary. :-)
— John R
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