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Post by Marti-Pair Furxheir S.H. on Jul 27, 2017 12:51:32 GMT -6
t is my pleasure to open call for bills of the August 2017 Clark. Eventually, the clark can be viewed in real time here: www.talossa.ca/files/cosa_vote_result.php?cosa=50&clark=6 (for the votes) and here: www.talossa.ca/files/clark.php?cosa=50&clark=6 (for the bills ) It is NOT too late to submit bills, of course, as you have OFFICIALLY until the morning of the 31st of this month, provided your bills have been in the Hopper before end of business day the 15th, of course. I will make the Clark on August 1st's morning and bills submitted up to a few hours before that will probably also be taken. PLEASE note that in order to support a bill, you need to: 1 ) Be a Senator, the Secretary of State or the King or 2 ) Have been nominated as a Cosa Member for the upcoming Clark BEFORE the 15th, To vote on the Clark, you will once again have 2 options: 1 ) You will be able to vote in the Clark thread (which will be created later on the 1st of August), as usual. I will enter your votes in the DB. 2 ) You will be able to vote directly in the database, using your usernumber and DB password (which you can retrieve at: www.talossa.ca/files/login.php using the PSC of the election) or by login via Facebook (which retrieve manual activation on my part). 
Marti-Pair Furxheir Secretary of State |
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Post by Viteu Marcianüs on Jul 31, 2017 9:04:29 GMT -6
I should like to clark the following three bills:
The Due Process Amendment
WHEREAS the Fifth Covenant of the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms seeks to protect individuals from having their life, liberty, and property threatened by the government.
WHEREAS the wording of the Fifth Covenant implies that due process protections of life, liberty, and property are only available in instances of double jeopardy.
WHEREAS it is the hallmark for the protection of individual rights to ensure that due process is always required when the State seeks to deprive an individual of their life, liberty, or property.
WHEREAS it should be desirable to clean up the Organic Law as necessary.
WHEREAS if we can strengthen individual liberties while fixing the Organic Law, we should do so.
THEREFORE, the Fifth Covenant, Organic Law XIX.5, which reads, “Any person charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and has the right to request information on his legal rights. No accused person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life, liberty, or property for the same offence, or without due process of law; nor shall any citizen be compelled in any criminal case to bear witness against himself. Excessive fines, and cruel and bizarre punishments, shall not be inflicted.” is repealed in its entirety.
FURTHERMORE, the following language shall be adopted as the Fifth Covenant, Organic Law XIX.5:
No person shall be deprived life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor denied equal protection of law. Any person charged with an offense must be informed of their legal rights upon seizure by the government, and must be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a court of law. No person shall be subject to answer to the same criminal offense after the criminal charge has been properly adjudicated in a court of law, nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to bear witness against himself, nor shall any person be subjected to excessive fines, nor shall any person be subjected cruel and unusual punishment. The Ziu shall have the power to enforce this Covenant by appropriate legislation.
Uréu q'estadra så:
Viteu Marcianüs
Ian Plätschisch
The Bar Reformation Act
WHERERAS the development of an independent judiciary is a benchmark of a developed democracy;
WHEREAS the judiciary as it exists in Talossa today is sorely underdeveloped;
WHEREAS while many factors contribute to the underdevelopment of the judiciary in Talossa, one factor, the inability to admit new members to the bar, stands out as one that can be rectified;
WHEREAS Talossa is in dire needs of qualified individuals to be admitted to the bar.
THEREFORE, El Lexhatx § C, 1.6 is hereby repealed in its entirety;
FURTHERMORE, El Lexhatx § C, 2, is hereby amended to read as follows: The Officers of the Royal Household shall have no fixed terms of office, and shall not be removed from office by the dissolution of the Cosa. The Officers of the Royal Household are appointed and removed by the King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The four exceptions to this are that the Secretary of State shall be appointed by the Prime Minister acting alone and may be removed by law; the Burgermeister of Inland Revenue shall be named in the same way as the Secretary of State; and the Commissioner of the Civil Service, who shall be appointed by the King, for a two year renewable term, after being recommended by a legislative civil service committee and approved by a two-thirds majority vote in the Cosa and a majority vote of the Senäts in favor of appointment. The Chancellor may be removed by the King on the recommendation of the Senäts.
FURTHERMORE, the following section is added to the El Lexhatx as § G,11:
12. The National Bar of Talossa is hereby established.
12.1. The National Bar of Talossa shall be governed by the five Justices of the Uppermost Cort, who shall set forth the procedure, ethics, and standards for those seeking admission to the National Bar of Talossa.
12.1.1 The Justices of the Uppermost Cort may, at their discretion, devolve their authority to a group made up of no less than three individuals admitted to practice law to set forth the requirements of admission to the bar, except the waiver described in G.12.2.3.1.
12.2. The National Bar of Talossa shall possess the sole authority to admit new individuals to practice law in the Courts of Talossa established under Article XVI of the Organic Law.
12.2.1. Admission to the Bar shall be limited to those who are eligible to vote in National Elections, and who satisfy any reasonable requirement set forth by the National Bar of Talossa.
12.2.2. The National Bar of Talossa shall set the standards for admission, which may include a test or legal training it views as necessary, to determine if an individual possess the legal knowledge and character necessary to practice law in the national courts of Talossa, except as those described in G.12.2.3.
12.2.2.1. An individual who has met the requirements set by the National Bar of Talossa is not entitled to practice law in in the national courts until the National Bar of Talossa has decreed they are eligible to do so.
12.2.2.2. The National Bar of Talossa may deny admission to individuals they think unworthy, provided those factors do not violate any other Organic or Statutory provision.
12.2.3. An individual who has earned a degree in the practice of law in their home country, or has been admitted to practice law in their home country, or has completed one year of legal education as well as legal training in their home country, may seek a waiver from the requirements set forth by National Bar of Talossa, which may grant said waiver with the consent of no less than two Justices of the Uppermost Cort.
12.2.3.1. The Uppermost Cort may increase the number of Justices required to give consent as it deems necessary, but may only decrease the number to the statutory limits with the same number of Justices required to give consent.
12.2.3.2. The Uppermost Cort may not devolve this waiver.
12.3. It shall be a criminal offense for any person to knowingly or recklessly practice law in Talossa without express statutory permission, or without the permission of the National Bar of Talossa.
12.3.1. The above provision is not applicable to an individual who represent themselves, known as pro se party, or to any individual who is a member of or has received authority by the Ministry of Justice to represent the Government in any Court throughout Talossa.
12.3.2. The following office holders may, at the discretion of the Chancellor, be exempt from the above requirements and shall be granted full membership to the bar while they hold such office, for the purpose of performing their official duties: the Prime Minister, the Distain, Judges of the Uppermost Cort, and Judges of any inferior Cort.
12.3.3. An Attorney General, as head of the Ministry of Justice, who is not admitted to their bar in their own right, is a de facto and de jure member of the bar for the duration that they hold that office.
12.4. The National Bar of Talossa shall set, as it deems necessary, the Code of Conduct to govern attorneys.
12.4.1. An individual admitted may have their admission revoked for cause with the consent of no less than four members Uppermost Cort of Talossa; in such a circumstance, the individual is no longer permitted to practice law in the national courts of Talossa.
12.4.2. All members of the bar admitted prior to the adoption of this statute shall continue to be deemed automatically admitted and may continue to practice law.
12.5. Any rules, regulations and/or code of conduct not set by a statute, Talossan Law or by the Organic Law, shall be a matter for the Bar to set itself as far as permissible by the aforementioned Laws.
This statute shall come into effect no later than six months after the requirements of Article X of the Organic Law have been satisfied. At its discretion, the Uppermost Cort may, immediately upon passage, begin to draft and promulgate Rules for admission, which, if the Uppermost Cort so chooses, may take effect no sooner than three months after the requirements of Article X of the Organic Law have been satisfied.
Uréu q'estadra så:
Viteu Marcianüs
The Ambiguity Resolution Act
WHEREAS Article XVI, Section 1, of the Organic Law vests the Cort pü Inalt (“Uppermost Cort”), with the judicial power of Talossa.
WHEREAS the Organic Law implies the Uppermost Cort maintains original jurisdiction over all cases, and permits the Cosâ to establish inferior courts as necessary.
WHEREAS Section 9 of Article XVI of the Organic Law vests the power of judicial review upon the Uppermost Cort, and requires the Cort to resolve issues of ambiguity in the Organic Law and statutory laws, interpret the Organic Law and statutory laws, and resolve conflicts between the Organic Law and statutory laws.
WHEREAS no procedure exists for the Government to request the Uppermost Cort to resolve potential ambiguities or conflicts in and between the Organic Law and statutory law.
WHEREAS the Attorney General and other representatives of the State may require guidance from the Uppermost Cort when such circumstance presents itself.
WHEREAS this act does not expand or limit the jurisdiction of the Uppermost Cort, but merely establishes a procedure by which the Uppermost Cort may perform a function.
THEREFORE, the Ziu, acting pursuant to Article X of the Organic Law hereby amends Section G of el Lexhatx to include:
11. The Secretary of State, Prime Minister, and Attorney General shall have standing to file a Petition for Resolution with the Uppermost Cort to resolve an ambiguity in the Organic Law or such inferior laws that were passed by the Ziu.
11.1. The individual petitioning the Uppermost Cort under this subsection shall be known as an “Applicant” until such time as the Uppermost Cort agrees to hear the case, and then shall be known as a “Petitioner.”
11.2. The Petition for Resolution may include a proposed interpretation for the Uppermost Cort to adopt, but must state, with specificity, reasons why the Uppermost Cort should adopt the proposed interpretation.
11.2.1. A Petition for Resolution shall not be an appropriate remedy for potential conflicts between National and provincial law, and this statute should not be construed to impact the ability of a party with standing to file suit for perceived inOrgancity of provincial actions, or potential conflicts between national and provincial law.
11.2.2. A Petition for Resolution shall only be made when there exists an actual case or controversy or bona fide ambiguity, and the Cort shall dismiss a Petition for Resolution for want of an actual question, when the petition seeks an order that is is entirely advisory in nature, and does not involve an actual case or controversy or ambiguity in the law.
11.3. In the interest of justice and to ensure all arguments are properly presented to the Uppermost Cort, the Secretary of State, Prime Minister, or Attorney General shall have discretion to appoint an individual to offer an alternative viewpoint, regardless of whether they are listed as the Applicant/Petitioner; when the Petition for Resolution directly impacts the interpretation of law as it relates to a specific governmental ministry, the Minister impacted may, at their discretion, appoint an individual to offer an alternative viewpoint; when the Petition for Resolution directly impacts the interpretation of law that will impact the conduct of the Crown or its Royal Officers, the Crown may, at its discretion, appoint an individual to represent an alternative viewpoint; all potential parties described above may be referred to as "interested parties" elsewhere in this statute.
11.3.1. Such individuals shall be known as a “Special Respondent.”
11.3.2. A Special Respondent may enter the case within ten days of a Petition for Resolution is filed, or, if that time has expired but no later than sixty days, may enter only with leave of the Uppermost Cort.
11.3.2.1. If, after ten days of filing, but no later than sixty days after filing, no Special Respondent has been appointed, any individual may seek leave of the Cort to intervene as a Special Respondent. The Cort may only grant leave if the intervener can show good cause as to why they should be allowed to proceed.
11.3.2.2. Applicant/Petition may file an Amended Petition for Relief within ten days of the original filing, or, if that time has expired but no later than sixty days, may only file an Amended Petition with leave of the Uppermost Cort.
11.3.2.3. The period to appoint a Special Respondent shall run from the day after the Petition is filed, or the day after the Amended Petition is filed, including holidays and weekends, whichever is later.
11.3.2.4. Only one Special Respondent may be named at any time, except as provided in 11.3.2.7, and deference shall be given to the first Special Respondent named, but the Cort may allow a Special Respondent subsequently named by another official to replace the named Special Respondent if it can be shown that the official has a bona fide connection to the case, their interest is greater than the party who named the original Special Respondent, and that Petitioner will not suffer undue prejudice by the change.
11.3.2.5. The Cort shall deny a motion to replace a Special Respondent if the period described above has expired, unless the party can show a good faith reason why the limitation should be set aside, that the Petition will not be prejudiced, and that the interest of the official moving for replacement is substantially greater than the Special Respondent then appointed.
11.3.2.6. A Special Respondent may consent to their replacement, and the Cort should freely grant leave for that replacement within sixty days of the filing of the original or amended petition, but may deny such a motion if Petitioner can show they would be unduly prejudiced, or if such an action was intended to circumvent the law.
11.3.2.7. If an interested party that would otherwise have authority to appoint a Special Respondent under this statute makes a motion to appoint a co-Special Respondent no later than ten days after a Special Respondent has been named, the Cort may, at its discretion, grant leave for the co-Special Respondent to represent the interest of that party if that interest party can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alternative viewpoint significantly and materially differs from that of then-existing parties, and will not cause the Petitioner or then-existing Special Respondent to suffer undue prejudice; the Cort may, on its own, convert a motion to replace a named Special Respondent into a motion to appoint a co-Special Respondent, and all applicable procedures and standards described in this statute shall be applied, provided that doing so is in the best interest of justice.
11.3.2.8. A motion filed pursuant to 11.3.2.5 shall be addressed immediately and toll any time limitations set-forth in other sections of this statute, until such time as the Cort resolves the motion, at which point the time limitations shall continue to accrue and, if the Cort permits a co-Special Respondent, they shall be subject to the then-existing time limitations described elsewhere in this statute.
11.3.2.9. Petitioner and then-existing Special Respondent may, at their discretion, object the motion to appoint a co-Special Respondent, and shall file such objections no later than three days after the motion has been filed; the interested party seeking a co-Special Respondent shall have the right of filing a rebuttal within two days of objection; opposing parties may file a surrebuttal with leave of the Cort if the interested party's rebuttal raises new arguments not previously made by the original motion within one day of service of the rebuttal.
11.3.2.10. If an opposing party can show by by a preponderance of the evidence that a motion for a co-Special Respondent was made for the primary purpose of delaying litigation, the Cort must deny the motion to appoint a co-Special Respondent,
11.3.3. A Special Respondent named in the original petition shall be titled “Defendant” until such time as the Uppermost Cort agrees to hear the case or controversy, at which time they shall be titled “Respondent.”
11.3.4. A Special Respondent is subject to all ethical practices and procedures as set forth by the judiciary, and may not simultaneously hold a position in the Chancery or as a sitting justice or judge in any national court of Talossa.
11.3.4.5 No later than ten days after the Uppermost Cort has agreed to hear the Petition for Resolution, any Talossan of voting age may file an amicus curiae brief.
11.3.4.5.1. The Uppermost Cort shall have broad discretion to limit the amount of amici curiae briefs as it deems necessary.
11.3.4.5.2. In proceedings consisting of a Special Respondent, the amicus curiae shall only address issues material to the proceedings that have not been raised by either party, and shall not seek to supplement arguments made by the parties.
11.3.4.5.2.1 Petitioner and Special Respondent may respond to the amicus curiae no later than three days after filing.
11.3.4.5.2.2 The amicus curiae shall not be entitled to file a rebuttal without good cause and leave of the cort.
11.3.4.5.3. In proceedings absent a Special Respondent, the amicus curiae shall only address topics material to the proceeding not previously may addressed but may also, if they so desire, include counter-arguments to the Petitioner.
11.3.4.5.3.1. The Petitioner may, if they choose, respond to that amicus curiae no later than three days after.
11.3.4.5.3.2. The amicus curiae shall not be entitled to file a rebuttal without good cause and leave of the cort.
11.4. A Petition for Resolution shall properly be titled: In the Matter of ________________ (abbreviated to In re: ________________).
11.4.1. Upon hearing the controversy in its entirety, the Uppermost Cort shall issue an order that shall have the binding effect of law equivalent to any other decision decided by the Uppermost Cort.
11.5. The Uppermost Cort may issue a preliminary injunction to prevent the Government or State from taking certain conduct if that conduct could potentially result in criminal charges against individuals performing their duties.
11.5.1. It shall be an affirmative defense for individual acting in their official capacity exercising the responsibilities of their office in accordance with a reasonable understanding of the Organic Law or an inferior law, even if that conduct is found to be contrary to the Organic Law or an inferior law, until such time as the Uppermost Cort agrees to hear the case, issues a preliminary injunction, and/or resolve the controversy.
11.5.1.1. No person shall be held to answer in a court of law or equity for their conduct prior to a preliminary injunction or final order.
Uréu q'estadra så:
Viteu Marcianüs
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Post by Eðo Grischun on Jul 31, 2017 13:13:52 GMT -6
The Good Laws Take Preparation Time Act
WHEREAS if the Hopper system isn't working then we should address that problem; and
WHEREAS having every bill go through two Clarks doesn't actually address fixing a broken Hopper; and
WHEREAS tinkering with the Hopper system (the thing that's arguably broken) rather than the Clark system (the thing that's working fine) might help; so
THEREFORE be it resolved by the Ziu of the Kingdom of Talossa that:
El Lexhatx H.6 which currently reads:
is amended to read:
FUTHERMORE the Ziu resolve that that El lexhatx H.6.1, which currently reads
is amended to read:
Uréu q'estadra så:
Éovart Grischun - Senator, Vuode.
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