The Standing Rules (Senate) Act

[Lüc da Schir]

WHEREAS both Houses of the Ziu do not currently have any body of bylaws, and indeed no rules outside of the pieces of Organic and Statutory Law estabilishing them and regulating elections to those bodies; and

WHEREAS this gap in regulations was evident earlier in the term, as the Senate argued over a contested election; and

WHEREAS, currently, the duties of the respective Presiding Officers are largely customary and their extent is effectively up to the incumbents; and

WHEREAS a set of rules for each House of the Ziu would attempt to clarify the parliamentary procedures of the Cosa and the Senate to the extent each House wishes; and

WHEREAS, additionally, the estabilishment of Committees on Rules and Administration will allow each House to work more efficiently on managing their own bylaws, while still allowing the full membership of the respective House a say and a final vote on proposals; so

THEREFORE WE, the Ziu of the Kingdom of Talossa, hereby amend El Lexhatx to add a new subsections numbered H.21, to read as follows:

21. The Senate shall autonomously determine the rules of its proceedings. To this goal, the Mençei shall mantain a body of Standing Rules of the Senate.

    21.1 At the beginning of a new term, and optionally at any subsequent time during a term, the Senate shall consider a motion to estabilish a Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Upon successful passage, any previously estabilished Committee shall disband and a new one be formed; upon failure, a Committee shall not be formed.

        21.1.1 Regardless, any previous iteration of the Committee shall disband at the beginning of a new term of the Senate, as defined by the publication by the Chancery and/or the respective provincial conducting officers of final results for all of the seats up for elections, or the beginning of a First Clark, whichever comes first.

        21.1.2 Upon disbandment, a Committee shall not be allowed to complete debate on any proposal, but shall be empowered to complete any voting that already was in progress by the time the disbandment was effective.

    21.2 The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration shall be formed by three Senators, appointed by the Mençei. The Senate shall be empowered to object to the appointments by passing a motion to suggest an alternate composition; successful passage shall override the Mençei's appointments with the Senate's suggestion.

    21.3 The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration shall be chaired by the Mençei, but unless him- or herself was appointed to the Commitee, the Mençei shall not be considered a member of the Committee.

    21.4 Any member of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and the Mençei, shall be empowered to submit to the Committee proposals regarding the estabilishment of a new Standing Rule, or the amendment or deletion of any of the preexisting Standing Rules of the Senate. After due debate, the Committee shall vote on the proposal, and the proposal shall be considered to be adopted by majority vote. Unless he/she is a member of the Committee, the Mençei shall only vote to break a tie, in the event that at least one of the three members abstained or did not vote by the end of the allotted voting time.

    21.5 The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration's proceedings shall be public; and the Mençei shall not deny a Senator's request to speak and be heard in front of the Committee. Additionally, any Senator shall place a proposal for the Committee's consideration, and upon endorsement of the proposal by any member of the Committee, or the Mençei, said proposal shall be debated and voted on as described in 21.4.

    21.6 Any proposal that has been adopted by the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration shall be referred to the whole Senate for approval. The Senate shall then vote to uphold the proposal by majority vote; upon successful passage, the proposal shall take effect. Should the Senate instead reject the proposal, it shall return to the Committee's consideration for amendments, or be discarded at the original proposer's discretion.

    21.7 No Standing Rule shall infringe on any Organic or Statutory provision, and Standing Rules shall be germane to the Senate's operations.

    21.8 The Senate shall be empowered to waive any Standing Rule for the remainder of the current term by majority vote, without consulting the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration.

    21.9 At any time a vacancy in the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration arises, the Mençei shall be empowered to appoint another Senator to the empty seat. The Senate shall be empowered to object to the appointment by passing a motion to suggest an alternate Senator; successful passage shall override the Mençei's appointment with the Senate's suggestion.

        21.9.1 Should a Senator resign or be expelled from the Committee, resign, strike out or be expelled from the Senate, the member will still be empowered to cast his or her vote in any Committee votes that are currently open, but not any that are initiated after the notice of resignation or expulsion is published.

        21.9.2 Failure to stand for reelection to the Senate shall not impede a member of the Committee from taking part in any of the Committee's activities prior to disbandment as per 21.1.1 and 21.1.2.

        21.9.3 Failure of a member of the Committee who is standing for reelection to the Senate to win his race, according to any provisional results, shall not impede said member of the Committee from taking part in any of the Committee's activities prior to disbandment as per 21.1.1 and 21.1.2.

    21.10 At any time, due to inactivity, other impediments to normal activity or subsequently to an individual motion of censure, the Senate shall be empowered to remove any of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration's members, through a motion adopted by simple majority.


Ureu q'estadra sa
Lüc da Schir, Senator (BE)

[Lüc da Schir]

This is an early draft, but I guess the final version shouldn't be much dissimilar to this. I'm stopping work on the draft both to take a breath (I've been researching and writing for a while now) and to hear any suggestions and concerns.

Feedback is HEAVILY encouraged, from both Houses, because 1) the Cosa may have additional stuff they want in that I can't think of; 2) I'm sure some of my colleagues in the Senate that concurred with me in the need for standing rules will want to give their own input. I want to get this bill right.

In the meantime, some cross-House commentary ordered by subsection:

2X.1:
- I conceived the initial motion as a way for any future term that has no need for a committee to avoid forming one. The Cosa might not be inclined to adopt any standing rule at all - they don't have to, they can just vote the motion down (or not considering it at all) each time without ever forming a committee, leaving the body of rules empty. The Senate might feel that the rules they have adopted are enough, and not form a committee because they don't need to edit them.

- Additionally note how the Senate can reconsider during a term, as Senators can and do resign or lose their seats and can be replaced by completely different people. This happens with a different outcome in the Cosa, because a former MC will be replaced by a member of his own party anyway; the balance of power doesn't (and usually can't) change. Therefore, the Cosa shall vote at most once on the motion; the outcome stands for the whole term. The Senate votes as many times as it pleases.

2X.1.1: Logically we want the never-dissolved Senate to have a clear final date for the disbandment of a previous committee.

2X.1.2: The difference between the two terms surfaces again. The Cosa is dissolved, so members of the Cosa Committee are no longer MCs and all business should logically cease. On the other hand, Committee Senators should probably be allowed to at least finish the votes in progress before clearing house, especially because Senate Committee disbandments can occur halfway during a term.

2X.2: The Cosa language is taken from the Civil Service Committee. The Senate has the smallest number of people possible (3), and additional caveats: since there are no official party groups there AND there often are independents, I have chosen to scrap the partisan bias language but allow the Senate to object to the appointees.

2X.3: The distinction is entirely based on the different role of the two presiding officers. The membership of the Senate's committee is so small that a casting vote is needed (see 21.4), so I just figured out the Mençei could act as an impartial chairman as well; this also is a subtle hint that the Senate's committee is intended to involve four Senators, which is the largest possible number of people to keep the Committee decently smooth.

2X.4 and 2X.5: Similar versions, but the Senate has the casting vote. Additionally, this couple of articles explicitly allows any MC and Senator to take part in the respective committee's proceedings if they wish.

2X.6: nothing particular to report.

2X.7: Obvious article, it may not even be needed as I originally wanted to list at least some areas that the rules could not act upon such as elections, but unless I get a decent version of it, this article is staying as it is.

2X.8: This comes back to what I said on 2X.1: a Committee may not be formed if it's not needed, but what if there's a specific exception to a rule that is needed when no Committee is formed? This article merely states that each House can ignore any rules it wishes, without passing through committee proposal + committee debate + committee approval + whole House approval, but ONLY until the current term ends.

[Lüc da Schir]

Added 21.9, 21.10, 22.9 and 22.10 to deal with vacancies and inactivity.

[Viteu Marcianüs]

I'm a fan of your thought process and I have to read this more closely, but I do have some initial Organic concerns. I need to read the Organic Law closer.

We have a number of articles in the Org Law addressing the Ziu, which is truly unnecessary but hey, it's not like there aren't two other Org Law proposals floating around somewhere (that's a jab at myself also). 

At the outset, the Org Law has  Article IV (Election to the Senate); Article V (Composition of the Senate); Article VII (Election to the Cosâ); Article VIII (Composition of the Cosâ); Article IX (The SOS, the Hopper, and the Clark); Article X (Passing Legislation); and Article XIV (Living Cosâ). 

Importantly, the Ziu is made up of three components - the King, the Cosâ, and the Senate (Org.L.X.1.) (please note, Art. X stands for the above proposition while also describing the Ziu in terms that exclude the King... it needs cleaning; another thing to add to my to do list). 

Arts. V and VIII, the compositions articles, are generally analogous. But Art VIII (Cosâ) does not contain an analogous provision to Art. V (Senate) § 7, which permits Senatorial commissions as decided by law. This  seemingly grants the Cosâ say in a legal procedure that would dictate how the Senate performs certain acts, which is still consistent with the Org Law as the Cosâ reserves specific authority reserved for the Cosâ (VOC, revenue [Org.L.V.6]) .  In any event, while Art X may think it is the authority on passing legislation, but I submit that its secondary when read in conjunction with IX - the SOS, the Hopper, and the Clark. Additionally, as I am obviously of the mind that no article exists in a vacuum, reading them in tandem, and presuming that, unless otherwise specified, they inform the other, this places me in two minds, both equal [50:50 if you must quantify] as to whether this act is permissible. Humor me while I try to explain my thought process - 

Initially, I would say that the only part of the Organic Law that may provide the requisite authority for this act is Art IX § 2, which reads that any MC, Senator, or the King or SOS "shall have the right to submit legislative proposals and bills to the SOS for consideration by the Ziu according to the procedures specified in this article, and specified by law." [emphasis added]). First, note legislative proposal - this section speaks primarily to who can propose legislation, and it clearly enumerates specific actors, but also then unshackles who can propose said legislation with the specified by law clause. Thus, what does it mean that we can specify by law who or what can propose legislation. While, on one hand, I would argue this permits the good PM's legislation (and I really do like the idea of clear procedure), I equally would argue that this was not intended to, in effect, nullify the preceding language, but, in the affirmative, to permit, as necessary, the Ziu to expand this power to statutory ministers, and conversely, in the negative, does not mean the Ziu can pass legislation that dictates how the other body will conduct business. 


Thus, I asked, where does the Org Law speak to procedure. What I found was that it only mentions it ten times: six times in Art XVIII - citizenship and rights and generally concerning immigration; one time concerning the SOS and election law (Org.L.VII.5); once for a procedure that allows for an MC to represent a geographic constituency (Org.L.VIII.5); legislative proposals as discussed above (Org.L.IX.2); and Seneschal absence (Org.L.XII.8). So now we are left with a dilemma - how broadly do we interpret Art IX § 2? If broad, are we not essentially negating the rest of the clause? Then I thought, well, if it's not there perhaps we can get by, but let's pay mind to Art. XXI § 1, "The Organic Law is the supreme law of the land. Any national, provincial or territorial laws which violate its provisions are null and void." (This begs the questions I've had about whether el Lex.E is impermissible, but let's save that for another time.) 

Hence, the language as it relates to the Cosâ may not be allowed. The language as it relates to the Senate as it concerns a commission for committees is likely allowed. But if we interpret Art. IX broadly, the entire thing may be allowed. The question really boils down to, under a system of separation of powers (which we have and don't have but do have but don't have), can we Organically mandate how one house will act, or is this truly something that is left up to each house to adopt at will (i.e., if that's the case, this would need to be advisory only and remove the words "shall" unless it concerns a senatorial commission or one of the enumerated procedural allowances). 

(For an analogous concept - in the U.S., art III of the US Constitution establishes the Supreme Court, limits its jurisdiction, and grants congress the power to establish inferior courts. Thus, Congress has the power to pass legislation regarding the number of justices of the Supreme Court, but the authority stops there. It cannot set ethics. Because it has authority to set up inferior courts, it can impose ethics, just not on SCOTUS. Equally so, it cannot pass legislation that commands the president to act a certain way; if SCOTUS justice or the president act untoward, it must seek impeachment and removal, in the case of the Court, Art 3 §1. I reference to say that, under a system where there is a separation of powers, while general checks and balances exists, when it comes to actually telling the other branch how to do their job, it becomes problematic. Now, the US explicitly doesn't permit either house from legislating procedure on the other, and we lack such a clear provision, but considering the discussion above, it's not unreasonable to read an implied provision.)

[Ián Tamorán S.H.]

Numbering: there are two 21.1.2 ... I believe the second of these (which is different from the first) should be 22.1.2

[Lüc da Schir]

Fixed the numbering issue. FYI -- me and V have spoken about this in private, and the path I'll follow will probably be to:
- split this bill in two Senate and Cosa halves;
- fix the Cosa language ("shall" -> "may");
- introduce an Organic amendment to allow for Cosa committees and clarify the separation of powers between Houses of the Ziu.

[Lüc da Schir]

The Act has been stripped of its Cosa language so that it can be Clarked; the Cosa side will be reworked and discussed further.

[Magniloqueu Épiqeu da Lhiun]

So, is it the first post? Can we see the current version (with numbering and so forth)?

[Lüc da Schir]

Yes, the first post is now the Senate version, which is the same as the first half of the previous bill. The second half has been cut&pasted on a new thread.